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ABSTRACT
FAMILIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHILD THEORY OF
MIND DEVELOPMENT
SEPTEMBER 2022
SARAH A. MCCORMICK, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kirby Deater-Deckard
Theory of mind is a social cognitive domain, reflecting the understanding that internal
mental states motivate outward behavior, that develops rapidly over the preschool time
period. While critical for healthy social development, less is known about the how aspects
of the family environment interact to influence this development or the neural mechanisms
that support it. Several decades of research have demonstrated behaviorally that aspects of
parent behavior and language are associated with theory of mind skill use in early
childhood. Many of the earliest social interactions occur with parents within the family
context and little research to date has examined how household environmental factors may
moderate the associations between parent behavior and language and child theory of mind
development. Aspects of household functioning, such as household chaos, may serve to
disrupt the positive interactions between parents and children that benefit early social
cognitive development. Further, very little is known about the neural mechanisms that
support early theory of mind development and how structural differences in the brain may
be associated with parent language use. My dissertation investigates the interactions
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between aspects of the family and home environment on the behavioral development of
theory of mind and the neural structures that support this skill in early childhood.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Four decades of research has given us great insight into the early development of social
cognition in young children. Of particular interest is theory of mind, an early social
cognitive skill defined as the ability to understand the beliefs, desires, and knowledge of
the self and others (Wellman, 1990). Understanding and attributing these mental states is
essential for successful social interactions, and theory of mind serves as a foundation for
the development of higher order social cognition and other skills (Schurz et al., 2021). In
this dissertation, I will build upon this foundation to investigate how aspects of the family
and home environment interact to influence behavioral theory of mind development and
the neural structures that support theory of mind use in early childhood.
What is Theory of Mind?
Historically, work with non-human primates functioned as an important catalyst for
this field of research. Premack and Woodruff first coined the term ‘theory of mind’ in their
1978 paper researching the ability of the chimpanzee to attribute mental states to other
agents. While the literature on theory of mind skill use in primates since has been mixed,
a key message is that in order to cooperate and succeed socially, primates must be able to
understand and anticipate the goals and intentions of others (Call & Tomasello, 2008).
Researchers take care to note that, while several components of theory of mind exist for
non-human primates, primate theory of mind falls short of human-like representational
theory of mind and differs in several ways. Namely, non-human primates seem to be able
to conceptualize what another individual knows or does not know, and make predictions
based on those representations, but that they are not able to conceptualize what another
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individual believes (Arre & Santos, 2021). Yet, it is likely that socio-ecological contexts
also affect cognitive development in non-human primates, just as it does in humans
(Boesch, 2008). These findings can be useful for understanding theory of mind’s protracted
and contextually dependent development in humans.
Indeed, there is considerable disagreement as to when theory of mind develops in
humans as well as the conceptualization of what theory of mind is. Following the work of
Premack and Woodruff (1978), the earliest definition of theory of mind in humans focused
on false-belief understanding in young children (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), or the ability
of one to understand that another person may hold a belief that is contrary to one’s own
knowledge of reality. In typical versions of this task, children are told a short vignette
where the character does not have a crucial piece of information and therefore possesses a
false belief about the scenario, whereas the child has all of the correct information about
the reality of the scenario. Children are asked to verbally, explicitly share what the
character is thinking or what action they will take. Most children do not reliably pass the
false-belief test before the age of 4 years (see Wellman et al., 2001 for a meta-analysis).
Further, children reach this higher-order false-belief ability through first experiencing a
series of scaffolded understandings: that other people have and act on their own desires,
then that people have and act on their own beliefs, and then that people can only have true
knowledge if they had perceptual access to that knowledge, before realizing that people
can possess incorrect knowledge that leads them to hold a false belief (Wellman & Liu,
2004). These findings are used to support the argument that between 3 and 4 years of age,
there is a critical developmental change in the understanding of the minds of others where
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children are then able to build fundamental representations of other’s mental states,
resulting in theory of mind “coming online”.
This once simple developmental story has become more nuanced in the past decade.
The classic false-belief task relies on the ability of the child to explicitly state their
understanding of the scenario, which some argue requires the use of more complex
executive control and verbal abilities that may mask the presence of earlier existent
conceptual competencies in mental state understanding (Baillargeon et al., 2010). There is
mounting evidence that children younger than 4 years and even infants demonstrate an
understanding of false beliefs on more implicit or indirect measures, including nonverbal
violation-of-expectation paradigms, anticipatory looking experiments, and others (see
Scott & Baillargeon, 2017 for a comprehensive review).
In brief, infant and toddler implicit false-belief understanding was first observed in
a sample of 15-month-olds completing a violation-of-expectation (VoE) task (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005). The VoE task relies on the typical infant behavior to look longer at
events that violate their expectations, and Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) observed that
these infants looked longer during events in which the experimenter held a false belief
about the location of a toy and consequently reached into the wrong box. Using the VOE
paradigm, others have replicated this finding and demonstrated that older infants and
toddlers reliably look significantly longer when observing an experimenter act on a false
belief (e.g. He et al., 2011; Träuble et al., 2010). Similarly, anticipatory looking and
pointing tasks examine if infants visually anticipate or physically point to where an
experimenter with a false belief about the location of an object will look for said object.
Results from these paradigms indicate that infants, 17 months and older, will visually
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anticipate that the experimenter will approach the location they have a false-belief about
(e.g. Meristo et al., 2012; Surian & Geraci, 2012) and infants 18 months and older will
spontaneously point to intervene and inform an experimenter that the object of interest has
been moved (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012a, 2012b; Powell et al., 2017). Three-year-old
children are able to represent false belief understanding through their actions, if not also
explicit words (Rhodes & Brandone, 2014).
Together, these and related findings have been interpreted as indicating that infants
and young children have an implicit theory of mind that allows them to track the mental
representations of other agents and expect them to act on false beliefs, and that an explicit
theory of mind, or a deliberate consideration of other’s mental states, is what develops over
the preschool years. It is suggested that the reason young children fail traditional explicit
false-belief tasks is due to processing and task limitations rather than an inability to
represent false beliefs (Setoh et al., 2016; Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). The scope of this
dissertation is largely limited to exploring the development of explicit false-belief
understanding and theory of mind, but the theories surrounding implicit-to-explicit theory
of mind development are useful for considering what factors might influence this
development over time (Sodian et al., 2020)
One such theory is the developmental enrichment view of theory of mind
development, which posits that theory of mind is rooted in infancy, but involves
developmental change (Sodian et al., 2020). This argues that implicit theory of mind
reflects lower level statistical tracking and understanding of behavior (Ruffman, 2014) that
develops into an explicit theory of mind through experience with and in increasingly
complex social interactions (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Developing a mature understanding
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of other minds is not an immediate, all-or-nothing acquisition and its development is likely
further influenced by a number of contextual factors.
Theory of Mind Development in Context
Several biological and contextual factors are known to influence theory of mind
development across the lifespan. Early work from Hughes and Cutting (1999) originally
demonstrated a strong genetic component of theory of mind, estimating the heritability to
be 67% for a sample of preschool age children. More recent work however, with a
substantially larger sample, contrasts this original finding, suggesting significant
environmental influences on individual differences in theory of mind (Hughes et al., 2005).
This led to work investigating the role of allelic variations in specific genes on theory of
mind abilities, with evidence suggesting that individual differences in the dopamine
receptor D4 gene (DRD4) and the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) both predicted
performance on explicit theory of mind tasks (Lackner et al., 2012; Wu & Su, 2015). This
oxytocin receptor is also associated with early social cognition at 18 months of age (Wade
et al., 2014) and interesting gene by environment (GxE) findings further suggest that
individual differences in OXTR interact with parenting behavior to predict explicit theory
of mind task performance (Wade et al., 2015). In addition to allelic variation, recent work
provides evidence that methylation of OXTR also influences theory of mind and interacts
with parental behavior to predict theory of mind performance (MacKinnon et al., 2019).
Though these findings are somewhat limited in scope, they support the notion that theory
of mind develops as a product of biologically and environmentally based influences
(Hughes et al., 2005).
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Indeed, human development does not occur in a vacuum independent of any
contextual input. The seminal work of Urie Bronfenbrenner emphasized the interactional
nature of human development and introduced a process-person-context-time, or
bioecological, model where individual development occurs within a series of proximal and
distal systems over time. Bronfenbrenner’s theory reflects the idea that most facets of
human development cannot be understood without considering the various environmental
and contextual factors and their interactions with each other (Bronfenbrenner, 1979;
Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). The development of theory of mind and social cognition
is no exception to this theory, detailed in a review by Mizokawa and Komiya (2014).
Research on the environmental influences began three decades ago, with the work
of Dunn and colleagues (1991) examining how parental discussions of mental states (e.g.,
thinking, knowing, believing) was predictive of false belief understanding longitudinally.
Since then, much research has focused on how different aspects of the proximal family
system (e.g., parent language, family size, parent behavior) influence the development of
explicit theory of mind and false belief understanding (Devine & Hughes, 2018).
Within the proximal family system, two of the most widely studied constructs in
relation to theory of mind understanding are parent behavior and parent mental state
language use. With regard to the former, parent behaviors and parenting styles have been
shown to influence children’s abilities to use theory of mind. Harsh parenting and coercive
discipline have been shown to impair explicit theory of mind understanding (Olson et al.,
2011; Pears & Moses, 2003) though evidence suggests this may not always be the case for
boys (Hughes et al., 1999). Sensitive parenting has been shown to be positively associated
with theory of mind development (Cahill et al., 2007; Ereky-Stevens, 2008; Licata et al.,
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2016). However, some studies have found no link between parenting styles and child theory
of mind abilities (Meins et al., 2013; Ruffman et al., 2006; Vinden, 2001). Caregivers’
responses to child social behavior may be critical in facilitating children's social
understanding, though the strength of this influence may be moderated by additional
factors.
Regarding the latter of parent mental state language use, language used by parents
influences the development of theory of mind in early childhood. Parental discussion of
mental states, or the use of mental-state language, (e.g., thinking, knowing, believing) make
these concepts salient to children (Devine & Hughes, 2018; Dunn et al., 1991). Explanatory
discussion of mental states by parents is associated with better concurrent theory of mind
abilities (Peterson & Slaughter, 2003), and scaffolding processes such as distancing,
explanation, and elaboration facilitate and show associations with theory of mind
development as well (Galende et al., 2012), though these effects may vary based on
socioeconomic status (Ebert et al., 2017). References to cognition in infancy and
toddlerhood further predict theory of mind and social understanding later in life (Ensor &
Hughes, 2008; Ensor et al., 2014; Ruffman et al., 2002; Sung & Hsu, 2014), though this
effect is not always observed (Symons et al., 2006). An overall modest positive association
has been found between parental mental-state talk and both concurrent and longitudinal
false-belief understanding (Devine & Hughes, 2018).
These proximal family processes occur within more distal environments, such as
the household environment (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). Aspects of the household
context, like levels of chaos within the home environment, can interfere with the ongoing
interactions between parents and children in the household environment (Evans et al.,
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2005). Household chaos reflects higher levels of noise and crowing in a home as well as
lack of routines and structure (Matheny et al., 1995), and has repeatedly been shown to
negatively impact child development outcomes (Marsh et al., 2020). It is associated with
higher problem behaviors (Coley et al., 2015; Deater-Deckard et al., 2009), poorer
language skills (Vernon-Feagans et al., 2012) and lower executive function skills (VernonFeagans et al., 2016). But little is known about how household chaos might impact theory
of mind development specifically. It is possible that household chaos interferes with the
social interactions between parents and children (Evans et al., 2005), perhaps leading to
decreased social exchanges or decreased predictability of social exchanges within the
home, negatively impacting theory of mind development. Elucidating how family
processes are impacted by daily contextual factors is critical for furthering our
understanding of how theory of mind develops overall and may help us better understand
previous inconsistent findings.
Neural Development Supporting Theory of Mind
The research presented above largely consists of behavioral methods. More
recently, researchers have utilized advances in neuroscience to better understand the
development of neural structures and mechanisms that support theory of mind. Work with
adults using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has consistently demonstrated
that the bilateral temporal parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
are engaged while using theory of mind during versions of false belief tasks (see Schurz et
al., 2014 for meta-analyses). These findings are further replicated in adolescents and
school-age children (5-12 years; Gweon et al., 2012; Saxe et al., 2009). Activity in the
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brain regions associated with theory of mind use appears to become more specified as
children get older.
The measurement constraints of fMRI can make it considerably more difficult to
replicate findings in very young children. In these cases, alternative psychophysiological
measures such as electroencephalogram (EEG/ERP) or functional near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIRS) are essential for elucidating activity and processes associated with
social cognition. Even so, studies examining concurrent neural or physiological activity in
preschool-aged children (3- to 5-years of age) or younger remain scarce. The limited
research available shows that individual differences in EEG alpha activity localized to the
dorsal MPFC and right TPJ are associated with better theory of mind performance
(Sabbagh et al., 2009). Interestingly, Hyde and colleagues show that the TPJ is activated
during passive viewing of false-belief scenarios, a measure of implicit theory of mind, in
7-month-old infants (Hyde et al., 2018) though no activation in the mPFC was observed.
These findings provide support for the existence of early implicit false belief understanding
present even in infancy.
Importantly, there have been two recent studies using resting state fMRI measures
in conjunction with behavioral theory of mind performance. By examining the neural
correlates of parent-reported theory of mind for 4- to 8-year-old children, researchers found
that connectivity between the right and left TPJ and the mPFC were related to components
of parent-reported theory of mind (Xiao et al., 2019). The second study examined white
matter connectivity of 3- to 4-year-old children in relation to behavioral performance on
implicit and explicit false-belief tasks and found age-related changes in white matter in
regions shown to be associated with false belief understanding (TPJ, mPFC: Grosse
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Wiesmann et al., 2017). The associations with white matter development were specific for
the emergence of explicit false belief understanding, independent of implicit false belief
understanding. Understanding white matter and functional connectivity will be very
important to the study of social cognition broadly and the function of the social brain
network (Wang & Olson, 2018; Wang et al., 2018).
Grosse Wiesmann and colleagues (2017) further show that explicit false belief
understanding was specifically related to the degree of which the TPJ connected to the
anterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) through the arcuate fasciculus (AF), two areas heavily
involved in language (Friederici, 2009). In older children and adults, gains in language
abilities are associated with changes in white matter structures (Keller & Just, 2009;
Yeatman et al., 2012). This is observed in preschool age children as well (Walton et al.,
2017). The development of white matter tracts may further be environmentally influenced
by the amount of adult-child conversational experience, evidenced by associations between
greater exposure to dialectic interaction and stronger, more coherent white matter
connectivity in the AF and the IFG (Romeo et al., 2018).
Taken together, these findings suggest a robust theory of mind network in the brain
whose origins may even be present in infancy. It appears likely that functional changes in
connectivity in the brain between critical brain regions involved in social cognition are
fundamentally involved in the maturation of explicit theory of mind understanding in early
childhood. Given the important roles that brain development and experience individually
play in theory of mind acquisition, it is vital to consider how experience may be interacting
with neural function to influence theory of mind development. But, to date, no work has
examined the influence of the parental language environment in relation to the neural
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structures associated with theory of mind development. Similar to behavioral work
examining theory of mind outcomes, it may be that greater exposure to mental-state
language during social interactions supports the structural maturation of these brain regions
and the connectivity between them.
Brief Overview of Dissertation
Theory of mind is a social cognitive domain reflecting the understanding that
internal mental states motivate outward behavior. While critical for healthy social
development, less is known about the how aspects of the family environment interact to
influence this development or the neural mechanisms that support it. Several decades of
research have demonstrated behaviorally that aspects of parent behavior and language are
associated with theory of mind skill use in early childhood (Cahill et al., 2007; Devine &
Hughes, 2018; Hughes et al., 1999; Licata et al., 2016). A developmental enrichment view
of shared intentionality would indeed suggest that rich social and communicative
interactions with others would influence growth of theory of mind in early development
(Sodian et al., 2020; Tomasello, 2018). Many of the earliest social interactions occur with
parents within the proximal family context (Devine & Hughes, 2018) and little research to
date has examined how more distal household environmental factors may moderate the
associations between parent behavior and language and child theory of mind development.
Aspects of household functioning, such as household chaos, may serve to disrupt the
positive interactions between parents and children that benefit social cognitive
development (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000). Further, very little is known about the
neural mechanisms that support early theory of mind development and how structural
differences in the brain may be associated with parent language use.
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Investigating how familial and environmental factors interact as well as the neural
development can begin to answer important questions about theory of mind development.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 investigate how the home environment may disrupt the beneficial
interactions between children and caregivers, impacting theory of mind. Specifically,
Chapter 2 investigates how household chaos, indexed by clutter and crowding, may
disrupt the known positive association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of
mind (N = 250 3.5-year-old children). Chapter 3 builds on those findings to investigate
how the bidirectional relationship between parents and children may be related to theory
of mind development, and how household chaos may further disrupt this association as
well (N = 88 dyads of fathers and their 3- to 5-year-old children). Chapter 4 explores this
further and examines more specifically how parental mental state language (i.e. references
to mental states) during these dyadic interactions is associated with theory of mind
development in childhood, and if household chaos impacts this association as well (N = 88
dyads of fathers and their 3- to 5-year-old children).
Chapter 5 will explore the development of brain regions commonly associated
with theory of mind and investigate if parental mental state language input is associated
with structural differences in brain regions known to be involved in theory of mind
development (N = 212 3- to 11-year-old children). The dissertation ends with a Chapter
6: General Discussion and Conclusion, which synthesizes the results of these studies and
suggests directions for future research.

12

REFERENCES
Arre, A. M., & Santos, L. R. (2021). Mentalizing in Nonhuman Primates. The Neural
Basis of Mentalizing, 131-147. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51890-5_7
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in
infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(3), 110-118.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006
Boesch, C. (2008). Taking development and ecology seriously when comparing
cognition: Reply to Tomasello and Call (2008). Journal of Comparative
Psychology, 122(4), 453-455. https://doi.org/10.1037/0735-7036.122.4.453
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human development. Harvard University
Press.
Bronfenbrenner, U., & Evans, G. W. (2000). Developmental science in the 21st century:
Emerging questions, theoretical models, research designs and empirical
findings. Social Development, 9(1), 115-125.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00114
Bronfenbrenner, U., & Morris, P. A. (2006). The bioecological model of human
development. Handbook of Child Psychology.
Cahill, K. R., Deater‐Deckard, K., Pike, A., & Hughes, C. (2007). Theory of Mind, self‐
worth and the mother–child relationship. Social Development, 16(1), 45-56.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00371.x
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years
later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5), 187-192.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010

13

Coley, R. L., Lynch, A. D., & Kull, M. (2015). Early exposure to environmental chaos
and children's physical and mental health. Early Childhood Research
Quarterly, 32, 94-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecresq.2015.03.001
Deater‐Deckard, K., Mullineaux, P. Y., Beekman, C., Petrill, S. A., Schatschneider, C., &
Thompson, L. A. (2009). Conduct problems, IQ, and household chaos: A
longitudinal multi‐informant study. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 50(10), 1301-1308. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2009.02108.x
Devine, R. T., & Hughes, C. (2014). Relations between false belief understanding and
executive function in early childhood: A meta‐analysis. Child
Development, 85(5), 1777-1794. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12237
Devine, R. T., & Hughes, C. (2018). Family correlates of false belief understanding in
early childhood: A meta‐analysis. Child Development, 89(3), 971-987.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12682
Dunn, J., Brown, J., Slomkowski, C., Tesla, C., & Youngblade, L. (1991). Young
children's understanding of other people's feelings and beliefs: Individual
differences and their antecedents. Child Development, 62(6), 1352-1366.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1991.tb01610.x
Ebert, S., Peterson, C., Slaughter, V., & Weinert, S. (2017). Links among parents’ mental
state language, family socioeconomic status, and preschoolers’ theory of mind
development. Cognitive Development, 44, 32-48.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.08.005

14

Ensor, R., & Hughes, C. (2008). Content or connectedness? Mother–child talk and early
social understanding. Child Development, 79(1), 201-216.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01120.x
Ensor, R., Devine, R. T., Marks, A., & Hughes, C. (2014). Mothers' cognitive references
to 2‐year‐olds predict theory of mind at ages 6 and 10. Child Development, 85(3),
1222-1235. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12186
Ereky‐Stevens, K. (2008). Associations between mothers' sensitivity to their infants'
internal states and children's later understanding of mind and emotion. Infant and
Child Development, 17(5), 527-543. https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.572
Evans, G. W., Gonnella, C., Marcynyszyn, L. A., Gentile, L., & Salpekar, N. (2005). The
role of chaos in poverty and children's socioemotional adjustment. Psychological
Science, 16(7), 560-565. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01575.x
Friederici, A. D. (2009). Pathways to language: fiber tracts in the human brain. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 175-181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.001
Galende, N., de Miguél, M. S., & Arranz, E. (2012). The role of parents’ distancing
strategies in the development of five-year-old children’s theory of mind. Early
Child Development and Care, 182(2), 207-220.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03004430.2011.553676
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Disla, D., Steinbeis, N., & Singer, T. (2018).
Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds’ but not 2-and 3-year-olds’ false beliefrelated action anticipation. Cognitive Development, 46, 58-68.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.08.007
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Schreiber, J., Singer, T., Steinbeis, N., & Friederici, A. D. (2017).

15

White matter maturation is associated with the emergence of Theory of Mind in
early childhood. Nature Communications, 8, 14692.
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms14692
Gweon, H., Dodell‐Feder, D., Bedny, M., & Saxe, R. (2012). Theory of mind
performance in children correlates with functional specialization of a brain region
for thinking about thoughts. Child Development, 83(6), 1853-1868.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01829.x
He, Z., Bolz, M., & Baillargeon, R. (2011). False‐belief understanding in 2.5‐year‐olds:
evidence from violation‐of‐expectation change‐of‐location and unexpected‐
contents tasks. Developmental Science, 14(2), 292-305.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00980.x
Hughes, C., & Cutting, A. L. (1999). Nature, nurture, and individual differences in early
understanding of mind. Psychological Science, 10(5), 429-432.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00181
Hughes, C., Deater‐Deckard, K., & Cutting, A. L. (1999). ‘Speak roughly to your little
boy’? Sex differences in the relations between parenting and preschoolers’
understanding of mind. Social Development, 8(2), 143-160.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00088
Hughes, C., Jaffee, S. R., Happé, F., Taylor, A., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. E. (2005).
Origins of individual differences in theory of mind: From nature to nurture? Child
Development, 76(2), 356-370.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.00850_a.x

16

Hyde, D. C., Simon, C. E., Ting, F., & Nikolaeva, J. I. (2018). Functional Organization of
the Temporal–Parietal Junction for Theory of Mind in Preverbal Infants: A NearInfrared Spectroscopy Study. Journal of Neuroscience, 38(18), 4264-4274.
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0264-17.2018
Keller, T. A., & Just, M. A. (2009). Altering cortical connectivity: remediation-induced
changes in the white matter of poor readers. Neuron, 64(5), 624-631.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2009.10.018
Knudsen, B., & Liszkowski, U. (2012a). Eighteen‐and 24‐month‐old infants correct
others in anticipation of action mistakes. Developmental Science, 15(1), 113-122.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01098.x
Knudsen, B., & Liszkowski, U. (2012b). 18‐month‐olds predict specific action mistakes
through attribution of false belief, not ignorance, and intervene
accordingly. Infancy, 17(6), 672-691.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2011.00105.x
Lackner, C., Sabbagh, M. A., Hallinan, E., Liu, X., & Holden, J. J. (2012). Dopamine
receptor D4 gene variation predicts preschoolers’ developing theory of
mind. Developmental Science, 15(2), 272-280.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01124.x
Licata, M., Kristen, S., & Sodian, B. (2016). Mother–child interaction as a cradle of
theory of mind: the role of maternal emotional availability. Social
Development, 25(1), 139-156. https://doi.org/10.1111/sode.12131
MacKinnon, A. L., Feeley, N., Gold, I., Hayton, B., King, L., Nagy, C., ... & Zelkowitz,
P. (2019). The interaction between oxytocin receptor gene methylation and

17

maternal behavior on children's early theory of mind abilities. Development and
Psychopathology, 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579419000257
Marsh, S., Dobson, R., & Maddison, R. (2020). The relationship between household
chaos and child, parent, and family outcomes: A systematic scoping review. BMC
Public Health, 20(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-08587-8
Matheny, A.P., Wachs, T.D., Ludwig, J.L., & Phillips, K. (1995). Bringing order out of
chaos: Psychometric characteristics of the Confusion, Hubbub, and Order Scale.
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 16, 429–444.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0193-3973(95)90028-4
Meristo, M., Morgan, G., Geraci, A., Iozzi, L., Hjelmquist, E., Surian, L., & Siegal, M.
(2012). Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants. Developmental
Science, 15(5), 633-640. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01155.x
Mizokawa, A., & Komiya, A. (2014). Social ecology and theory of
mind. Psychologia, 57(2), 133-151. https://doi.org/10.2117/psysoc.2014.133
Olson, S. L., Lopez-Duran, N., Lunkenheimer, E. S., Chang, H., & Sameroff, A. J.
(2011). Individual differences in the development of early peer aggression:
Integrating contributions of self-regulation, theory of mind and
parenting. Development and Psychopathology, 23, 253–266.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579410000775
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false
beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255-258. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621
Pears, K. C., & Moses, L. J. (2003). Demographics, parenting, and theory of mind in

18

Preschool children. Social Development, 12(1), 1-20.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00219
Peterson, C., & Slaughter, V. (2003). Opening windows into the mind: Mothers’
preferences for mental state explanations and children’s theory of mind. Cognitive
Development, 18(3), 399-429. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(03)00041-8
Powell, L. J., Hobbs, K., Bardis, A., Carey, S., & Saxe, R. (2018). Replications of
implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands. Cognitive
Development, 46, 40-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.004
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of
mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515-526.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512
Rhodes, M., & Brandone, A. C. (2014). Three-year-olds’ theories of mind in actions and
words. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 263. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00263
Romeo, R. R., Segaran, J., Leonard, J. A., Robinson, S. T., West, M. R., Mackey, A. P.,
Yendiki, A., Rowe, M.L., & Gabrieli, J. D. (2018). Language exposure relates to
structural neural connectivity in childhood. Journal of Neuroscience, 38(36),
7870-7877. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0484-18.2018
Ruffman, T. (2014). To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind. Developmental
Review, 34(3), 265-293. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2014.04.001
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002). The relation between children’s and
mothers’ mental state language and theory-of-mind understanding. Child
Development, 73, 734–751. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00435
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., Devitt, K., & Crowe, E. (2006). What mothers say and what they

19

do: The relationship between parenting, theory of mind, language and
conflict/cooperation. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 24, 105–124.
https://doi.org/10.1348/026151005X82848
Sabbagh, M. A., Bowman, L. C., Evraire, L. E., & Ito, J. M. (2009). Neurodevelopmental
correlates of theory of mind in preschool children. Child Development, 80(4),
1147-1162. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01322.x
Saxe, R. R., Whitfield‐Gabrieli, S., Scholz, J., & Pelphrey, K. A. (2009). Brain regions
for perceiving and reasoning about other people in school‐aged children. Child
Development, 80(4), 1197-1209.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01325.x
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). Fractionating
theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging
studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 42, 9-34.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Tholen, M. G., Maliske, L., Margulies, D. S., Mars, R. B., . . . Kanske, P.
(2021). Toward a hierarchical model of social cognition: A neuroimaging meta-analysis
and integrative review of empathy and theory of mind. Psychological Bulletin, 147(3),
293-327. http://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000303
Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2017). Early false-belief understanding. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 21(4), 237-249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.012
Setoh, P., Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2016). Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a

20

traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 113(47), 13360-13365.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1609203113
Sodian, B., Kristen‐Antonow, S., & Kloo, D. (2020). How does children’s theory of mind
become explicit? A review of longitudinal findings. Child Development
Perspectives, 14(3), 171-177. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12381
Sung, J., & Hsu, H. C. (2014). Collaborative mother–toddler communication and theory
of mind development at age 4. Journal of Applied Developmental
Psychology, 35(5), 381-391. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2014.06.001
Surian, L., & Geraci, A. (2012). Where will the triangle look for it? Attributing false
beliefs to a geometric shape at 17 months. British Journal of Developmental
Psychology, 30(1), 30-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02046.x
Symons, D. K., Fossum, K. L. M., & Collins, T. K. (2006). A longitudinal study of belief
and desire state discourse during mother–child play and later false belief
understanding. Social Development, 15(4), 676-692.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2006.00364.x
Tomasello, M. (2018). How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared
intentionality account. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(34),
8491-8498. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804761115
Träuble, B., Marinović, V., & Pauen, S. (2010). Early theory of mind competencies: Do
infants understand others’ beliefs? Infancy, 15(4), 434-444.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2009.00025.x
Vernon-Feagans, L., Garrett-Peters, P., Willoughby, M., Mills-Koonce, R., & Family

21

Life Project Key Investigators. (2012). Chaos, poverty, and parenting: Predictors
of early language development. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 27(3), 339351. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecresq.2011.11.001
Vernon-Feagans, L., Willoughby, M., & Garrett-Peters, P. (2016). Predictors of
behavioral regulation in kindergarten: Household chaos, parenting, and early
executive functions. Developmental Psychology, 52(3), 430.
https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000087
Vinden, P. (2001). Parenting attitudes and children’s understanding of mind: A
comparison of Korean-American and Anglo-American families. Cognitive
Development, 16, 793–809. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(01)00059-4
Wade, M., Hoffmann, T. J., Wigg, K., & Jenkins, J. M. (2014). Association between the
oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene and children's social cognition at 18
months. Genes, Brain and Behavior, 13(7), 603-610.
https://doi.org/10.1111/gbb.12148
Wade, M., Hoffmann, T. J., & Jenkins, J. M. (2015). Gene–environment interaction
between the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene and parenting behaviour on
children’s theory of mind. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10(12),
1749-1757. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv064
Walton, M., Dewey, D., & Lebel, C. (2018). Brain white matter structure and language
ability in preschool-aged children. Brain and Language, 176, 19-25.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2017.10.008
Wang, Y., & Olson, I. R. (2018). The original social network: white matter and social
cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22(6), 504-516.

22

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.03.005
Wang, Y., Metoki, A., Alm, K. H., & Olson, I. R. (2018). White matter pathways and
social cognition. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 90, 350-370.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.015
Wellman, H. (1990). Children's theories of mind. Bradford/MIT Press, Cambridge, USA.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta‐analysis of theory‐of‐mind
development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655-684.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory‐of‐mind tasks. Child
Development, 75(2), 523-541. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.x
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining
function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of
deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103-128.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5
Wu, N., & Su, Y. (2015). Oxytocin receptor gene relates to theory of mind and prosocial
behavior in children. Journal of Cognition and Development, 16(2), 302-313.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2013.858042
Xiao, Y., Geng, F., Riggins, T., Chen, G., & Redcay, E. (2019). Neural correlates of
developing theory of mind competence in early childhood. NeuroImage, 184,
707-716. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.09.079
Yeatman, J. D., Dougherty, R. F., Ben-Shachar, M., & Wandell, B. A. (2012).
Development of white matter and reading skills. Proceedings of the National

23

Academy of Sciences, 109(44), E3045-E3053.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206792109

24

CHAPTER 2
HOUSEHOLD CLUTTER AND CROWDING CONSTRAIN ASSOCIATIONS
BETWEEN MATERNAL SENSITIVITY AND CHILD THEORY OF MIND
Theory of mind is defined as the ability to understand the beliefs, desires, and
knowledge of the self and others (Wellman, 1990). This mentalizing ability is critical for
the development of healthy social cognition and develops rapidly between the ages of 3
and 5 years (Wellman et al., 2001), and is rooted in both cognitive and social influences.
With regards to the latter, individual differences in theory of mind abilities have been
linked to aspects of the home, family, and broader cultural context (i.e., Cahill et al., 2007;
Cutting & Dunn, 1999; see Devine & Hughes, 2018, for meta-analyses; Hughes et al.,
2017; Shahaeian et al., 2014). There may further be factors of the daily household
environment that can disrupt ongoing proximal processes between the child and their
caregivers and other social partners (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000), impacting theory of
mind development. This disruption is typically investigated by examining the environment
as a moderator of the link between parenting and child behavior (Marsh et al., 2020). The
current study will seek to examine the moderating role of the household environment on
associations between parental sensitivity and theory of mind abilities.
Parental Sensitivity
Early social interactions between parents and children serve as an important
foundation for children to acquire theory of mind (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Hughes &
Devine, 2015; Devine & Hughes, 2018). Parental sensitivity, reflecting warmth,
availability, and attentive and appropriate responses to the child, during social interactions
is particularly critical (Ainsworth et al., 1978; DeWolfe & van IJzendoorn, 1997; Lamb &
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Easterbrooks, 1981). Parents who are sensitive and respond appropriately to their child’s
needs might facilitate early theory of mind development. Namely, by providing predictable
and appropriate responses, the behavior of others may become more meaningful, and may
help the child become better at understanding mental states (Ensor & Hughes, 2008;
Fonagy & Target, 1997; Licata et al., 2016). Additionally, insensitive, inconsistent, or
unpredictable interactions with caregivers may put an increased cognitive demand on
developing emotion regulation systems, potentially leaving the child with limited resources
to focus on mental state understanding (Fonagy & Target, 1997; Licata et al., 2016).
Several studies have shown that sensitive parenting (largely limited to maternal
sensitivity) is associated with theory of mind development, and this has been observed both
concurrently (Cahill et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 1999) and longitudinally (Ereky-Stevens,
2008; Licata et al., 2016; Symons & Clark, 2000). However, this association between
maternal sensitivity and theory of mind has not always been observed. Meins and
colleagues did not observe an association between maternal sensitivity in infancy (8months) and theory of mind in preschool (51-months; Meins et al., 2015). Additional
studies have found no link between warm, sensitive parental interaction styles and child
theory of mind abilities (Ruffman et al., 2006; Vinden, 2001). Aspects of the surrounding
home environment, especially those that might impact the predictability or quality of
parent-child interactions, might account for some of the variability in this observed
association.
Housing Environment
Aspects of the larger environmental context can interfere with the proximal
processes that occur between parents and children (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). One
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example of this context is “chaos”, a broad construct combining housing conditions
(clutter, crowding, and traffic), predictability and routines, and noise levels. Research has
shown that household chaos impacts socioemotional development (Bronfenbrenner &
Evans, 2000; Coldwell et al., 2006; Evans & Wachs, 2009; Marsh et al., 2020) and is a
chronic stressor that often (Evans et al., 2005) but not always (Valiente et al., 2007)
accompanies poverty and low socioeconomic status.
Two

major

facets

of

household

chaos

are

cleanliness/clutter

and

crowding/“people traffic”. Across the globe, these aspects of the physical environment of
the home are known to influence cognitive and socioemotional development (see Ferguson
et al., 2013 for a comprehensive review). After controlling for correlated factors (e.g.,
socioeconomic status), the cleanliness and clutter of a child’s home has been associated
with greater child conduct problems (Deater-Deckard et al., 2009), lower child educational
attainment (Dunifon et al., 2001), and higher rates of child internalizing behaviors (Eamon,
2000). Crowding in the home, often indexed as number of people per room, has also been
associated with several negative outcomes. These include greater conduct problems
(Deater-Deckard et al., 2009), increased levels of social withdrawal (Liddell & Kruger,
1989), greater problems at school (Evans et al., 2002), and poorer executive function skills
(Vernon-Feagans et al., 2016). The link between crowding and executive functioning is
particularly interesting, given the importance of executive function for the development of
theory of mind (Benson et al., 2013; Devine & Hughes, 2014), and may suggest that
crowding may have a similar detrimental impact on emerging theory of mind abilities.
Crowding has also been found to contribute to psychological distress in adults (Ross et al.,
2000) and to disrupt parent – child interactions (Evans, 2006; Wachs & Corapci, 2003).
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Relatively few studies have investigated the role that clutter and crowding in the
housing environment may play in the development of child theory of mind. However, one
recent study involving a sample of father-preschooler dyads examined how household
chaos moderated associations between the closely related construct of dyadic mutuality
and child theory of mind and found that the positive associations between dyadic mutuality
and child theory of mind were only observed at lower levels of household chaos
(McCormick et al., 2021). These findings support the theory that an unclean, cluttered, and
crowded housing environment may interfere with the proximal socialization processes that
occur continuously between parents/caregivers and their children within their immediate
environment throughout human development (Evans et al., 2005). More broadly, a chaotic
home environment is less predictable and more stressful. In such contexts, lower levels of
predictability and social exchanges with parents may negatively impact the link between
parent behavior and child theory of mind, limiting the child’s ability to fully develop the
skills necessary for understanding other’s minds. Examining how physical aspects of the
home environment can attenuate associations between parental sensitivity and theory of
mind development is critical for informing potential intervention work.
Socioeconomic Status
Socioeconomic status (SES) is a multifaceted construct that encompasses parent
income, occupation, and/or educational attainment (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). While early
theory of mind research often only included data from middle- to upper-class samples,
reducing any observable influence of SES (Hughes, 2005), a recent meta-analysis of fifty
studies demonstrates a significant positive association between SES and theory of mind
development, specifically false belief understanding (Devine & Hughes, 2018). These
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findings suggest that children from higher SES families consistently perform better on false
belief tasks. Another recent meta-analysis suggests that SES shows small to moderate
positive associations with parental sensitivity (Booth et al., 2018). Further, aspects of
household chaos are thought to serve as an index of family functioning distinct from SES
(Deater-Deckard et al., 2012; Dumas et al., 2005; Lecheile et al., 2020; McCormick et al.,
2021; Pike et al., 2006), and while correlated, one is not merely a stand-in for the other.
Household chaos is still associated with child behavioral development in ‘middle-class’
samples as well as over and above SES when SES is controlled for in statistical models
(Wachs & Evans, 2010). SES and aspects of chaos may moderate the associations between
parental sensitivity and child theory of mind differently, and both need to be examined in
tandem.
Current Study
The current study will examine if physical aspects of chaos in the housing
environment—operationalized as high levels of crowding and clutter—moderate the
association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind. We expect to find that
higher levels of maternal sensitivity are positively associated with stronger theory of mind
abilities in early childhood. Additionally, we expect that associations between maternal
sensitivity and theory of mind abilities will vary depending on the housing environment.
Specifically, the association between maternal sensitivity and theory of mind is expected
to be strongest in families with the least crowded and cluttered housing, and weakest in
families with the highest levels of crowding and clutter, controlling for child sex and family
SES. Further, because of the well-established association between greater crowding and
clutter in lower-SES households, and the known link between SES and theory of mind
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development, we also included SES as a moderator in addition to a covariate, to test
whether the hypothesized effects were specific to crowding/clutter. We expect to find that
the association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind varies depending on
family SES, specifically that it is stronger in higher SES families, controlling for child sex
and housing environment.
Method
Participants
Participants included 250 children comprised of 125 same-sex twin pairs (59%
female, 51% monozygotic, Mage = 43 months, SD = 0.82 months, range = 42 months to 45
months). While young, we would still expect considerable variability in early theory of
mind abilities in this age-range (e.g., Cahill et al., 2007; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Families
were recruited through hospital birth records and twin clubs in metropolitan London and
other areas of southern and central England. The majority of families were White (93%),
which reflects the greater population of England around the time of data collection (Office
of Population Censuses & Surveys, 1991). Approximately half of the mothers and fathers
had the equivalent of a high-school diploma or less (56.9% of mothers and 46.9% of
fathers), about one-third (33.3% of mothers and 38.9% of fathers) had college degrees and
the remaining parents (9.8% of mothers and 14.2% of fathers) had postgraduate degrees.
A small percentage of parents chose not to indicate educational levels (1.6% of mothers
and 9.6% of fathers). Participating families had two residential parents, and the families
lived in a variety of housing types, including council housing (8.8%), flats/shared houses
(2.4%), terraced/semi-detached housing (46.4%), detached housing (25.6%), or another
housing type (16.8%).
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Participants were identical and fraternal twin pairs, but the current study did not
employ the classic twin design in answering our research questions. We know from
previous research that while theory of mind appears to be highly heritable in the preschool
years, it also appears that nonshared environmental factors still play an important role
(Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Hughes et al., 2005). The presence of twin-pairs in the data set
will result in non-independent observations (i.e. two children per family), and methods for
dealing with this will be described in the data analysis section.
Procedure
Children and their primary caregiver (the mother in all but five families) visited the
laboratory and participated in a home visit soon after (approximately one month). Theory
of mind measures were administered during the laboratory visit and parental warmth and
responsiveness and household disorganization was measured immediately following the
home visit. The home visit took approximately 90 minutes and involved two 10-minute
structured play tasks between parents and each of their children, a free play task and an
etch-a-sketch drawing task (Deater-Deckard & Petrill, 2004, Helm et al., 2020, StevensonHinde & Shouldice, 1995). The two researchers on the home visit completed a modified
version of the Post-Visit Inventory of parenting behavior (Deater-Deckard, 2000; Dodge
et al., 1986). The same two researchers completed the laboratory and home visit for a given
family. Procedures were approved by the ethics board of King’s College, London.
Measures
Theory of Mind. Theory of mind ability was assessed using a battery of eight falsebelief tasks and two deception tasks that have been shown to yield highly reliable
individual difference scores representing overall mentalizing ability (Cahill et al., 2007;
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Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Hughes et al., 1999; Hughes et al., 2000). Methods described
here are identical to those presented by Hughes and Cutting (1999) and Cahill and
colleagues (2007). Four of the false-belief tasks involved unexpected locations. In these
tasks, either the anticipated contents of one container (e.g., cereal box) were shown to be
in a different container, or a puppet moved an object while another puppet was not present
to observe the action. For each of these, children had to state where the puppet would search
for an object and explain why the puppet looked in the wrong location while referring to
the puppet’s false belief. Two additional false-belief tasks involved unexpected identity.
Children were asked to attribute a false belief to a puppet as well as recall their own false
belief. The remaining two false-belief tasks showed a puppet receiving a good or bad
surprise. These tasks required children to attribute a false belief to the puppet as well as to
predict and explain how the puppet would have felt before the surprise.
All of the false-belief questions were asked in a counterbalanced, forced-choice
format. To receive credit for a correct response, children first had to respond correctly to
memory and reality control questions. Altogether, each child was presented with 14 test
questions, and one point was awarded for each correctly answered question, with the
possibility of one or two additional bonus points would be awarded for spontaneous false
belief explanations in two of the tasks. Therefore, the maximum possible score for falsebelief tasks was 16.
The two deception tasks were a box and puppet game and a penny hiding game
(Sodian & Frith, 1992). In the box and puppet game, there were four counterbalanced trials:
non-verbal/verbal co-operation with a friendly puppet (i.e. by opening a locked box or by
telling the puppet the box was open), and non-verbal/ verbal competition with a nasty
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puppet (i.e. locking the box or falsely telling the puppet that the box was locked). Children
scored 2 points for success on all four test trials, 1 point if they succeeded on the nonverbal
trials only, and no points for any other pattern of performance. In the penny hiding game
the researcher showed the child how to trick someone by showing a penny and then hiding
it behind her back, then bringing the hands forward and asking the child to guess which
hand held the penny. After three trials, the child was invited to play the game several times
with the researcher, and received one point if successful on one trial, and two points if
successful on at least two trials. Thus, the maximum score for the deception tasks was four.
The final maximum total score across the 10 combined false-belief and deception tasks was
20. The composite scores were internally consistent ( = .83).
Maternal Sensitivity. The two researchers on the home visit completed five
globally rated items (5-point Likert-type scales) from the modified Post-Visit Inventory
(Deater-Deckard, 2000) immediately following the home visit: maternal warmth (1= cold,
unfriendly, 5= warm, affectionate), mother–child relationship (1= hostile, negative, 5=
warm, positive), how well mother knows her own children (1= not very well, 5= very well),
and enjoyment of parenting (1= none at all, 5= a lot). Inter-rater agreement was >.7. These
first four items were substantially correlated (r(114) = .72 to .84, p’s > .001) and were
averaged into a general maternal warmth composite ( = .85). The fifth item assessed
general maternal negativity by rating how often the mother shouted at the children (1= not
at all, 5= a lot;  = .60). For the current study, a new composite score was created including
the general maternal warmth composite and the general maternal negativity score, reverse
coded. This score was then standardized to create a composite score for maternal
sensitivity, where higher scores indicate higher levels of observed sensitivity.
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Housing Environment: Clutter and Crowding. The two researchers on the home
visit rated several aspects of housing conditions using a modified version of the Post-Visit
Inventory, or PVI (Deater-Deckard, 2000; Dodge et al., 1986), including crowding and
clutter (Deater-Deckard et al., 2009). Inter-rater agreement was >.7. Crowding was
computed as the number of residents per room (excluding bathrooms) in the home. Clutter
was rated using a 5-point Likert-type scale for two items regarding the areas inside and
outside the home: How clean was the inside of the home? (1 = Very clean, no bugs, bad
smells, clutter, etc.: 3 = Somewhat clean, nothing unhealthy, but some clutter; 5 = Very
dirty, many bugs, bad smells, trash, clutter) and How clean was the area outside of the
home? (1 = Very clean, no bad smells, trash, etc.: 3 = Somewhat clean, nothing unhealthy,
but some trash; 5 = Very dirty, lots of trash, bad smells). Indicators for crowding and clutter
were standardized and averaged for all participants that had at least one indicator available
to create a score for housing environment ( = .64). Higher scores indicate higher levels of
clutter and crowding in the housing environment.
Socioeconomic Status. Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured using mother’s
and father’s education level and occupational class. Income information was not available
for this sample. Three categories of parental occupational class (Office of Population
Censuses & Surveys, 1991) were identified: (i) skilled/unskilled manual/non-manual
(42.4% of fathers, 44.6% of mothers): (ii) managerial or technical (55.8% of fathers, 52.9%
of mothers); (iii) professional (1.8% of fathers, 2.5% of mothers). Education was also
classified into three levels: (i) A-level (the British equivalent of a high school diploma) or
lower (46.9% of fathers, 56.9% of mothers); (ii) undergraduate degrees (38.9% of fathers,
33.3% of mothers); (iii) post-graduate degrees (14.2% of fathers, 9.8% of mothers). A
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principal components analysis of these four indicators yielded a single SES factor with
factor loadings >.79 that explained 70% of the variance. These four indicators were
standardized and averaged to yield a single SES composite, with higher scores
corresponding to higher SES.
Covariate. Child sex was included as a covariate, with female coded as 0 and male
as 1.
Data analysis plan.
The current study includes non-independent observations (i.e. two children per
family). We first tested the hypotheses using the full sample. Analyses were then internally
replicated by analyzing the data again after randomly assigning each twin to two different
samples (so that each sample had only one child per family in it), an approach that has been
used before (Cahill et al., 2007). Only families with complete data on all variables were
used in analyses. Ten families were missing data on maternal sensitivity, nine were missing
data for housing environment, two were missing data about SES, and twelve children total
were missing data on theory of mind tasks for a valid N of 222 families in the full sample
and 111 families in each replication sample. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations
were computed to understand patterns of variance in and covariance between the study
variables and covariates (Table 1).
To test the hypothesized main effect of maternal sensitivity on child theory of mind,
and potential moderating effects of crowding/clutter and SES on the association between
maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind, we estimated a hierarchical multiple
regression equation (Model 2 (Hayes, 2013); standardized (z) variables provided meancentered statistical predictors) to explain variance in child theory of mind scores: Step One:
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child sex (Male = 1, Female = 0), SES (z), maternal sensitivity (z), crowding/clutter in
household environment (z); Step Two: maternal sensitivity X household environment (z),
maternal sensitivity X SES (z) (Table 2). Significant two-way interactions will be probed
using simple slopes (Schubert & Jacoby, 2004).
Results
We first estimated the zero-order Pearson correlations between the study variables
(see Table 1). For the total sample, maternal sensitivity was negatively correlated with the
housing environment and positively correlated with SES and child theory of mind. The
housing environment was also negatively correlated with SES and child theory of mind.
SES was positively correlated with child theory of mind. Similar patterns were seen in the
two random subsamples, although the p-values were larger because of the decrease in
sample size.
Using hierarchical multiple regression (see Table 2), the first step of the equation
explained 30.9% of the variance in child theory of mind, F(4,221) = 5.725, p < .001). There
was a significant main effect of maternal sensitivity, such that higher maternal sensitivity
was associated with better child theory of mind performance, controlling for other
variables. There was also a significant main effect of housing environment, where more
highly crowded and cluttered housing environments were associated with lower child
theory of mind scores. The final full equation for the full sample explained 37.5% of the
variance in child theory of mind, F(6, 221) = 5.880, p < .001. There were significant
interactions between both household environment and maternal sensitivity ( = -.138, p =
.043), as well as SES and maternal sensitivity ( = .147, p = .047) in statistically predicting
child theory of mind, controlling for other variables. This pattern of results for both the
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regression and simple slopes analyses held with internal replication, though the p-values
increased due to the decrease in sample size (Table 3). In the first half sample, the
interaction between household environment and maternal sensitivity was not observed to
be significant ( = -.067, p = .504), but the interaction between SES and maternal
sensitivity was marginally significant ( = .205, p = .062). In the second half sample, we
saw a shift, where the interaction between household environment and maternal sensitivity
was significant ( = -.219, p = .019), and the interaction between SES and maternal
sensitivity was not observed to be significant ( = .083, p = .409). The pattern of results
was similar in the half samples compared to the full sample findings, but significance
values were decreased, likely due to lower power.
To interpret the two-way interaction term in the full and half samples for
crowding/clutter in the household environment and maternal sensitivity, we conducted
post-hoc probing using estimation of simple slopes at the mean and 1 and 2 SD above and
below the sample mean of household environment as the moderator (see Table 4). As
expected, the association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind was
significant for slopes at the mean and levels below the mean of household environment. In
contrast, the association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind was no
longer significant at levels of household environment above the mean. Results indicated
that the association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind was evident at
average and lower levels of household clutter and crowding, controlling for child sex and
family SES.
Additionally, to interpret the two-way interaction term for SES and maternal
sensitivity, we conducted post-hoc probing using estimation of simple slopes at the mean
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and 1 and 2 SD above and below the sample mean of SES as the moderator (see Table 5).
The association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind was significant for
slopes at average and higher levels of SES. In contrast, the association between maternal
sensitivity and child theory of mind was no longer significant at levels of SES below the
mean. Results indicated that the association between maternal sensitivity and child theory
of mind was evident at moderate to high levels of SES, controlling for child sex and
housing environment.
Discussion
The home environment, and specifically the physical aspects of household chaos
(e.g., crowding, clutter) have been implicated as risk factors in children’s cognitive and
emotional development (e.g. Coley et al., 2015; Deater-Deckard et al., 2009; Martin et al.,
2012), but to date little work has examined how these external factors may impact the early
development of social cognition and theory of mind acquisition. The current study was
novel in its examination of how these physical facets of the home environment might
impact the association between maternal sensitivity and theory of mind development in a
large sample of preschool-age children. The association between maternal sensitivity and
child theory of mind was evident in the context of low crowding and clutter (i.e., “chaos”),
controlling for child sex and family SES. These findings suggest that crowding and clutter
in the home environment may disrupt the effects of parental socialization processes in the
home in ways that are impacting the development of theory of mind.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the moderating role
of clutter and crowding on the association between parenting behavior and child theory of
mind. But previous research has examined the moderating role of chaos and the home
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environment on links between aspects of parenting behavior and parental social cognition,
both of which have been shown to be important for the development of theory of mind in
children (Hughes et al., 2017; Kirk et al., 2015; Laranjo et al., 2010). In one study,
researchers found that chaos within the home environment can disrupt the link between
parental attributions of child behavior and parental behaviors, such that parents in high
chaos homes are more likely to interpret child misbehavior as intentional compared to
parents in nonchaotic households (Wang et al., 2013). Findings from another study further
suggest a deleterious effect of chaos, combined with the stressor of premature birth, on
links between maternal mentalization and maternal sensitivity. Specifically, the wellestablished link between mentalization and sensitivity in mothers was evident in low- but
not high-stress contexts (Yatziv et al., 2018). Building on these prior findings, our study
results suggest that the home environment context plays a crucial part in supporting
sensitive and responsive caregiving, which has a critical role in the healthy development
of preschoolers’ theory of mind. More research is needed to better understand the
mechanisms underlying these associations.
Consistent with literature examining other parenting constructs and other child
outcomes, the findings of the current study suggest that aspects of the home environment
can disrupt the proximal social processes between parents and children that support theory
of mind development (Coldwell et al., 2006; Evans et al., 2005; McCormick et al., 2021).
Homes that have higher levels of clutter and crowding may simply constrain opportunities
for parent-child interactions, or higher levels of clutter and crowding may affect the nature
of these interactions. This could result in either less sensitive or fewer sensitive interactions
overall between parents and children, potentially negatively impacting theory of mind
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development. Future longitudinal studies and intervention experiments with larger samples
will better allow for causal inferences to be made regarding the particular influence of the
housing environment on associations between parental sensitivity and child theory of mind.
Interestingly, there was also a statistical interaction between SES and maternal
sensitivity as predictors of child theory of mind abilities. A sizeable body of literature
demonstrates that SES has an impact on broader cognitive development, including
language and executive function (Hackman & Farah, 2009; Hoff, 2006; Noble et al., 2005)
and a recent meta-analysis also shows that SES has small to moderate positive associations
with parental sensitivity (Booth et al., 2018). While early theory of mind research often
only included data from middle- to high-class samples, reducing any observable influence
of SES (Hughes, 2005), more recent work suggests that there is also a significant positive
association between growing up in a higher SES home and showing better theory of mind
performance (Devine & Hughes, 2018). Recent evidence complicates this finding by
demonstrating that children experimentally assigned to be of a disadvantaged social status
display better theory of mind (Rizzo & Killen, 2018), demonstrating that mental state
understanding is not always a stable skill and may be influenced by experience with
structurally based inequalities. More research is also needed on the specific and
interactional processes involving SES and other familial and environmental factors.
SES and housing environments are known to covary (Evans et al., 2005; Wang et
al., 2013), but the current study suggests that they do not completely overlap and may have
a differential impact on theory of mind development. This finding is reflected in the extant
literature as well, with regard to a broader set of developmental outcomes (Deater-Deckard
et al., 2012; Hart et al., 2007; Holmes et al., 2019; Micalizzi et al., 2019; Seidler & Ritchie,
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2018). In particular, it may be that the household environment operates interactively, not
additively, with the effects of socioeconomic status. Aspects of the housing environment
might serve as a signal of something distinct such as parent and household functioning or
time to engage in activities besides work and childcare. Further research is needed to more
thoroughly disentangle the specific influence of these environmental moderators.
Findings from the current study should be interpreted in the context of study
limitations. The current study was limited in its sole use of observer reports of housing
conditions. Many studies examining the influence of the home environment or household
chaos utilize parent-report measures of these constructs. It may be that parental perceptions
of the home environment are critical to accurately measuring the saliency of these
environmental constructs. Future research should consider using more rigorous
assessments, including parent-report questionnaires, interviews, and direct observations of
the physical environment of the home and neighborhood that would strengthen the
measurement of the home context (Deater-Deckard et al., 2009; Whitesell et al., 2015).
Similarly, we did not conduct analyses examining clutter and crowding effects separately.
It would be very interesting to examine these constructs independently to see if one drives
these associations in particular. Future research examining associations between aspects of
household chaos and theory of mind should explore this possibility. Certain aspects of
chaos such as crowding might indicate potential extra social interactions within the home.
This may also be especially important to consider given the increase in multigenerational
homes (Pearce et al., 2018), or other family structures that offer children increased
opportunities to interact with more people on a daily basis. Clutter might indicate different
problems than crowding (e.g., lack of time to clean versus lack of income needed to get an
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adequate living space). The various components of the housing environment will likely
require different intervention to address, so examining the distinct variance that each
component contributes will be an important future direction for research to consider.
Finally, chaotic households are not often intentional, but rather are the result of systemic
stressors and demands that pile up and disproportionately impact lower income families.
Programs and policies to reduce the additional systemic burdens that chaotic homes may
face will be critical in addition to any future parenting intervention work (Emond, 2020).
Further, participants included in the current study were all twin pairs, which may
have resulted in unequal distribution of variance in the data. We accounted for this nested
data structure by validating findings in random subsamples, but results should be replicated
in a sample of unrelated participants. Additionally, the statistical significance values of the
interaction terms of interest were large in the current study. This suggests that the study
might be significantly underpowered to detect small effects. While the results of the full
analyses are in line with extant research suggesting that chaos disrupts proximal processes
in the home (Marsh et al., 2020; McCormick et al., 2021), future research should also seek
to replicate these findings in larger samples. Further, while the twin-design was a strength
in that all families had a minimum of two children, it may also be that families with multiple
children in the current study have different levels of clutter than families with a single
child. Additionally, families with two children that are the same age may have ‘two of
everything’, resulting in excess clutter. Further, maternal sensitivity may be more clutterdependent in the context of having to be responsive to two children of the same age. Future
research should consider this and examine unrelated participants from small and large
families.
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Finally, children in this study were young and the analyses were cross-sectional.
While there is considerable variability in theory of mind abilities in the preschool years, a
larger age-range would have provided more variability in theory of mind scores.
Longitudinal data is needed as well, and these results from the current study are exploratory
and not causal or predictive. As mentioned above, longitudinal research may better allow
for inferences to be made about how clutter and crowding are impacting parent-child
interactions, perhaps through limiting the number of interactions overall or by constraining
them in some way. This would also be particularly informative for examining the stability
of clutter and crowding in the context of home visits, where this may vary more from day
to day. The limited research that exists on the stability of chaos suggests that it is stable
longitudinally, but has relied on self-report measures of chaos (Lecheile et al., 2020).
Future research should examine these questions with a larger age range and in longitudinal
samples, as well as using observer and self-report methods to measure chaos.
Despite these limitations, the current study adds to our understanding of factors that
impact links between parenting and theory of mind abilities by highlighting the potential
importance of physical aspects of the home context. Given that theory of mind is critical
for developing a healthy social cognition (Hughes & Devine, 2019), it is especially
important to understand the mechanisms underlying its development and identify potential
areas for intervention in cases where theory of mind may develop atypically. Future
research should attempt to further examine constructs within the proximal environment
that may impact theory of mind development, including physical housing conditions that
may be readily amenable to change with adequate supports in place for families.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Variable Used in Analysis
Full Sample (N = 222)
1
2
3
4
1. Sensitivity (z)
1
2. Household Environment (z)
-.213**
1
3. SES (z)
.316**
-.269**
1
4. Theory of Mind
.235**
-.186**
.219**
1
5. Child Sex
-.165*
.015
-.107
.030
M
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.79
SD
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.55
range
-3.07 – 1.31 -1.46 – 4.96 -2.53 – 1.68 0 – 19
Random Subsample 1 (N =111)
1
2
3
4
Sensitivity (z)
1
Household Environment (z)
-.213*
1
SES (z)
.316**
-.269**
1
Theory of Mind
.153
-.132
.209*
1
Child Sex
-.165
.015
-.107
.040
M
0.00
0.00
0.00
8.21
SD
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.78
range
-3.07 – 1.31 -1.46 – 4.96 -2.53 – 1.68 0 – 19
Random Subsample 2 (N = 111)
1
2
3
4
Sensitivity (z)
1
Household Environment (z)
-.213*
1
SES (z)
.316**
-.269**
1
Theory of Mind
.329**
-.249**
.231*
1
Child Sex
-.165
.015
-.107
.018
M
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.37
SD
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.28
range
-3.07 – 1.31 -1.46 – 4.96 -2.53 – 1.68 0 – 19
Note: * indicates significance at the .05 level and ** at the .01 level. For child sex,
female is coded as 0 and male as 1.
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5

1

5
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Table 2: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Predicting Theory of Mind from Parental
Warmth and Housing Environment (Crowding/Clutter) – Full Sample
B
S.E.
β
t
p
Step One:
Maternal Sensitivity (z)

0.824

0.314

0.183

2.624

.009

-0.681

0.355

-0.131

-1.918

.056

SES (z)

0.520

0.310

0.117

1.676

.095

Child Sex

0.744

0.594

0.083

1.253

.212

1.160

0.328

0.257

3.531 <.001

-0.754

0.350

-0.146

-2.156

.032

SES (z)

0.630

0.307

0.142

2.052

.041

Child Sex

0.659

0.584

0.073

1.129

.260

Sensitivity X Housing (z)

-0.683

0.336

-0.138

-2.036

.043

Sensitivity X SES (z)

0.651

0.326

0.147

1.999

.047

Housing Environment (z)

Step Two:
Maternal Sensitivity (z)
Housing Environment (z)

Note: For child sex, male is coded as 1 and female as 0.
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Table 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Predicting Theory of Mind from Parental
Warmth and Housing Environment (Crowding/Clutter) – Internal Replication Samples
B
S.E.
β
t
p
Replication Sample 1
Step One:
Maternal Sensitivity (z)

0.497

0.486

0.105

1.025

.308

-0.470

0.549

-0.086

-0.858

.393

SES (z)

0.599

0.479

0.128

1.249

.214

Child Sex

0.611

0.918

0.064

0.666

.507

0.899

0.511

0.189

1.759

.082

-0.504

0.544

-0.092

-0.927

.356

SES (z)

0.744

0.477

0.159

1.559

.122

Child Sex

0.476

0.908

0.050

0.524

.602

Sensitivity X Housing (z)

-0.350

0.522

-0.067

-0.671

.504

Sensitivity X SES (z)

0.957

0.507

0.205

1.890

.062

1.151

0.403

0.273

2.855

.005

-0.891

0.455

-0.184

-1.956

.053

SES (z)

0.441

0.398

0.106

1.108

.270

Child Sex

0.877

0.762

0.104

1.151

.252

1.421

0.419

0.337

3.394 <.001

-1.003

0.445

-0.207

-2.253

.026

SES (z)

0.515

0.391

0.124

1.318

.190

Child Sex

0.843

0.744

0.100

1.133

.260

Sensitivity X Housing (z)

-1.017

0.428

-0.219

-2.376

.019

Sensitivity X SES (z)

0.344

0.415

0.083

0.830

.409

Housing Environment (z)

Step Two:
Maternal Sensitivity (z)
Housing Environment (z)

Replication Sample 2
Step One:
Maternal Sensitivity (z)
Housing Environment (z)

Step Two:
Maternal Sensitivity (z)
Housing Environment (z)

Note: For child sex, male is coded as 1 and female as 0.
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Table 4: Simple Slopes of Maternal Sensitivity Predicting Theory of Mind at Different
Levels of Housing Environment (Crowding/Clutter)
Full Sample (N = 222)
Level of crowding/clutter
+2 SD
+1 SD
M

β
-0.055
0.092
0.238

p
.685
.274
.000

-1 SD
-2 SD

0.385
0.532

.000
.001

Internal Replication
Sample 1 (N=111)
Level of crowding/clutter
+2 SD
+1 SD
M
-1 SD
-2 SD

β
-0.032
0.062
0.155
0.249
0.342

p
.574
.616
.116
.103
.147

Internal Replication
Sample 2 (N=111)
Level of crowding/clutter

β

p

+2 SD
+1 SD
M
-1 SD
-2 SD

-0.082
0.127
0.335
0.543
0.752

.655
.267
.000
.000
.000
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Table 5: Simple Slopes of Maternal Sensitivity Predicting Theory of Mind at Different
Levels of SES
Full Sample (N = 222)
Level of SES
+2 SD
+1 SD
M
-1 SD
-2 SD

β
0.596
0.430
0.264
0.097
-0.069

p
.000
.000
.000
.198
.553

Internal Replication
Sample 1 (N=111)
Level of SES
+2 SD
+1 SD
M

β
0.584
0.389
0.194

p
.014
.016
.067

-1 SD
-2 SD

0.001
-0.197

.989
.243

Internal Replication
Sample 2 (N=111)
Level of SES
+2 SD
+1 SD
M

β
0.617
0.481
0.346

p
.007
.002
.000

-1 SD
-2 SD

0.210
0.075

.048
.645
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CHAPTER 3
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CHILD THEORY OF MIND, MUTUALITY IN
FATHER-PRESCHOOLER DYADS, AND HOUSEHOLD CHAOS
Learning to navigate social relationships and interactions becomes increasingly
important in early childhood. These new relational demands require the development of
social cognition, which comprises many domains that support an awareness of mental
states and inner psychological worlds that become increasingly advanced with age. Theory
of mind is one such domain and is defined as the ability to understand the beliefs, desires,
and knowledge of the self and others (Wellman, 1990). This mentalizing ability is critical
for the development of healthy social cognition, and the explicit use of this skill develops
rapidly between the ages of 3 and 5 years (Wellman et al., 2001). Theory of mind abilities
contribute to later social skills, such as prosocial behavior (Imuta et al., 2016), empathy
(Brown et al., 2017), and increased peer popularity (Slaughter et al., 2015).
Parenting and Dyadic Mutuality
The development of theory of mind is influenced by proximal social systems.
Children acquire theory of mind and other important skills from early social interactions
that occur within their immediate environment (Hughes & Devine, 2015). Much of the
research on the development of early social cognition focuses on the influence of family
members and parents in particular (see Devine & Hughes, 2018 for meta-analyses).
Parental sensitivity during these early social interactions is particularly critical, and is
thought to indicate warmth, availability for interaction, attentiveness to child’s needs, and
appropriate responses (Ainsworth et al., 1978; De Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 1997; Lamb &
Easterbrooks, 1981). Children of parents who are more available for social interactions and
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sensitive to their child’s needs and bids for interaction might learn from these interactions
and display better theory of mind reasoning.
Indeed, sensitive parenting is associated with concurrent theory of mind abilities
and longitudinal theory of mind development. Most of the research in this domain has
focused on mothers and not other parents and caregivers, so the extant background
literature is limited to maternal sensitivity. Maternal sensitivity observed at age two
predicts better performance on a false-belief, caregiver location task at age five (Symons
& Clark, 2000), and maternal sensitivity observed in infancy predicts better theory of mind
abilities at age 4 (Licata et al., 2016). A sensitive, warm maternal interaction style has been
concurrently (Cahill et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 1999) and longitudinally (Ereky-Stevens,
2008; Symons & Clark, 2000) associated with better child theory of mind skills, measured
behaviorally.
There is limited research about father sensitivity on theory of mind development.
However, the construct of mind-mindedness (the tendency of a parent to view their child
as an independent agent with their own mind and internal states) is thought to be a precursor
to parental sensitivity (Laranjo et al., 2008; Lundy, 2013; Meins, 1999), and has been
examined in the context of father-child relationships and child theory of mind (see
McMahon & Bernier, 2017 for a review). Findings are mixed about the comparability of
maternal and paternal mind-mindedness on child theory of mind development. In one study
of 4-year-old children, both maternal and paternal mind-mindedness were associated with
child theory of mind (Lundy, 2013). Longitudinally, however, maternal, but not paternal
mind-mindedness in infancy was associated with preschool theory of mind abilities (Goffin
et al., 2020). Beyond mind-mindedness, one study examined the longitudinal relation
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between both maternal and paternal mental-state language use during a picture-book
interaction task in early preschool and theory of mind abilities in later preschool. The
investigators found that fathers’ use of desire and emotion language was associated with
child theory of mind abilities, suggesting that social interactions with fathers may play a
role in children learning to understand other minds (LaBounty et al., 2008). Since fathers
tend to use less emotion language compared to mothers (Jenkins et al., 2003), their mentalstate language use may reflect not only sensitivity during an interaction but also the degree
to which interactions may be more connected and reciprocal (Pavarini et al., 2013).
Therefore, in considering family influences on the early development of social
cognition, it is important to keep in mind that parent-child relationships are bidirectional,
in that parent and child effects interact continuously across development (Bronfenbrenner,
1994; Dunn, 1997). Parent-child dyadic mutuality refers to the reciprocal responsive
quality of the parent-child interaction (Deater-Deckard & O’Connor, 2000). A mutually
responsive orientation (the positive, mutually binding and cooperative relationship
characteristic of some parent-child dyads), between parents and children has been explored
in the context of child development and shown to have a host of beneficial outcomes. (see
Funamoto & Rinaldi, 2015 for a review; Kochanska, 1997; Kochanska et al., 2005).
In measuring mutuality in parent-child relationships and associations with child
outcomes, research has also begun to include the role of multiple parents. Among older
children, greater dyadic mutuality between children and mothers was associated with lower
child behavior problems (Deater-Deckard & Petrill, 2004), and greater mutuality between
children and both fathers and mothers was associated with fewer externalizing problems
(Deater-Deckard et al., 2004). Lower mother-child mutuality in toddlerhood predicted
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higher levels of child maladjustment in the early school years (Ensor et al., 2012). Higher
levels of observed parent-child mutually responsive orientation in infancy and toddlerhood
were associated with better child self-regulation at age 4 for both mothers and fathers
(Kochanska et al., 2008). Greater parent-child mutuality is also observed with higher levels
of exploring language, which is defined as language that encourages children to express
themselves and share their ideas, needs, and desires, for both mothers and fathers (Menashe
& Atzaba-Poria, 2016). Further, mutuality for mother- and father-toddler dyads was
concurrently associated with greater peer social competence (Lindsey et al., 2010). The
bidirectional nature of the parent-child dyadic mutuality construct (namely, the reciprocal
and socially connected dynamic of the pair and the active participation of the child in these
social interactions) might capture salient aspects of social cognitive development emerging
in the preschool time period beyond considering solely parental sensitivity.
To date, no study has examined whether the particular bidirectional
responsiveness of parent-child mutuality might influence theory of mind development.
Given the known benefit of parental sensitivity, it is possible that higher levels of sensitive
and mutually responsive behavior within the parent-child dyad will be associated with
better theory of mind reasoning in early childhood. However, it is important to note that
the statistically significant association between parental (in these cases, maternal)
sensitivity and theory of mind has also not always been observed. Meins and colleagues
did not observe an association between maternal sensitivity in infancy (8 months) and
theory of mind in preschool (51 months; Meins et al., 2013). Additional longitudinal
studies have also found no link between parenting styles in early preschool years and child
theory of mind abilities in later preschool years (Ruffman et al., 2006; Vinden, 2001).
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Limited prior research and mixed results thus far make it difficult to predict what impact
father-child dyadic mutuality might have on theory of mind development. Other aspects of
the parent-child environment, including child effects and characteristics of the home, might
explain these differences observed in associations between parental-child social
relationships and child theory of mind.
Household Chaos
Child development and the development of parent-child relationships occurs within
the larger environmental context. Aspects of this environmental context can interfere with
the proximal processes that occur between parents and children (Bronfenbrenner & Morris,
2006). Often in the literature, researchers study how chaos in the home environment
interferes with and negatively impacts child development and the family system more
broadly (see Marsh et al., 2020 for a review). Chaos in the home is an indicator of a lack
of routine, chronic uncertainty, and ever-present distractors, and is a broad construct
combining housing conditions (clutter, crowding, and traffic), predictability and routines,
and noise levels. Household chaos is a chronic stressor often accompanying poverty and
low socioeconomic status (Evans et al., 2005). However, this is not always the case
(Valiente et al., 2007) and chaos can serve as an index of family functioning beyond or
independent of socioeconomic status (Deater-Deckard et al., 2012; Dumas et al., 2005;
Lecheile et al., 2020; Pike et al., 2006).
Indeed, research has shown that household chaos is associated with a wide range of
child and family outcomes (Marsh et al., 2020). Of particular relevance to the current study,
higher levels of household chaos have been associated with greater incidence of child
problem behaviors (Coley et al., 2015), greater conduct problems (Deater-Deckard et al.,
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2009), lower early literacy skills (Johnson et al., 2008), poorer expressive and receptive
language skills (Vernon-Feagans et al., 2012) and poorer executive function skills (VernonFeagans et al., 2016). The link with both language skills and executive function is
particularly noteworthy, given the importance of both domains in the development of
theory of mind via the facilitation of executive function skills for reflecting upon and
learning from social experience (Benson et al., 2013) and associations with both receptive
and expressive language ability (Milligan et al., 2007). Household chaos has also been
found to be a mediator and moderator of several aspects of the family environment and
child outcomes. Consistently, when parenting behaviors are measured in relation to child
outcomes, household chaos has been shown to worsen the effects of negative parenting and
undermine positive parenting behaviors (Marsh et al., 2020).
As Evans and colleagues postulate in their 2005 article, it is possible that chaos
interferes with the proximal processes that occur continuously between the child and their
immediate environment throughout human development (Evans et al., 2005). The
decreased predictability of the environment and social exchanges with caregivers may
negatively impact the developing child’s ability to glean important information from social
situations. A lack of consistent responses from the environment and social partners may
impede a child’s ability to learn appropriate skills to interact with and respond to their
immediate environment—an essential element of theory of mind development. While it is
possible aspects of parenting might instead moderate or serve as a buffer for the deleterious
effects of chaos on child outcomes, elucidating how potentially modifiable aspects of the
home environmental context can disrupt the role that parenting plays in theory of mind
skills is critical for addressing potential prevention and intervention efforts.
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Current Study
The current study will investigate associations between child theory of mind,
dyadic mutuality, and household chaos in a sample of father-preschooler dyads. We will
examine first if dyadic mutuality is associated with concurrent child theory of mind. Then,
we will examine if household chaos moderates the association between dyadic mutuality
and child theory of mind. We expect to find that dyadic mutuality is associated with child
theory of mind, such that greater observed mutuality in dyads is associated with higher
child theory of mind scores. Additionally, we expect that associations between mutuality
and theory of mind abilities will vary depending on levels of chaos reported in the
household. Specifically, the association between mutuality and theory of mind is expected
to be strongest in families with the lowest levels of household chaos, and weakest in
families with the highest levels of chaos. In these analyses, we will control for a number
of covariates that have been shown to be associated with child theory of mind abilities,
including child sex (Calero et al., 2013), child age (Wellman et al., 2001), family SES
(Devine & Hughes, 2018), child executive function (Carlson et al., 2002), and child
expressive language ability (Milligan et al., 2007).
Method
Participants
The current study included dyads of 3- to 5-year-old children and their fathers (N
= 88 dyads) from two locations in Springfield, Massachusetts, USA and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, USA. The average age of child participants was 51.22 months (SD = 9.26
months, range = 35-68 months, 51% female), and the average age of father participants
was 39.65 years (SD = 6.82 years, range = 23.83 to 61.75). Dyads were recruited through
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a combination of flyers, public event recruitment, and work with local preschools and
community organizations. Families were paid $25 for their participation and children
received stickers and a toy. Twenty-six percent of the families participated from the greater
Springfield, MA area and the remaining 74% participated from the greater Philadelphia,
PA area.
Fathers completed questionnaires including demographic information. Information
on child race and ethnicity, total household income, and parent education are included in
Table 1. Race and ethnicity are broadly characteristic of the regions in which data were
collected. There is variability in household income and education, but the sample skews
towards more highly educated and higher income than the regions data were collected in
(Springfield, MA median household income = $36, 730 and 18.6% of adults hold a
Bachelor’s degree or higher; Philadelphia, PA median household income = $43,744 and
28.6% of adults hold a Bachelor’s degree or higher; retrieved from census.gov). Further,
for 76 of the families (86%), the participating father was the child’s biological father. In
terms of siblings, the study child was the only child in 31% of the families. Forty-eight
percent of the families had two children in the home, and 15.9% of families had more than
two children. Three percent of participants did not answer the question as to how many
children were in the home. There was variability in family structure in the study sample
though most fathers (87.5%) reported co-parenting with the child’s biological mother.
Questionnaires referred to the second parent as “parent two”, and we report this as
“mother/parent two”. We do not have data on the residential status of the fathers in this
sample.
Procedures
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Children and their fathers participated either by visiting the research laboratory or
through data collection taking place at the child’s preschool or home. Fathers were
informed of all study procedures and signed a consent form. Verbal assent was obtained
from the child before beginning study procedures. Fathers completed questionnaires on a
tablet while children completed a battery of executive function and theory of mind tasks as
well as an expressive language assessment. Fathers and children then completed two 5minute dyadic interaction tasks – one where they worked together to complete a marble
maze and a session where they worked together to draw pictures using a Etch-A-Sketch
drawing toy. Each individual was assigned a dial so that the pair had to co-operate to
complete each task (Deater-Deckard & Petrill, 2004; Helm et al., 2020; Stevenson-Hinde
& Shouldice, 1995). All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board of
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Measures
Dyadic mutuality. The Parent Child Interaction System (PARCHISY; DeaterDeckard, 2000; Deater-Deckard et al., 1997) was used to code parent and child behavior
during the dyadic interaction tasks. Trained researchers involved in study data collection,
but not directly with each family and blind to study hypotheses, coded videos. Observations
were coded for behavior using a 7-point Likert scales, coded 1 (no occurrence of the
behavior) to 7 (continual occurrence of the behavior). Nine coders total scored the dyadic
interactions. All videos were double coded by pairs of trained coders, and intra-class
correlation coefficients for the average of all coding pairs was ICC = .71.
The mutuality score included eight global ratings, four each from the etch-a-sketch
and marble maze tasks: parent responsiveness to child, child responsiveness to parent (1 =
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never responds; ignores comments, questions, behaviors; 4 = moderate amounts of
responsiveness; responds to about half of comments, questions, and behaviors, although
some responses may be delayed; 7=always responds immediately; expands on comments
made by other), dyadic cooperation (explicit agreement and discussion about how to
proceed with task; 1 = no evidence of cooperation during task; 4 = moderate amounts of
cooperation; appears during about half of the interaction; 7 = highly cooperative interaction
for entire task), and dyadic reciprocity/joint attention (co-occurring parent–child positive
affect, eye contact, and “conversation like” quality to exchanges; 1 = no evidence of
reciprocity; 4 = moderate levels of reciprocity; evidence of both shared positive affect and
eye contact, and some evidence of conversation-like quality of interaction; 7 = highly
integrated and reciprocal; constant shared positive affect and eye contact that never loses
turn-taking quality) (Deater-Deckard et al., 2004).
The first principal component among the eight codes explained 45.38% of the
variance (λ = .38–.89). Treating each global rating as a single scale item, the eight items
together reliable ( = .823). The eight scores were standardized, averaged together, and
standardized again to create a composite score representing dyadic mutuality. Two families
did not complete the interaction tasks and do not have a score for dyadic mutuality (N =
86). The standardized composite score was widely and normally distributed.
Theory of Mind. The first four items from the Wellman and Liu (2004) scale were
used, including diverse-desires, diverse-beliefs, knowledge-access, and contents falsebelief tasks. Only the first four items were used because of time constraints in the larger
study and because children under the age of 5 years are generally unable to pass the
remaining three items in the scale (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2020; Wellman & Liu, 2004). In
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each condition, the child is told a short vignette and asked questions about the characters’
desires, beliefs, or knowledge. In the diverse desires condition, children must correctly
answer that the character in the story prefers a different snack than them. In the diverse
beliefs condition, the child must correctly answer that the character believes her lost cat to
be in the opposite location chosen by the child. In the knowledge access condition, children
must correctly answer both that a character does not know what is in the box and that they
had not seen in the box. In the contents false belief condition, the child must correctly
identify that the character will assume a band-aid box has band-aids instead, even though
the child knows that there are really crayons inside. Children received one point for every
task they passed, thus higher scores indicate better theory of mind understanding. Three
children did not complete all items of the theory of mind assessment (N = 85).
Household Chaos. Parents completed a modified version of the Chaos, Hubbub,
and Order Scale (CHAOS: Matheny et al., 1995). The modified scale includes six Likerttype scale items that assess the home environment. The six items are: ‘You can’t hear
yourself think in our home’, ‘It’s a real zoo in our home’, ‘There is usually a television
turned on somewhere in our home’, ‘We are usually able to stay on top of things’ (reverse
scored), ‘I have a regular morning routine’ (reverse scored), and ‘The atmosphere in our
house is calm’ (reverse scored). These are rated on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 indicates
“Definitely untrue of our home”, 2 = “Somewhat untrue”, 3 = “Neither untrue nor true”, 4
= “Somewhat true”, and 5 = “Definitely true”. Scores on the CHAOS scale have been
shown to reliably measure environmental processes distinctly different from
sociodemographic measures (Matheny et al., 1995). One-year test-retest reliability has
been reported to range from .70 to .80 (Deater-Deckard et al., 2009). Though the validity
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of the modified 6-item scale has not yet been examined directly in relation to the original
15-item scale, the 6-item version has been used in over 42 studies around the world (Chang
et al., 2019; Marsh et al., 2020). Scale reliability was acceptable and consistent with prior
studies ( = .53; e.g. Chen et al., 2014; Coldwell et al., 2006). Two families did not
complete the chaos questionnaire (N = 86).
Covariates. We examined a number of covariates in the current study that have
been shown to be associated with child theory of mind abilities, including child sex (Calero
et al., 2013), child age (Wellman et al., 2001), family SES (Devine & Hughes, 2018), child
executive function (Carlson et al., 2002), and child expressive language ability (Milligan
et al., 2007). For child sex, male was coded as 0 and female as 1. Two families did not
report child sex (N = 86). Child age was computed in months from birthdate to date of visit.
The correct birthdate was missing for four families (N = 84). We also controlled for the
site of study data collection because of the uneven distribution where data was collected.
Springfield, MA was coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA as 1.
Family SES. Family SES was computed as an average score of total household
income and father and mother/parent two education levels. Household income and parent
education levels were highly correlated (father: r = .516, p < .001; mother/parent two: r =
.621, p < .001). Variables were standardized and averaged for every family that had at least
one of the SES variables (four families were missing one of the variables). The average
was standardized again to yield a composite z-score that was widely and normally
distributed. Two families were missing data on all SES variables (N = 86).
Child Executive Function. Child executive function was computed as a composite
score (Rushton et al., 1983) of performance on three tasks assessing working memory,
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cognitive flexibility, and inhibitory control – Digit Span (Helm et al., 2020; Wechsler,
1986), Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Zelazo et al., 1996), and Bear/Dragon
(Carlson et al., 2002) – consistent with literature in this age range (Hughes et al., 2010;
Wiebe et al., 2008).
Digit Span. A forward digit span task was administered to assess working
memory. A backward digit span was also attempted but was too difficult for the majority
of the participants, which is consistent with the literature in this age range (Bull et al., 2008;
Houwen et al., 2019). For this task, based on previous work (Helm et al., 2020; Wechsler,
1986), children were presented with sequences of digits and instructed to repeat the
sequences. Two practice trials of sequences two digits in length were given to ensure
understanding and then the task began. Two trials of the same length sequence were
presented, and children were allowed one recall attempt for each sequence. If the child
recalled at least one of the two trials correctly, the length of the sequence increased by one
digit. The sequences were lengthened until errors were produced on two consecutive trials
of the same length (Blankenship et al., 2019). The highest number of correct trials on the
forward digit span was used. Thirteen children were unable to understand the rules and
complete the task, or otherwise unable to complete the task due to fatigue (N = 75).
DCCS. For the DCCS (Zelazo et al., 1996), children were instructed to sort
cards based on two dimensions (i.e., color, shape). Children first sorted five cards by one
dimension (pre-switch; counterbalanced across participants) and then were instructed to
switch and to sort the remaining five cards by the other dimension (post-switch).
Performance was scored as the total of correct post-switch responses. Two children were
unable to complete the DCCS (N = 86).
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Bear/Dragon. The Bear/Dragon task followed administration procedures
outlined by Carlson and colleagues (see Carlson et al., 2002 for full procedure). Briefly,
children were introduced to two engaging puppets (a ‘‘good bear’’ and a ‘‘bad dragon’’)
and told to do what the bear asked them to do but not what the dragon asked them to do.
Children passed practice trials if they followed the bear’s command but ignored the
dragon’s command. Ten test trials were administered with alternating bear and dragon
commands. After five test trials, all children received a reminder of the rules regardless of
performance.
Each child’s performance was coded independently by two coders (each child
received two sets of scores, one from each coder). For the Bear trials, scores ranged from
0 (failure to move), 1 (wrong movement: e.g., touches nose when told to clap hands), 2
(partial commanded movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands and brings hands together
but does not clap), and 3 (full commanded movement: e.g. commanded to clap hands and
claps hands), for a possible total score of 15. For Dragon trials, scores ranged from 0 (full
commanded movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands and claps hands), 1 (wrong
movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands and touches nose), 2 (partial commanded
movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands, begins to move hands together then stops), 3
(no movement plus strategy [anything the child deliberately does to help prevent them from
performing a full commanded movement]: e.g., shakes head, sits on hands, clasps hands
together, says “no”) and 4 (no movement, no strategy: e.g., commanded to clap hands, does
nothing), for a possible total score of 20 (Shamblaw et al., 2019).
Since we were looking for complete agreement between coders for each child, any
video that had a discrepancy in codes between the coders was viewed again by the coders
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together to try to reach consensus. Seventeen videos had to be watched and coded again to
reach consensus. Performance on dragon trials was used in analysis. Fifteen children were
unable to complete the task or did not pass the rule check (N = 73).
To estimate the overall EF construct, we computed and analyzed a single composite
score representing inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and working memory, which is
consistent with previous literature in this age group (Hughes et al., 2010, Wiebe et al.,
2008). The first principal component among the three task scores explained 52.57% of the
variance (λ = .55–.85). All three scores were standardized and averaged for every child
who had at least two task scores. Thirteen children were missing one of the task scores.
Two children were missing more than one of the tasks included in the composite (N = 86).
The average score was standardized again to yield a composite z-score that was widely and
normally distributed. A higher score reflected better executive function abilities.
Expressive Language. Children completed the Expressive Vocabulary Test Second
Edition (EVT-2; Williams, 1997) to measure expressive language abilities. Five children
did not complete the EVT (N=83).
Results
Planned Analyses
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations were computed to understand
patterns of variance in and covariance between the study variables and covariates (Tables
2 and 3). We then examined the correlations among the main constructs. Dyadic mutuality
was significantly correlated with child theory of mind, r = .352, p = .001. Household chaos
was not significantly correlated with dyadic mutuality or child theory of mind.

74

For covariates, child age was significantly correlated with dyadic mutuality (r =
.340, p = .002) and child theory of mind (r = .515, p < .001), but not household chaos.
Expressive language ability (r = .346, p = .001) and child executive function (r = .654, p <
.001) were both significantly correlated with child theory of mind. Child sex, study site,
and SES were not significantly correlated with the main study variables.
To test the hypothesized main effect of dyadic mutuality on child theory of mind,
and moderating effect of household chaos on the association between dyadic mutuality and
child theory of mind, we estimated a hierarchical regression equation (standardized
variables provided mean-centered predictors) in two steps to explain variance in child
theory of mind scores; Step One: child sex (Male = 0, Female = 1), SES (z), child age in
months, study site (Springfield, MA = 0, Philadelphia, PA = 1), child executive function
(z), child expressive language ability, dyadic mutuality (z), household chaos (z), and Step
Two: dyadic mutuality X household chaos (z).
The first step of the equation explained 56.6% of the variance in child theory of
mind, F(8, 78) = 13.73, p < .001 (Table 4). There were significant main effects of several
covariates, including child age (β = .51, p < .001), child executive function (β = .25, p =
.02), and child expressive language ability (β = .34, p < .001), such that older children,
children with higher scores on executive function tasks, and children with higher scores on
expressive language measures performed better on theory of mind tasks controlling for all
other study variables.
Surprisingly, there were no observed significant main effects of dyadic mutuality
(β = .09, p = .284) or household chaos (β = -.01, p = .922) on child theory of mind. However,
there was a significant interaction between both household chaos and dyadic mutuality (β
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= -.35, p < .001) in predicting child theory of mind, controlling for other variables. The
final full equation explained 67.3% of the variance in child theory of mind, F(9, 78) =
18.87, p < .001, and this second step accounted for an additional 10.7% of the variance in
child theory of mind scores (Table 4). To interpret the two-way interaction term for dyadic
mutuality and household chaos, we conducted post-hoc probing using estimation of simple
slopes at the mean and 1 and 2 SD above and below the sample mean of household chaos
as the moderator (Figure 1A; region of significance of the simple slopes estimates is shown
in Figure 1B). As expected, the association between dyadic mutuality and child theory of
mind was significant for slopes at the mean and levels below the mean of household chaos
(mean: β = .488, p < .001; -1 SD: β = .785, p < .001; -2 SD: β = 1.081, p < .001). In contrast,
the association between dyadic mutuality and child theory of mind was no longer
significant at levels of household chaos above the mean (+2 SD: β = -.105, p = .696; +1
SD: β = .191, p =. 253), and findings show that the association between mutuality and
theory of mind was attenuated when household chaos was more than 0.72 SD above the
sample mean (Figure 1B). It should be noted that with our analytical method, only patterns
of simple slopes were interpreted, not exact endpoints of the slopes themselves. Thus, the
pattern suggests that at higher levels of chaos, the association between mutuality and theory
of mind was not significant, whereas at average/low levels, the slope was significant and
positive. Results indicated that the association between dyadic mutuality and child theory
of mind was evident at average and lower levels of household chaos, controlling for all
other variables.
Exploratory Analyses
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As discussed in the general introduction, explicit theory of mind, also known as
false belief understanding, generally “comes on-line” between the ages of 3 and 5 years
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). But, this more advanced reasoning does not occur as a sudden
automatic shift, but rather involves a series of conceptual progressions (Gopnik &
Wellman, 2012). The Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004) used in the current
study assesses the scaffolding of these abilities through the tasks that measure Diverse
Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, and finally False Belief Understanding.
Preschool aged children reliably solve these tasks in this order, becoming more advanced
with age (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). Examining patterns of responses to these individual
tasks may reveal important information for how dyadic mutuality and household chaos
may be related to the progression of theory of mind in young children and provide insight
for how early theory of mind may be developing.
First, we examined descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations to understand
patterns of variance in and covariance between the individual theory of mind scale item
scores, study variables, and covariates (Tables 5 & 6). We found a similar pattern of
correlations among the main constructs as with the total theory of mind score, namely that
dyadic mutuality was significantly correlated or marginally significantly correlated with
individual child theory of mind task scores (Diverse Desires, r = .223, p = .042; Diverse
Beliefs, r = .219, p = .045; Knowledge Access, r = .193, p = .079; False Belief, r = .349,
p = .001). Household chaos was not significantly correlated with dyadic mutuality, but
was marginally significantly correlated with performance on the False Belief task, r = .213, p = .053.
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Then, we conducted the same regression analyses as above with each individual
task on the theory of mind scale as the outcome variable (Tables 7 – 10). The interaction
between household chaos and dyadic mutuality was found to be statistically significant or
marginally statistically significant in predicting performance on each individual Theory of
Mind Scale task (Wellman & Liu, 2004), including Diverse Desires (β = -.21, p = .056)
Diverse Beliefs (β = -.27, p = .019), Knowledge Access (β = -.26, p = .005), and False
Belief (β = -.25, p = .009).
To interpret the two-way interaction term for dyadic mutuality and household
chaos, we conducted post-hoc probing using estimation of simple slopes at the mean and 1
and 2 SD above and below the sample mean of household chaos as the moderator for each
task. Similar to the full score results, the association between dyadic mutuality and each
individual child theory of mind task score was significant for slopes at the mean and levels
below the mean of household chaos and was no longer significant at levels of household
chaos above the mean (Table 11).
Discussion
The current study examined associations between parent-child dyadic mutuality,
household chaos, and child theory of mind in a sample of father and preschool child dyads
using a multi-method approach. We sought to address two novel questions using a variety
of observational, behavioral, and parent-report measures. The first asked if dyadic
mutuality was associated with child theory of mind. Given the known link between parental
sensitivity and child theory of mind abilities (Cahill et al., 2007; Ereky-Stevens, 2008;
Hughes et al., 1999; Licata et al., 2016; Symons & Clark, 2000), we expected to find that
higher mutuality displayed by the dyad would be associated with child theory of mind

78

abilities. However, some previous studies examining parental sensitivity in relation to child
theory of mind have found mixed results (Meins et al., 2013; Ruffman et al., 2006; Vinden,
2001). To address this, the study asked a second question to understand how the contextual
factor of household chaos might moderate the association between mutuality and child
theory of mind. We expected based on theory from Evans and colleagues (Evans et al.,
2005) to find that higher levels of household chaos would have a deleterious moderating
effect on associations between dyadic mutuality and theory of mind. Finally, we conducted
exploratory analyses to examine how household chaos and dyadic mutuality might interact
and differentially impact the progression of theory of mind skills, indexed by individual
task scores.
With regard to the first question, we did find that dyadic mutuality was correlated
with better child theory of mind abilities. However, this association was not statistically
significant when controlling for other variables. With regard to the second question, we did
observe a statistically significant interaction between household chaos and dyadic
mutuality associated with theory of mind abilities. These results showed that a positive
association between dyadic mutuality and child theory of mind is observed at low and
average levels of household chaos; in contrast, there was no association at high levels of
chaos. This pattern was further observed for each individual theory of mind scale task
score. Consistent with literature examining other child outcomes, this suggests that chaos
in the home disrupts the proximal social processes going on between parents and children
that support theory of mind development (Coldwell et al., 2006; Evans et al., 2005). It may
be that either highly chaotic homes have fewer opportunities to engage in mutually
responsive parent-child interactions, or perhaps that these interactions occur with a similar
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frequency as lower chaos homes, but are disrupted by ongoing noise, crowding, or other
factors. As discussed below, future longitudinal studies and intervention experiments with
larger samples will better allow for causal inferences to be made regarding the particular
influence of household chaos on associations between parenting and child outcomes.
Some have proposed that chaos more readily modifiable compared to other chronic
life stressors that often accompany it (e.g., poverty, housing conditions) (Fiese et al., 2013).
Several correlational studies have suggested that reduction of household chaos will be a
crucial part of promoting the effectiveness of parenting interventions (i.e. Deater-Deckard
et al., 2012; Emond et al., 2018; Fulkerson et al., 2019; Micalizzi et al., 2019), though to
our knowledge there is no current evidence of interventions aimed at specifically reducing
overall household chaos. However, increasing use of routines has been targeted in
interventions. Establishing predictable routines leads to better child outcomes in several
domains (e.g. Fiese et al., 2013; Mindell & Williamson, 2018). Having predictable routine
times for play and social interaction between parents and children may be one effective
way to reduce the impact of stressors and promote high quality dyadic interactions that
enhance social cognitive development. It also is important to consider differential effects
of specific aspects of chaos. For example, perhaps crowding reflects opportunity for social
interaction and therefore has a smaller negative or even a potentially positive impact, while
lack of routines, noise, and cluster may largely serve to amplify risk processes. Future
experimental and correlational research should consider these specific facets of chaos when
examining links with child social cognitive outcomes.
There were also significant main effects of several variables that were included as
covariates, including child age, child executive function, and child expressive language
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ability. Older children, children with higher scores on executive function tasks, and
children with higher scores on expressive language measures performed better on theory
of mind tasks. This was expected and is consistent with the literature (Carlson et al., 2002;
Milligan et al., 2007; Wellman et al., 2001). Two meta-analyses have demonstrated widely
replicated associations between theory of mind ability with both language (Milligan et al.,
2007) and execution function skills (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Perhaps language and
executive function are needed to express an underlying competence in theory of mind; in
addition, these abilities may promote emergence of explicit theory of mind (Carlson &
Moses, 2001; Hughes & Devine, 2015). Whenever it is plausible, age, language and
executive function should be considered as potential covariates when examining theory of
mind.
The current study uses a multi-method approach and furthers our understanding of
contextual factors and the bidirectional nature of parenting in relation to theory of mind
development. However, it is not without limitations. First, there was variability in study
location. Dyads who participated in Springfield, MA were tested in a university-based lab
setting, and dyads who participated in Philadelphia, PA were primarily seen at their child’s
preschool, though several participated instead during a home visit. While we do not observe
any significant site differences for the main variables, there is some evidence from previous
studies that parents and children engage differently in research when they are in a familiar
environment (such as a preschool or home) compared to a novel lab environment (Gardner,
2000). Future research should take this into consideration when designing studies working
with parents and children to minimize environment differences while still making research
fun and accessible for families.
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Second, the current study utilizes a cross-sectional and correlational design, with
an adequately powered but relatively small sample size. This design limits our ability to
understand the full context of parent-child mutuality, household chaos, and theory of mind
development in terms of how these constructs change over time and/or how they may be
causally related. A longitudinal design with a larger sample size would allow us to better
understand the developmental association between dyadic mutuality and theory of mind,
and would allow for a more in-depth understanding of how early theory of mind is
progressing relative to childrens’ age and environmental input. It is possible that a more
advanced understanding of mental states and social cognitive abilities might also positively
impact levels of dyadic mutuality. The sample size of the current study provides adequate
power to detect large effects, but it may not be large enough to detect medium or small
effects, which may partially explain the lack of expected findings with regard to dyadic
mutuality and child theory of mind understanding after controlling for covariates.
A particular strength of the current study is that it focusses on historically
understudied fathers and father-child relationships (Cabrera et al., 2018). There is little
research on the role of fathers in children’s theory of mind development. Findings from a
few studies present mixed results but do suggest that fathers’ mental-state language use
during interactions may have a particular influential role on theory of mind development
(LaBounty et al, 2008). We find that father-child mutuality is associated with child theory
of mind abilities (but only at average and lower levels of household chaos), supporting the
theory that fathers may play an important role in early social cognitive development.
Unfortunately, the lack of maternal or non-parental caregiver data makes it difficult to
extrapolate any specific effects of father-child mutuality on child theory of mind
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development. However, previous research on dyadic mutuality its link with other child
outcomes shows no significant parent gender differences (Deater-Deckard et al., 2004;
Kochanska et al., 2008; Lindsey et al., 2010; Menashe & Atzaba-Poria, 2016). Thus, the
association between dyadic mutuality and theory of mind development may be the same
for fathers and mothers, although more research with multiple caregivers is needed.
Unfortunately, we did not have data on the residential status of the fathers. Many
children grow up with fathers who reside outside the home and who still provide very
important contributions to child development (Adamsons & Johnson, 2013). Nonresidential and residential father-child relationships may be differently impacted by
household chaos. For example, their relationship may be less impacted if most interactions
occur outside of the child’s home, or they may be more impacted due to the potential for
even greater variability in routines due to custody arrangements or other family dynamics
involving a non-residential father (Bakker et al., 2015). Despite this limitation, mutuality
in father-child relationships is important for early theory of mind development, and fathers
should be included in research on child social cognitive development when possible.
It is also important to address that a further limitation of the current study, and the
broader field of parenting and child development, is that it typically assumes a two-parent
family context where fathering always operates in addition to mothering. The true global
context of child development includes a vast array of family systems not often captured by
our restrictive measures and analyses, including single parents, stepfamilies, nonresidential parents, multigenerational homes, and LGBT families (Pearce et al., 2018).
Within-family processes that support healthy child development work similarly regardless
of differing family structures (Murry & Lippold, 2018), but our measures often ignore these
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contextual aspects or are not yet adequate to capture variation in family structure. Future
research examining parent-child interactions and the home environment in relation to
aspects of child development should consider refining the conceptualization of family
structure and move away from the traditional nuclear family serving as the referent or
default group (Murry & Lippold, 2018). These efforts support conducting informative
family research that is inclusive and reflects the diversity of families in the United States
and globally.
Furthermore, we know very little about the potential additive effects of interactions
with multiple primary caregivers on theory of mind development. While we were only able
to examine mutuality in one parent-child dyad in the current study, it would be informative
to examine mutuality in the child’s relationships with multiple parents and caregivers.
Previous work has demonstrated that fathers and mothers do not differ much in the effects
of mutuality in their relationships with their child in predicting child outcomes (e.g. DeaterDeckard et al., 2004; Kochanska et al., 2008; Lindsey et al., 2010; Menashe & AtzabaPoria, 2016), but there may be additive effects of this social aspect of mutuality that
represents family unit (e.g., triad) functioning. This family unit social functioning may
further vary depending on additional factors within the household. Further, many children
spend at least part of their time in other non-family caregiving arrangements, such as
preschool or daycare. These arrangements are known to positively impact cognitive
development outcomes for children (Geoffroy et al., 2010), and greater time spent in
quality daycare settings can mitigate the negative impacts of household chaos on social and
cognitive outcomes (Berry et al., 2016). However, we know little about the mechanisms
underlying these associations or specific implications for theory of mind development. It
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is likely that daycare provider-child mutuality also is important for early social cognitive
development. Future research should also consider the role of non-parental caregivers.
Another strength of the current study is that we collected data from a relatively
heterogenous sample in terms of race and SES, increasing the generalizability of the
study’s findings. However, we did not consider the full social context of both race
(particularly racialized experiences) and SES on the development of theory of mind.
Previous research has long found that racialized experiences play a critical role in social
cognition (Roberts & Rizzo, 2020), but studying the context of race and racialized
experiences on social cognitive development and psychological phenomena more broadly
remains understudied (Roberts et al., 2020). Similarly, SES has long been considered a
predictor or covariate in theory of mind research, but researchers rarely consider why SES
as a fairly distal factor would be connected to theory of mind (Devine & Hughes, 2018).
Future research should consider race and SES as predictors and potential moderators, and
not just as covariates.
Finally, while not necessarily a limitation, we want to draw attention to the
relatively lower levels of household chaos reported in the current study, comparative to
previous research using the same abbreviated measure (Brieant et al., 2017; Coldwell et
al., 2006; Deater-Deckard et al., 2012). The lower levels of household chaos observed in
the current study may be due to chance or selective participation, potentially indicating that
we were primarily able to recruit families that were lower overall in household chaos.
Indeed, based on the available data collected our study sample would likely be categorized
as lower risk. To address this, future research should consider specifically recruiting
families that indicate higher levels of chaos. Future research should also consider including
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additional observed measures of chaos (Vernon-Feagans et al., 2012; Vernon-Feagans et
al., 2016; Whitesell et al., 2015) or measures of environmental and neighborhood chaos
(Coley et al, 2015; St. John & Tarullo, 2020) in future research to provide a more
comprehensive view of the child’s environment. Qualitative data, like the Ecocultural
Family Interview (Weisner, 2010), can provide additional data that explores family-wide
processes and gives contextual information for the causes of household chaos. To that
point, we wish to be clear that household chaos is not something families intentionally
create, but rather is the result of systemic stressors and demands that pile up and
disproportionately impact lower income families. In addition to considering addressing
household chaos within parenting interventions, we should be fiercely advocating for
programs and policies to reduce the additional systemic burdens that chaotic homes may
face (Emond, 2020).
Despite these limitations, the current study furthers our understanding of contextual
and familial factors that contribute to early social cognitive development. We observe that
household chaos moderates the association between dyadic mutuality and child theory of
mind. This finding is consistent with the idea that contextual factors like household chaos
can interfere with proximal processes within the child’s immediate environment to impact
child development. We hope that our suggestions for future research will support inquiry
that will more comprehensively describe and explain these developmental processes.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Sample Demographic Information
Total Household Income
$5,000 - $15,999
$16,000 - $24,999
$25,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 or greater
Do not know/No response
Child Race/Ethnicity
Asian
Black/African American
Hispanic or Latinx
Middle Eastern/North African
White
Another race not listed
Biracial/Multiracial/Multiethnic
No response
Highest Education - Father
8th Grade or Less
Some High School
High School/GED
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
M.D., Ph.D., J.D. or Equivalent
No response
Highest Education – Parent 2/Mother
8th Grade or Less
Some High School
High School/GED
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
M.D., Ph.D., J.D. or Equivalent
No response
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4.5%
4.5%
6.8%
9.1%
18.2%
17.0%
35.2%
4.6%
15.9%
13.6%
7.9%
1.1%
40.9%
2.3%
17.1%
1.1%
2.3%
1.1%
22.7%
3.4%
20.5%
17.0%
30.7%
2.3%
1.1%
1.1%
12.5%
3.4%
21.6%
30.7%
22.7%
6.8%

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
M
Theory of Mind Scale Score
2.39
Dyadic Mutuality Composite Score (z)
0
Etch – Parent Responsivity
5.69
Etch – Child Responsivity
5.24
Etch – Dyad Cooperation
2.61
Etch – Dyad Reciprocity
2.27
Marble – Parent Responsivity
5.68
Marble – Child Responsivity
5.05
Marble – Dyad Cooperation
3.75
Marble – Dyad Reciprocity
2.05
Household Chaos
1.99
Executive Function Composite Score (z) 0
Bear/Dragon
15.92
DCCS Post
4.62
Forward Digit Span
3.79
EVT – Standard Score
105.49
Child Age (months)
51.33
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SD
1.25
1
.82
.79
1.15
1.09
.75
.86
1.06
.96
.59
1
5.65
1.06
1.14
14.56
9.26

Min
0
-2.22
2.5
2.5
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
-3.20
0
0
0
74
35

Max
4
2.72
7
6.5
6
6
7
7
5.5
5
3.5
1.39
20
5
5
141
68

Table 3: Correlations Between Variables Used in Analysis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. ToM
1
Score
2. DM
.352** 1
3. HC
-.071
.049
1
4. EF
.654** .185
-.151 1
Score
5. SES
.193
-.043
-.181 .231*
1
6. EVT
.346** .220*
-.073 .324*
.292*
1
7. Age
.515** .340** .042
.437** -.195
-.235* 1
8. Child
.206
.015
.131
.266*
.132
.138
.055 1
sex
9. Site
.173
-.199
-.205 .323*
.674** .226* -.073 .148 1
Notes:
** indicates significance at the .001 level and * at the.05 level.
ToM = theory of mind, DM = observed dyadic mutuality, HC = household chaos, EF =
executive function, SES = socioeconomic status, EVT = expressive vocabulary standard
score
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For age, child age is in months.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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Table 4: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Theory of Mind Score
B
S.E.
β
t
Step One
F(8,78) = 13.734, p < .001; R2 = .566
SES (z)
.198
.135
.162 1.471
Child age
.069
.014
.513 4.771
Executive Function (z)
.316
.133
.250 2.375
EVT Standard Score
.028
.008
.335 3.475
Child sex
.003
.195
.001
.013
Study site
-.298
.329
-.098
-.907
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.115
.106
.093 1.079
Household Chaos (z)
-.009
.095
-.008
-.098
Step Two
F(9,78) = 18.867, p < .001; R2 = .673
F = 5.133; R2 = .107
SES (z)
.193
.117
.157 1.651
Child age
.062
.013
.463 4.929
Executive Function (z)
.509
.122
.403 4.174
EVT Standard Score
.022
.007
.258 3.039
Child sex
-.008
.170
-.003
-.047
Study site
-.342
.286
-.112 -1.195
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.118
.092
.095 1.274
Household Chaos (z)
-.106
.085
-.087 -1.253
Dyadic Mutuality X Chaos (z)
-.440
.090
-.350 -4.892
Note:
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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p

.146
.000
.020
.000
.989
.368
.284
.922

.103
.000
.000
.003
.962
.236
.207
.215
.000

Figure 1: A) Standardized simple slopes () of associations between father-child dyadic
mutuality and child theory of mind scores at levels of household chaos. All solid lines were
significant at p < .05, dashed lines were not significant. B) Simple slope of child theory of
mind regressed on standardized father-child dyadic mutuality at levels of standardized
household chaos. The shaded region depicts the region of significance for child theory of
mind regressed on standardized father-child mutuality at different levels of household
chaos.
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Table 5: Exploratory Analysis Descriptive Statistics
N
M
Theory of Mind Scale Score
85
2.39
Diverse Desires
85
0.85
Diverse Beliefs
85
0.73
Knowledge Access
85
0.51
False Belief Understanding
85
0.31

108

SD
1.254
0.362
0.447
0.503
0.464

Min
0
0
0
0
0

Max
4
1
1
1
1

Table 6: Exploratory Analysis Correlations Between Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1. ToM: DD
1
2. ToM: DB
.330* 1
3. ToM: KA
.299* .404** 1
4. ToM: FB
.069
.232* .554** 1
5. DM
.223* .219* .193
.349** 1
6. HC
.086
.101
-.131
-.213* .049
1
7. EF Score
.338* .342** .659** .461** .185
-.151 1
8. SES
.176
.098
.231* .042
-.043 -.181 .231* 1
9. EVT
.435** .262* .275* .045
.220* -.073 .324* .292* 1
10. Age
.093
.246* .443** .588** .340* .042 .437** -.195
-.235* 1
11. Child sex
.147
.095
.202
.135
.015
.131 .266* .132
.148
.055
1
12. Study Site .073
.099
.228* .067
-.199 -.205 .323* .674** .226* -.073 .148 1
Notes:
** indicates significance at the .001 level and * at the.05 level.
ToM = theory of mind, DD = Diverse Desires DB = Diverse Beliefs, KA = Knowledge Access, FB = False Belief, DM = observed
dyadic mutuality, HC = household chaos, EF = executive function, SES = socioeconomic status, EVT = expressive vocabulary
standard score
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For age, child age is in months.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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Table 7: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Diverse Desires
B
S.E.
β
t
Step One
F(8,78) = 4.286, p < .001; R2 = .252
SES (z)
.056
.048
.167 1.160
Child age
.008
.005
.223 1.582
Executive Function (z)
.019
.048
.054
.392
EVT Standard Score
.012
.003
.504 3.987
Child sex
-.051
.070
-.075
.723
Study site
-.177
.118
-.214 -1.506
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.025
.038
.074
.655
Household Chaos (z)
.053
.034
.161 1.565
Step Two
F(9,78) = 4.382, p < .001; R2 = .281
F = 0.096; R2 = .029
SES (z)
.055
.047
.165 1.166
Child age
.007
.005
.194 1.390
Executive Function (z)
.050
.049
.145 1.008
EVT Standard Score
.010
.003
.459 3.639
Child sex
-.052
.069
-.078
-.762
Study site
-.184
.116
-.223 -1.595
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.025
.037
.075
.680
Household Chaos (z)
.038
.034
.114 1.097
Dyadic Mutuality X Chaos (z)
-.071
.036
-.206 -1.945
Note:
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.

110

p

.250
.118
.696
.000
.472
.137
.515
.122

.248
.169
.317
.000
.448
.115
.499
.277
.056

Table 8: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Diverse Beliefs
B
S.E.
β
t
Step One
F(8,78) = 2.599, p = .015; R2 = .141
SES (z)
.005
.067
.011
.069
Child age
.014
.007
.289 1.910
Executive Function (z)
.042
.067
.094
.636
EVT Standard Score
.009
.004
.303 2.236
Child sex
-.066
.098
-.075
-/678
Study site
.010
.165
.009
.058
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.036
.053
.081
.668
Household Chaos (z)
.065
.048
.149 1.358
Step Two
F(9,78) = 3.112, p = .003; R2 = .196
F = 0.513; R2 = .055
SES (z)
.003
.065
.007
.050
Child age
.012
.007
.250 1.699
Executive Function (z)
.096
.068
.213 1.402
EVT Standard Score
.007
.004
.244 1.831
Child sex
-.069
.095
-.079
-.732
Study site
-.002
.160
-.002
-.015
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.036
.052
.083
.705
Household Chaos (z)
.038
.047
.088
.803
Dyadic Mutuality X Chaos (z)
-.121
.050
-.270 -2.406
Note:
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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p

.945
.060
.527
.029
.500
.954
.506
.179

.960
.094
.165
.071
.467
.988
.483
.425
.019

Table 9: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Knowledge Access
B
S.E.
β
t
Step One
F(8,78) = 9.054, p < .001; R2 = .452
SES (z)
.105
.062
.210 1.702
Child age
.021
.007
.393 3.248
Executive Function (z)
.194
.061
.377 3.185
EVT Standard Score
.007
.004
.213 1.965
Child sex
.023
.090
.023
.255
Study site
-.134
.151
-.108
-.889
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
-.027
.049
-.054
-.554
Household Chaos (z)
-.026
.043
-.053
-.607
Step Two
F(9,78) = 9.838, p < .001; R2 = .505
F = 0.784; R2 = .053
SES (z)
.103
.059
.207 1.764
Child age
.019
.006
.356 3.078
Executive Function (z)
.252
.061
.489 4.109
EVT Standard Score
.005
.004
.157 1.499
Child sex
.020
.085
.019
.230
Study site
-.147
.144
-.119 -1.024
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
-.026
.046
-.052
-.564
Household Chaos (z)
-.055
.043
-.112 -1.299
Dyadic Mutuality X Chaos (z)
-.131
.045
-.256 -2.903
Note:
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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p

.093
.002
.002
.053
.800
.377
.581
.546

.082
.003
.000
.138
.818
.309
.574
.198
.005

Table 10: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting False Belief
B
S.E.
β
t
Step One
F(8,78) = 8.138, p < .001; R2 = .423
SES (z)
.032
.059
.069
.548
Child age
.025
.006
.496 4.000
Executive Function (z)
.061
.058
.126 1.036
EVT Standard Score
.000
.004
.007
.062
Child sex
.097
.086
.103 1.127
Study site
.004
.145
.003
.024
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.081
.047
.173 1.737
Household Chaos (z)
-.100
.042
-.217 -2.412
Step Two
F(9,78) = 8.674, p < .001; R2 = .470
F = 0.536; R2 = .047
SES (z)
.031
.057
.067
.548
Child age
.024
.006
.461 3.855
Executive Function (z)
.112
.059
.233 1.892
EVT Standard Score
-.001
.003
-.046
-.429
Child sex
.094
.082
.100 1.141
Study site
-.008
.139
-.007
-.058
Dyadic Mutuality (z)
.082
.045
.174 1.829
Household Chaos (z)
-.126
.041
-.273 -3.073
Dyadic Mutuality X Chaos (z)
-.117
.044
-.245 -2.684
Note:
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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p

.585
.000
.304
.951
.264
.981
.087
.019

.586
.000
.063
.669
.258
.954
.072
.003
.009

Table 11: Simple Slopes of Dyadic Mutuality Predicting Theory of Mind Task Scores at
Different Levels of Household Chaos
Diverse Desires
Level of crowding/clutter
+2 SD
+1 SD
M

β
-0.046
0.023
0.092

p
.555
.644
.014

-1 SD
-2 SD

0.161
0.230

.005
.009
Diverse Beliefs

Level of crowding/clutter
+2 SD
+1 SD
M
-1 SD
-2 SD

β
-0.068
0.021
0.111
0.200
0.289

p
.500
.736
.021
.006
.011

Knowledge Access
Level of crowding/clutter
+2 SD

β
-0.022

p
.849

+1 SD
M
-1 SD
-2 SD

0.046
0.114
0.182
0.251

.527
.038
.028
.054
False Belief

Level of crowding/clutter
+2 SD
+1 SD
M

β
0.032
0.102
0.172

p
.732
.107
.000

-1 SD
-2 SD

0.242
0.312

.000
.006
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CHAPTER 4
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CHILD THEORY OF MIND, MENTAL STATE
LANGUAGE USE IN FATHER-PRESCHOOLER DYADS, AND HOUSEHOLD
CHAOS
Interactions between parents and children help direct the course of social cognitive
development (Hughes & Devine, 2015; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). One skill that is
shaped in part by these early social interactions is theory of mind, which refers to the ability
to infer the mental states of the self and others, including understanding that other people
may have different thoughts, knowledge, beliefs, and desires than we do (Wellman, 1990).
Theory of mind develops markedly over the preschool age period (Wellman et al., 2001)
and social interactions, especially with parents, can influence the development of theory of
mind greatly during this time (Devine & Hughes, 2018). The positive benefits of these
social interactions can be disrupted by factors in the environment though, impacting child
development (Evans et al., 2005).
Parent Mental State Language Use
The important social skill of theory of mind develops from early social interactions,
particularly with parents and other family members (Devine & Hughes, 2018; Hughes &
Devine, 2015). While parent behavior during these social interactions has been widely
considered in predicting theory of mind development (e.g. Cahill et al., 2007; Licata et al.,
2016), attention has also been paid to the specific verbal content of these interactions.
Mental state language use describes the usage of terms that reference mental states (e.g. I
know, she thinks, he feels, they want). Usage of these terms by parents during dyadic
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interactions with their children may reflect better attunement to mental states and facilitate
and understanding of other minds in these play sessions (Dunn et al., 1991).
Indeed, parent mental state language has been associated with child theory of mind
abilities both concurrently and longitudinally (see Devine & Hughes, 2018 and Tompkins
et al., 2018 for meta-analyses). Dunn and colleagues (1991) were the first to show evidence
that maternal mental state talk about emotions in toddlerhood predicted later theory of
mind. Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002) built on this work by describing different
categories of mental-state talk terms (i.e. cognitive, emotion, desire, etc.) and further found
that preschool-aged children whose mothers used more mental state talk showed greater
improvement in theory of mind abilities than those whose mothers did not. Moreover,
Peterson and Slaughter (2003) report that mothers differ greatly from one another in their
use of mental state talk and that these differences correlate significantly with their
children’s false-belief outcomes, even when controlling for the child’s verbal ability. Since
this early work, dozens of studies have examined parent mental state talk in relation to
early child theory of mind development (Devine & Hughes, 2018; Tompkins et al., 2018).
Notably, nearly all of this work has been done with mothers. Only one previous
published study to date included an investigation of how mental state language use by
fathers was associated with child theory of mind abilities (LaBounty et al., 2008). As a part
of their investigation, they found that father use of negative emotion language over and
above mother use of emotion language during a picture book reading task and other control
variables was predictive of concurrent theory of mind in 3.5 years old children. However,
there were no other concurrent associations or longitudinal associations between any type
of total father mental state talk terms with theory of mind when the children were 5.5 years
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old. These results suggest that mothers and fathers may differentially influence theory of
mind development through social conversations, but much more research on fathers’ use
of mental state language is needed (Pavarini et al., 2013).
Further, the consistency of parent mental state language use in predicting child
theory of mind abilities is mixed and found to be an overall modest predictor based on
recent meta-analyses (Devine & Hughes, 2018). Several studies have found unexpected
and/or non-existent associations between different aspects of parent mental state language
use and child theory of mind (LaBounty et al., 2008; Ontai & Thompson, 2008; Symons et
al., 2006). One potential reason for the inconsistency in past research may be that other
aspects of the family environment not being measured and tested in the studies serve to
disrupt parent-child interactions (Evans et al., 2005) and limit the observable benefits of
mental state language exposure.
Household Chaos
The larger environmental context that occurs around the family can interfere with
the proximal processes that occur between parents and children (Bronfenbrenner & Morris,
2006). Household chaos in particular has been shown to be detrimental to child
development and to the family system more broadly (see Marsh et al., 2020 for a review).
Chaos in the home is an indicator of a lack of routine, chronic uncertainty, and ever-present
distractors, and is a broad construct combining housing conditions (clutter, crowding, and
traffic), predictability and routines, and noise levels. While household chaos is a chronic
stressor that is more common for those living in poverty or lower socioeconomic status
(Evans et al., 2005), this is not always the case (Valiente et al., 2007) and chaos can be
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informative beyond or independent of other socioeconomic indicators (Deater-Deckard et
al., 2012; Dumas et al., 2005; Lecheile et al., 2020; Pike et al., 2006).
Household chaos has been associated with a wide range of child and family
outcomes (Marsh et al., 2020) including child problem behaviors (Coley et al., 2015), lower
early literacy skills (Johnson et al., 2008), poorer expressive and receptive language skills
(Vernon-Feagans et al., 2012) and poorer executive function skills (Vernon-Feagans et al.,
2016). Given the importance of executive function and language skills for theory of mind
(Benson et al., 2013; Milligan et al., 2007), these findings may be particularly relevant to
the current study. Household chaos has also been found to be a mediator and moderator of
various parent and caregiver behaviors and child outcomes. Consistently, when parenting
behaviors are measured in relation to child outcomes, household chaos has been shown to
worsen the effects of negative parenting and undermine positive parenting behaviors
(Marsh et al., 2020).
It is hypothesized that chaos has such a detrimental impact because it interferes
with the ongoing proximal processes that occur between the child and their immediate
environment (Evans et al., 2005). The increase in noise and clutter and decreased
predictability of the environment and social exchanges with caregivers might hinder the
child’s ability to learn important information from daily social interactions. This lack of
consistent responses from the environment and social partners may impede a child’s ability
to learn appropriate social cognitive skills to interact with and respond to their immediate
environment.
Current Study
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In the current study we will investigate associations between child theory of mind,
mental state language use, and household chaos in a sample of father-preschooler dyads.
We will examine first if father mental state language use is associated with concurrent child
theory of mind. Then, we will examine if household chaos moderates the association
between father mental state language use and child theory of mind. We expect to find that
father mental state language use is positively associated with child theory of mind, such
that greater observed use of mental state language during a dyadic interaction is associated
with higher child theory of mind scores. Additionally, we expect that associations between
mental state language use and theory of mind abilities will vary depending on levels of
chaos reported in the household. Specifically, the association between mental state
language use and theory of mind scores is expected to be strongest in families with the
lowest levels of household chaos, and weakest in families with the highest levels of chaos.
In these analyses, we will control for a number of covariates that have been shown to be
associated with child theory of mind abilities, including child sex (Calero et al., 2013),
child age (Wellman et al., 2001), family SES (Devine & Hughes, 2018), child executive
function (Carlson et al., 2002), and child expressive language ability (Milligan et al., 2007).
Method
Participants
The current study included dyads of 3- to 5-year-old children and their fathers (N
= 88 dyads) from two locations in Springfield, Massachusetts, USA and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, USA. The average age of child participants was 51.22 months (SD = 9.26
months, range = 35-68 months, 51% female), and the average age of father participants
was 39.65 years (SD = 6.82 years, range = 23.83 to 61.75). Dyads were recruited through
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a combination of flyers, public event recruitment, and work with local preschools and
community organizations. Families were paid $25 for their participation and children
received stickers and a toy. Twenty-six percent of the families participated from the greater
Springfield, MA area and the remaining 74% participated from the greater Philadelphia,
PA area.
Fathers completed questionnaires including demographic information. Information
on child race and ethnicity, total household income, and parent education are included in
Table 1. Race and ethnicity are broadly characteristic of the regions in which data were
collected. There is variability in household income and education, but the sample skews
towards more highly educated and higher income than the regions data were collected in
(Springfield, MA median household income = $36, 730 and 18.6% of adults hold a
Bachelor’s degree or higher; Philadelphia, PA median household income = $43,744 and
28.6% of adults hold a Bachelor’s degree or higher; retrieved from census.gov). Further,
for 76 of the families (86%), the participating father was the child’s biological father. In
terms of siblings, the study child was the only child in 31% of the families. Forty-eight
percent of the families had two children in the home, and 15.9% of families had more than
two children. Three percent of participants did not answer the question as to how many
children were in the home. There was variability in family structure in the study sample
though most fathers (87.5%) reported co-parenting with the child’s biological mother.
Questionnaires referred to the second parent as “parent two”, and we report this as
“mother/parent two”. We do not have data on the residential status of the fathers in this
sample.
Procedures
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Children and their fathers participated either by visiting the research laboratory or
through data collection taking place at the child’s preschool or home. Fathers were
informed of all study procedures and signed a consent form. Verbal assent was obtained
from the child before beginning study procedures. Fathers completed questionnaires on a
tablet while children completed a battery of executive function and theory of mind tasks as
well as an expressive language assessment. Fathers and children then completed two 5minute dyadic interaction tasks – one where they worked together to complete a marble
maze and a session where they worked together to draw pictures using a Etch-A-Sketch
drawing toy. Each individual was assigned a dial so that the pair had to co-operate to
complete each task (Deater-Deckard & Petrill, 2004; Helm et al., 2020; Stevenson-Hinde
& Shouldice, 1995). All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board of
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Measures
Mental state language use. The dyadic interaction tasks were video-taped and
transcribed for coding. Transcripts were coded for use of mental state language using a
modified version of the scale use by Ruffman and colleagues (see Ruffman, Slade, &
Crowe, 2002 for a full coding scheme; see Appendix A for full coding scheme with
modifications). Briefly, mental state language included: cognitive terms (e.g. think, know),
desire terms (e.g. want, like), emotion terms (e.g. happy, sad), modulations of assertions
(e.g. might, maybe, probably), and other mental state terms (e.g. remember, idea) (Table
2). Transcriptions were reviewed and one-hundred percent double-coded by a team of
trained coders. Since the goal was to achieve one-hundred percent agreement on codes,
videos were then consensus coded to reach full agreement on final codes used in analyses.
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Codes for each category were totaled across the two tasks as well as total terms used, for
six parent mental state language variables. Sixteen interaction tasks could not be included
in analyses: thirteen dyads spoke in a non-English language that could not be translated for
more than one total minute of the interaction, one dyad did not complete the interaction,
and two video files were corrupted or had other technical issues (N = 72).
All remaining measures described for Chapter 4 below are the same as presented in
Chapter 3.
Theory of Mind. The first four items from the Wellman and Liu (2004) scale were
used, including diverse-desires, diverse-beliefs, knowledge-access, and contents falsebelief tasks. Only the first four items were used because of time constraints in the larger
study and because children under the age of 5 years are generally unable to pass the
remaining three items in the scale (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2020; Wellman & Liu, 2004). In
each condition, the child is told a short vignette and asked questions about the characters’
desires, beliefs, or knowledge. In the diverse desires condition, children must correctly
answer that the character in the story prefers a different snack than them. In the diverse
beliefs condition, the child must correctly answer that the character believes her lost cat to
be in the opposite location chosen by the child. In the knowledge access condition, children
must correctly answer both that a character does not know what is in the box and that they
had not seen in the box. In the contents false belief condition, the child must correctly
identify that the character will assume a band-aid box has band-aids instead, even though
the child knows that there are really crayons inside. Children received one point for every
task they passed, thus higher scores indicate better theory of mind understanding. Three
children did not complete the theory of mind assessment (N = 85).
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Household Chaos. Parents completed a modified version of the Chaos, Hubbub,
and Order Scale (CHAOS: Matheny et al., 1995). The modified scale includes six Likerttype scale items that assess the home environment. The six items are: ‘You can’t hear
yourself think in our home’, ‘It’s a real zoo in our home’, ‘There is usually a television
turned on somewhere in our home’, ‘We are usually able to stay on top of things’ (reverse
scored), ‘I have a regular morning routine’ (reverse scored), and ‘The atmosphere in our
house is calm’ (reverse scored). These are rated on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 indicates
“Definitely untrue of our home”, 2 = “Somewhat untrue”, 3 = “Neither untrue nor true”, 4
= “Somewhat true”, and 5 = “Definitely true”. Scores on the CHAOS scale have been
shown to reliably measure environmental processes distinctly different from
sociodemographic measures (Matheny et al., 1995). One-year test-retest reliability has
been reported to range from .70 to .80 (Deater-Deckard et al., 2009). Though the validity
of the modified 6-item scale has not yet been examined directly in relation to the original
15-item scale, the 6-item version has been used in over 42 studies around the world (Chang
et al., 2019; Marsh et al., 2020). Scale reliability was acceptable and consistent with prior
studies ( = .53; e.g. Chen et al., 2014; Coldwell et al., 2006). Two families did not
complete the chaos questionnaire (N = 86).
Covariates. We examined a number of covariates in the current study that have
been shown to be associated with child theory of mind abilities, including child sex (Calero
et al., 2013), child age (Wellman et al., 2001), family SES (Devine & Hughes, 2018), child
executive function (Carlson et al., 2002), and child expressive language ability (Milligan
et al., 2007). For child sex, male was coded as 0 and female as 1. Two families did not
report child sex (N = 86). Child age was computed in months from birthdate to date of visit.

123

The correct birthdate was missing for four families (N = 84). We also controlled for the
site of study data collection because of the uneven distribution where data was collected.
Springfield, MA was coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA as 1.
Family SES. Family SES was computed as an average score of total household
income and father and mother/parent two education levels. Household income and parent
education levels were highly correlated (father: r = .516, p < .001; mother/parent two: r =
.621, p < .001). Variables were standardized and averaged for every family that had at least
one of the SES variables (four families were missing one of the variables). The average
was standardized again to yield a composite z-score that was widely and normally
distributed. Two families were missing data on all SES variables (N = 86).
Child Executive Function. Child executive function was computed as a composite
score (Rushton et al., 1983) of performance on three tasks assessing working memory,
cognitive flexibility, and inhibitory control – Digit Span (Wechsler, 1986; Helm et al.,
2020), Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Zelazo et al., 1996), and Bear/Dragon
(Carlson et al., 2002) – consistent with literature in this age range (Hughes et al., 2010;
Wiebe et al., 2008).
Digit Span. A forward digit span task was administered to assess working
memory. A backward digit span was also attempted but was too difficult for the majority
of the participants, which is consistent with the literature in this age range (Bull et al., 2008;
Houwen et al., 2019). For this task, based on previous work (Wechsler, 1986; Helm et al.,
2020), children were presented with sequences of digits and instructed to repeat the
sequences. Two practice trials of sequences two digits in length were given to ensure
understanding and then the task began. Two trials of the same length sequence were
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presented, and children were allowed one recall attempt for each sequence. If the child
recalled at least one of the two trials correctly, the length of the sequence increased by one
digit. The sequences were lengthened until errors were produced on two consecutive trials
of the same length (Blankenship et al., 2019). The highest number of correct trials on the
forward digit span was used. Thirteen children were unable to understand the rules and
complete the task, or otherwise unable to complete the task due to fatigue (N = 75).
DCCS. For the DCCS (Zelazo et al., 1996), children were instructed to sort
cards based on two dimensions (i.e., color, shape). Children first sorted five cards by one
dimension (pre-switch; counterbalanced across participants) and then were instructed to
switch and to sort the remaining five cards by the other dimension (post-switch).
Performance was scored as the total of correct post-switch responses. Two children were
unable to complete the DCCS (N = 86).
Bear/Dragon. The Bear/Dragon task followed administration procedures
outlined by Carlson and colleagues (see Carlson et al., 2002 for full procedure). Briefly,
children were introduced to two engaging puppets (a ‘‘good bear’’ and a ‘‘bad dragon’’)
and told to do what the bear asked them to do but not what the dragon asked them to do.
Children passed practice trials if they followed the bear’s command but ignored the
dragon’s command. Ten test trials were administered with alternating bear and dragon
commands. After five test trials, all children received a reminder of the rules regardless of
performance.
Each child’s performance was coded independently by two coders (each child
received two sets of scores, one from each coder). For the Bear trials, scores ranged from
0 (failure to move), 1 (wrong movement: e.g., touches nose when told to clap hands), 2
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(partial commanded movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands and brings hands together
but does not clap), and 3 (full commanded movement: e.g. commanded to clap hands and
claps hands), for a possible total score of 15. For Dragon trials, scores ranged from 0 (full
commanded movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands and claps hands), 1 (wrong
movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands and touches nose), 2 (partial commanded
movement: e.g., commanded to clap hands, begins to move hands together then stops), 3
(no movement plus strategy [anything the child deliberately does to help prevent them from
performing a full commanded movement]: e.g., shakes head, sits on hands, clasps hands
together, says “no”) and 4 (no movement, no strategy: e.g., commanded to clap hands, does
nothing), for a possible total score of 20 (Shamblaw et al., 2019).
Since we were looking for complete agreement between coders for each child, any
video that had a discrepancy in codes between the coders was viewed again by the coders
together to try to reach consensus. Seventeen videos had to be watched and coded again to
reach consensus. Performance on dragon trials was used in analysis. Fifteen children were
unable to complete the task or did not pass the rule check (N = 73).
To estimate the overall EF construct, we computed and analyzed a single composite
score representing inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and working memory, which is
consistent with previous literature in this age group (Hughes et al., 2010, Wiebe et al.,
2008). The first principal component among the three task scores explained 52.57% of the
variance (λ = .55–.85). All three scores were standardized and averaged for every child
who had at least two task scores. Thirteen children were missing one of the task scores.
Two children were missing more than one of the tasks included in the composite (N = 86).
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The average score was standardized again to yield a composite z-score that was widely and
normally distributed. A higher score reflected better executive function abilities.
Expressive Language. Children completed the Expressive Vocabulary Test Second
Edition (EVT-2; Williams, 1997) to measure expressive language abilities. Five children
did not complete the EVT (N=83).
Results
Planned analyses
We first report the descriptive statistics for study variables (Table 3) as well as
bivariate correlations to understand patterns of variance and covariance between the study
variables and covariates (Table 4). Neither father total mental state language use nor
household chaos was associated with child theory of mind scores. Total father mental state
language was negatively correlated with household chaos (r = -.244, p = .042).
For covariates, greater child expressive language ability (r = .346, p = .001), child
executive function (r = .654, p < .001), and child age (r = .515, p < .001) were all
significantly correlated with better child theory of mind performance. Higher SES (r =
.402, p < .001), greater child expressive language ability (r = .334, p = .005), and living in
Philadelphia compared to Springfield (MA) (r = .398, p < .001) were all significantly
correlated with greater father mental state language use. Child sex was not significantly
correlated with any of the main study variables.
To test the hypothesized main effect of father mental state language use on child
theory of mind, and moderating effect of household chaos on the association between father
mental state language use and child theory of mind, we estimated a hierarchical regression
equation (standardized variables provided mean-centered predictors) in two steps to
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explain variance in child theory of mind scores; Step One: child sex (Male = 0, Female =
1), SES (z), child age in months, study site (Springfield, MA = 0, Philadelphia, PA = 1),
child executive function (z), child expressive language ability, father mental state language
use (z), household chaos (z), and Step Two: father mental state language use X household
chaos (z).
The first step of the equation explained 55.9% of the variance in child theory of
mind, F(8, 64) = 11.124, p < .001 (Table 4). There were significant main effects of several
covariates, including child age (β = .49, p < .001), child executive function (β = .37, p =
.004), and child expressive language ability (β = .34, p = .002), such that older children,
children with higher scores on executive function tasks, and children with higher scores on
expressive language measures performed better on theory of mind tasks controlling for all
other study variables.
There were no observed significant main effects of father mental state language use
(β = -.08, p = .437) or household chaos (β = -.04, p = .673) on child theory of mind. There
was also no significant interaction between household chaos and father mental state
language use (β = .01, p = .961) in predicting child theory of mind, controlling for other
variables. The final full equation explained 55.1% of the variance in child theory of mind,
F(9, 64) = 9.71, p < .001, and this second step accounted for a 0.8% reduction of the
variance in predicting child theory of mind scores (Table 5).
Exploratory analyses
After conducting the planned analyses, we sought to explore a few additional
hypotheses that were not outlined earlier in the paper. We describe each in turn below.
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Child Mental State Talk. While a good deal of research has focused on parental use
of mental state language predicting children’s theory of mind, children’s own proclivity to
use mental state language has also previously been shown to be correlated with their
Theory of mind scores during the preschool time period (Carr et al., 2018). We sought to
examine children’s own use of mental state language during the parent-child dyadic
interaction and any association with child theory of mind, household chaos, and study
covariates.
We examined descriptive statistics from child mental state language use (Table 6)
and correlations between child mental state talk, household chaos, theory of mind, and
study covariates (Table 7). Neither child total mental state language use nor household
chaos was associated with child theory of mind scores. Total child mental state language
was negatively correlated with household chaos (r = -.240, p = .045). For covariates, as
presented above, child expressive language ability (r = .346, p = .001), child executive
function (r = .654, p < .001), and child age (r = .515, p < .001) were all significantly
correlated with child theory of mind. No covariates were found to be significantly
correlated with child mental state language use.
Mental State Term Categories. Research on mental state language use often breaks
down this construct into several distinct categories, though the exact categories and what
comprises each category appears to be highly heterogenous across studies (e.g. Ensor &
Hughes, 2008; Ruffman et al., 2002). In the current study, we considered five categories
of mental-state language when coding, including cognitive terms, emotion terms, desire
terms, modulation of assertion terms, and other mental state terms, in line with Ruffman
and colleagues (Ruffman et al., 2002). These distinct categories have been shown to be
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differentially related to child theory of mind scores. In particular, a recent meta-analysis
found that cognitive terms were found to be a significantly greater predictor of theory of
mind scores than emotion and desire terms (Tompkins et al., 2018). Also of relevance for
the current study, the one previously published study on father use of mental state language
use found that only negative emotion terms used by fathers were associated with child
theory of mind abilities (LaBounty et al., 2008). We sought to examine how the individual
categories of father and child mental state talk were associated with each other, as well as
child theory of mind and household chaos.
We examined correlations between father and child mental state talk by category,
household chaos, and child theory of mind (Table 8). Two categories of mental state
language use were found to be significantly associated with higher child theory of mind
scores: more father modulation of assertion use (r = .270, p = .024) and more child other
mental state term use (r = .368, p = .002). As reported before, greater total father and child
mental state language was correlated with less household chaos (r = -.244, p = .042; r = .240, p = .045), and for specific categories, only more father desire term use was
significantly correlated with less household chaos (r = -.258, p = .031). Greater father and
child mental state language was significantly correlated for total terms (r = .269, p = .022),
emotion terms (r = .310, p = .008), desire terms (r = .393, p < .001), and modulation terms
(r = .308, p = .009), but not cognitive or other mental state terms.
Discussion
The current study examined associations between mental state language use,
household chaos, and child theory of mind in a sample of father and preschool child dyads.
We sought to address two primary questions using a variety of observational, behavioral,
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and parent-report measures. The first asked if father mental state language use was
associated with child theory of mind. Maternal mental state language use has been shown
to be a moderately significant predictor of child theory of mind (Devine & Hughes, 2018;
Tompkins et al., 2018), but the only previous study examining paternal mental state
language use found only the emotion category of mental state language was associated with
child theory of mind (LaBounty et al., 2008). Despite this one previous finding, we still
expected to find that greater observed total father mental state language use would be
associated higher child theory of mind scores, because of the limited evidence thus far with
fathers, and the modestly significant associations found in meta-analyses (Devine &
Hughes, 2018; Tompkins et al., 2018). Some previous studies examining parent mental
state language use in relation to theory of mind have however found inconsistent results
(LaBounty et al., 2008; Ontai & Thompson, 2008; Symons et al., 2006). To address this,
the study asked a second question to understand how the contextual factor of household
chaos might moderate the association between father mental state language use and child
theory of mind. We expected based on theory from Evans and colleagues (Evans et al.,
2005) that household chaos would have a moderating effect on associations between father
mental state language use and child theory of mind, where associations would be strongest
in households rated lower in chaos. Finally, we conducted exploratory analyses to examine
how individual categories of both child and father mental state language use were
associated with each other and with child theory of mind and household chaos.
We did not find that total father mental state language use was associated with
concurrent child theory of mind abilities. We further did not observe any main effects of
father mental state language use or household chaos, nor did we observe any significant
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interactions between father mental state language use and household chaos in predicting
child theory of mind scores.
In subsequent analyses, breaking the mental state language use down into
categories led to the finding of one specific category of parent mental state language use
that was positively correlated with child theory of mind--modulations of assertion. The
modulations of assertion category refers to terms that indicate the degree of certainty about
a statement, and this category has not been well examined in the current literature. The
dyadic interaction used to observe mental state language was a structured play task, and it
may be that this type of task elicits more modulation of assertion terms (e.g. “Do you think
that maybe we should turn the dial that way?” or “That will probably work, should we try
it?”), as opposed to picture book or reminiscing tasks that may elicit more emotion and
cognitive talk. Indeed, the type of task used to measure mental state language use has been
shown to be important (Farkas et al., 2018), suggesting that mental state language use, and
that categories that comprise it, may be context dependent. Additionally, the amount of
time that children spend in non-home environments is likely important to consider as well,
as mental state language use by teachers has also been found to influence child theory of
mind in middle childhood (Lecce et al., 2021). Future research should consider using
multiple different types of interactions to get a full picture of the daily mental state
language exposure for the child.
Along a similar vein, the extant literature makes use of several different types of
coding schemes (e.g. Ruffman et al., 2002; Ensor & Hughes, 2008). These various coding
schemes are not only comprised of different and overlapping categories, but the categories
themselves are comprised of varying terms. For example, the cognitive terms category in
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the Ensor and Hughes coding scheme (2008) includes the words think, know, forgot, mean,
idea, understand, and others, where the Ruffman and colleagues coding scheme (2002)
only includes think and know, and the other terms mentioned above would fall under the
other mental state term category. While total mental state talk is often the construct of
interest and less likely to be impacted by variations in category construction, there are cases
where this might still matter, such as how modulations of assertion are not included in the
Ensor and Hughes (2008) coding scheme at all. Further, some studies on mental state talk
consider additional dimensions of conversation, including causal explanatory language
(e.g. Farkas et al., 2018; LaBounty et al., 2008) and the referent of the statements (e.g.
Tompkins et al., 2018). Future research should consider specifying what the field intends
to measure as mental state language for more comprehensive cross-study comparison, and
a more thorough discussion of this particular topic can be found in Chapter 6.
Importantly, we did find that household chaos was negatively correlated with both
father and child mental state language use, suggesting that higher levels of chaos in the
home are associated with lower overall mental state language use. While not found to
moderate the association between father mental state language and child theory of mind,
these findings are still consistent with the idea that higher levels of chaos in the home can
impact parent and child functioning (Evans et al., 2005). It may be that homes with higher
levels of chaos have fewer opportunities to engage in interactions that prompt the use of
mental state language, or possibly that these interactions are impacted by higher levels of
noise or crowding. As discussed in Chapter 3, future studies should consider including
additional measure of chaos (Coley et al., 2015; Vernon-Feagans et al., 2016; Whitesell et
al., 2015), including the processes involved in chaos via qualitative data (Weisner, 2010).
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This data can provide a more comprehensive understanding of how different facets of chaos
may differentially impact family and child outcomes.
There are some additional limitations to consider for the current study. First, among
the families whose dyadic data was included in analyses, not all of the families spoke
English as the primary language in their home, and we do not have data on the estimated
percentage of time spent speaking in English in the home. These families may not have felt
comfortable engaging in the task as the would have at home in a different language. We
further were not able to include 13 families in the original study in these analyses because
their interaction task was completed in a non-English language that could not be translated
by the transcriber. This drastically limited the power of the current study and therefore our
ability to accurately determine the role that father mental state language plays in theory of
mind development. Very few studies have considered mental-state language in nonEnglish contexts, but future research should consider allowing families to complete
interaction tasks in the language most comfortable for them to more accurately measure
mental state language exposure.
Despite these limitations and unexpected findings, the current study furthers our
understanding of how environmental factors might impact family functioning. We found
that household chaos is negatively correlated with levels of father and child mental state
language use. While chaos was not observed to moderate any association between father
mental state language use and child theory of mind outcomes, findings suggest that
household chaos may impact the amount of mental state language occurring in parent-child
interactions, which is consistent with the idea the contextual factors like household chaos
can disrupt these proximal processes over the course of child development. We hope that
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our findings provide additional directions for future research to help us better understand
how familial and contextual factors interact to influence early social cognitive
development.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Sample Demographic Information
Total Household Income
$5,000 - $15,999
$16,000 - $24,999
$25,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 or greater
Do not know/No response
Child Race/Ethnicity
Asian
Black/African American
Hispanic or Latinx
Middle Eastern/North African
White
Another race not listed
Biracial/Multiracial/Multiethnic
No response
Highest Education - Father
8th Grade or Less
Some High School
High School/GED
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
M.D., Ph.D., J.D. or Equivalent
No response
Highest Education – Parent 2/Mother
8th Grade or Less
Some High School
High School/GED
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
M.D., Ph.D., J.D. or Equivalent
No response
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4.5%
4.5%
6.8%
9.1%
18.2%
17.0%
35.2%
4.6%
15.9%
13.6%
7.9%
1.1%
40.9%
2.3%
17.1%
1.1%
2.3%
1.1%
22.7%
3.4%
20.5%
17.0%
30.7%
2.3%
1.1%
1.1%
12.5%
3.4%
21.6%
30.7%
22.7%
6.8%

Table 2: Mental State Terms Used by Dyads
Category
Terms Used
Cognitive
Think, Know, Believe
Emotion

Excited, Angry, Sad, Surprised, Scared, Love,
Fun, Feel, Happy, Proud, Frustrated

Desire

Prefer, Like, Want, Love

Modulations of Assertion

Must, Probably, Maybe, Figure, Guess,
Possibly, Sure, Wonder, Might, Could be,
Definitely

Other Mental State Terms

Remember, Idea, Forget, Mean, Understand,
Pretend, Realize, Ignore
Notes: Bolded terms were most frequently used (i.e. more than 5 total times across all
dyads).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
M
Theory of Mind Scale Score
Total Father Mental State Terms (z)
Total Father Mental State Terms
Cognitive Terms
Emotion Terms
Desire Terms
Modulation of Assertion Terms
Other Mental State Terms
Household Chaos
Executive Function Composite Score (z)
Bear/Dragon
DCCS Post
Forward Digit Span
EVT – Standard Score
Child Age (months)
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SD
2.39
0.00
14.51
4.78
0.64
6.76
1.47
0.86
1.99
0.00
15.92
4.62
3.79
105.49
51.33

Min
1.25
1.00
10.46
4.49
1.19
6.18
1.91
1.13
0.59
1.00
5.65
1.06
1.14
14.56
9.26

0.00
-1.29
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
-3.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
74.00
35.00

Max
4.00
2.63
42.00
23.00
5.00
29.00
9.00
5.00
3.50
1.39
20.00
5.00
5.00
141.00
68.00

Table 4: Correlations Between Variables Used in Analysis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. ToM Score 1
2. MSL
.086
1
3. HC
-.071
-.244* 1
4. EF Score
.654** .215
-.151 1
5. SES
.193
.402** -.181 .231* 1
6. EVT
.346** .334** -.073 .324*
.292* 1
7. Age
.515** -.114
.042 .437** -.195
-.235* 1
8. Child sex
.206
.102
.131 .266*
.132
.148
.055 1
9. Site
.173
.398** -.205 .323*
.674** .226* -.073 .148 1
Notes:
** indicates significance at the .001 level and * at the.05 level.
ToM = theory of mind, MSL = observed father mental state language use total, HC =
household chaos, EF = executive function, SES = socioeconomic status, EVT =
expressive vocabulary standard score
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For age, child age is in months.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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Table 5: Multiple Regression Analysis
B
S.E.
β
t
Step One
F(8,64) = 11.124, p < .001; R2 = .559
SES (z)
.154
.148
.127
1.038
Child age
.063
.015
.492
4.086
Executive Function (z)
.476
.160
.365
2.973
EVT Standard Score
.028
.009
.335
3.198
Child sex
.128
.217
.053
.591
Study site
-.371
.328
-.129 -1.133
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.087
.112
-.075
-.783
Household Chaos (z)
-.047
.112
-.039
-.424
Step Two
F(9,64) = 9.712, p < .001; R2 = .551
F = -1.412; R2 = -.008
SES (z)
.154
.149
.127
1.028
Child age
.063
.016
.492
4.045
Executive Function (z)
.476
.162
.365
2.922
EVT Standard Score
.028
.009
.335
3.149
Child sex
.128
.219
.053
.582
Study site
-.371
.331
-.129 -1.124
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.086
.115
-.074
-.749
Household Chaos (z)
-.046
.115
-.038
-.403
Parent Mental State Language X Chaos (z)
.005
.102
.004
.048
Note:
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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p

.304
.000
.004
.002
.557
.262
.437
.673

.308
.000
.005
.003
.563
.266
.457
.688
.961

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
M
0.00
2.75
0.64
0.18
1.68
0.15
0.10

Total Child Mental State Terms (z)
Total Child Mental State Terms
Cognitive Terms
Emotion Terms
Desire Terms
Modulation of Assertion Terms
Other Mental State Terms
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SD
1.00
2.57
1.56
0.48
2.13
0.52
0.30

Min
-1.07
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max
3.61
12.00
9.00
2.00
9.00
3.00
1.00

Table 7: Correlations Between Variables Used in Analysis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. ToM Score 1
2. MSL-C
.067
1
3. HC
-.071
-.240* 1
4. EF Score
.654** .028
-.151 1
5. SES
.193
.113
-.181 .231* 1
6. EVT
.346** .114
-.073 .324*
.292* 1
7. Age
.515** .054
.042 .437** -.195
-.235* 1
8. Child sex
.206
-.004
.131 .266*
.132
.148
.055 1
9. Site
.173
.146
-.205 .323*
.674** .226* -.073 .148 1
Notes:
** indicates significance at the .001 level and * at the.05 level.
ToM = theory of mind, MSL-C = observed child mental state language use total, HC =
household chaos, EF = executive function, SES = socioeconomic status, EVT =
expressive vocabulary standard score
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For age, child age is in months.
For study site, Springfield, MA is coded as 0 and Philadelphia, PA is coded as 1.
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Table 8: Exploratory Analysis Correlations Between Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1. ToM
1
2. HC
-.071 1
3. P Tot
.086 -.244* 1
4. P Cog
.109 -.137
.767** 1
5. P Emo
.146 -.053
.488** .406** 1
6. P Des
-.079 -.258* .783** .264*
.226 1
7. P Mod
.270* -.153
.548** .496** .224
.165
1
8. P Oth
.198
.013
.485** .416** .234* .207
.272* 1
9. C Tot
.067 -.240* .269*
.213
.141
.243*
.067
.056 1
10. C Cog .168 -.123 -.153
-.072
-.003 -.171
-.070
-.077 .537** 1
11. C Emo .052 -.081
.212
.148
.310* .104
.104
.304* .343*
.386** 1
12. C Des -.142 -.144
.321*
.177
.054
.393** .034
-.001 .666** -.197
-.135 1
13. C Mod .140 -.122
.290*
.454** .272* -.015
.308** .156 .197
.051
.057 -.057 1
14. C Oth
.368* -.005 -.021
-.089
-.138
.036
-.008
.124 .143
.077
.169 -.061 -.006 1
Notes:
** indicates significance at the .001 level and * at the.05 level.
ToM = theory of mind, HC = household chaos, Tot = Total Terms, Cog = Cognitive Terms, Emo = Emotion Terms, Des = Desire
Terms, Mod = Modulation of Assertion Terms, and Oth = Other Mental State Terms.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN OBSERVED MENTAL STATE LANGUAGE AND
CORTICAL THICKNESS IN CHILDHOOD
Decades of research have provided us insight into the behavioral development of
theory of mind and the factors that influence it (Poulin-Dubois, 2020). However, until fairly
recently, substantially less consideration has been given to the neural development of this
important social cognitive skill. Early work in this domain using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) has consistently demonstrated that the bilateral temporal
parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) are engaged when adults
are using theory of mind skills during false-belief tasks (see Schurz et al., 2014 for metaanalyses). These findings are further replicated in adolescents and school-age children (512 years; Gweon et al., 2012; Saxe et al., 2009). Activity in these brain regions associated
with theory of mind use appears to become more specified as children get older, meaning
that activity during task completion becomes more robust and localized to these areas.
It is considerably more difficult to ask young children to complete tasks within the
fMRI scanner. Importantly though, there have been two recent studies using structural MRI
and resting state fMRI measures in conjunction with behavioral theory of mind
performance. By examining the neural correlates of parent-reported theory of mind for 4to 8-year-old children, researchers found that connectivity between the right and left TPJ
and the mPFC were related to components of parent-reported theory of mind (Xiao et al.,
2019). Another study examined white matter connectivity at rest for 3- to 4-year-old
children in relation to behavioral performance on implicit and explicit false-belief tasks
and found age-related changes in white matter in regions shown to be associated with false
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belief understanding (TPJ, mPFC: Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017). The associations with
white matter development were specific for the emergence of explicit false belief
understanding, independent of implicit false belief understanding. Understanding white
matter, functional connectivity, and the development of neural structures supporting theory
of mind development will be very important to the study of social cognition broadly and
the function of the social brain network (Wang & Olson, 2018; Wang et al., 2018).
As mentioned above, the measurement constraints of fMRI can make it
considerably more difficult to replicate findings in very young children. In these cases,
alternative psychophysiological measures such as electroencephalogram (EEG/ERP) or
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) are essential for elucidating activity and
processes associated with social cognition. Even so, studies examining concurrent neural
or physiological activity in preschool-aged children (3- to 5-years of age) or younger during
active task completion remain scarce. The limited research available shows that individual
differences in EEG alpha activity localized to the dorsal MPFC and right TPJ are associated
with better theory of mind performance (Sabbagh et al., 2009). Interestingly, Hyde and
colleagues show that the TPJ is activated during passive viewing of false-belief scenarios
in 7-month-old infants (Hyde et al., 2018) though no activation in the mPFC was observed.
These findings provide support for the existence of early implicit false belief understanding
present even in infancy. The limited research available suggests that the TPJ may be
recruited early in development for social cognitive processes, but that connectivity and
recruitment of the mPFC allows for the onset of explicit ToM (Bowman et al., 2019; Grosse
Wiesmann et al., 2017; Hyde et al., 2018).
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Taken together, these findings suggest a robust theory of mind network in the brain
whose origins may even be present in infancy. It appears likely that functional changes in
connectivity in the brain between critical brain regions involved in social cognition are
fundamentally involved in the maturation of explicit theory of mind understanding in early
childhood. Given the important roles that brain development and experience individually
play in theory of mind acquisition, it is vital to consider how experience may be interacting
with neural function to influence theory of mind development.
But, to date, no work has examined the influence of the parental language
environment in relation to the neural structures associated with theory of mind
development. Similar to behavioral work examining theory of mind outcomes, it may be
that greater exposure to mental-state language supports the structural maturation of the
regions involved in theory of mind use and the connectivity between them. While no work
has yet examined this hypothesis with mental state language specifically, recent findings
support the possibility of this by indicating the influence of overall language in brain
structure and function. Grosse Wiesmann and colleagues (2017) show that explicit false
belief understanding was specifically related to the degree of which the TPJ connected to
the anterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) through the arcuate fasciculus (AF), two areas
heavily involved in language (Friederici, 2009). In older children and adults, gains in
language abilities are associated with changes in white matter structures (Keller & Just,
2009; Yeatman et al., 2012). This is observed in preschool age children as well (Walton et
al., 2017). The development of white matter tracts may further be environmentally
influenced by the amount of adult-child conversational experience, evidenced by
associations between greater exposure to dialectic interaction and stronger, more coherent
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white matter connectivity in the AF and the IFG (Romeo et al., 2018). Whether the specific
content of language used, such as mental state language, might have a similar impact
remains an open question.
Functional analyses are confounded by skill because activation can differ as a
function of accuracy and response times. Structure, in contrast, is more stable and less
dependent on performance in the moment, so therefore can be a better marker of cumulative
experience with mental state language, and practice with ToM. Practice with ToM is
associated with changes in cortical thickness in adults, with adults who showed greater
improvements in ToM showing bigger increases in cortical thickness (Valk et al., 2017).
Examining possible individual differences in cortical thickness, or the distance between
the white matter and pial surface at each cortex location (Fischl & Dale, 2000), related to
mental state language exposure and use will be a useful first step towards understanding
environmental influences on the neural development of structures supporting theory of
mind development.
Current Study
In the current study, we will investigate the associations between parent and child
mental state language use and cortical thickness in a sample of school-aged children. We
will first examine if parent mental state language use during a dyadic interaction is
associated with the cortical thickness of two particular theory of mind brain regions, the
bilateral TPJ and mPFC. We will then examine the same questions, but instead
investigating child mental state language use during the dyadic interaction. We expect to
find that overall greater mental state language use by parents is associated with greater
cortical thickness in the specific theory of mind brain regions. We further expect to find
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this same pattern when examining child mental state language use in relation to cortical
thickness. In these analyses, we will control for a number of covariates that have been
shown to be associated with mental state language use and/or child theory of mind abilities,
including child age (Wellman et al., 2001), child sex (Calero et al., 2013), and family SES
(Devine & Hughes, 2018). We will also control for mean cortical thickness in each
hemisphere.
Method
Participants
Participants for the current study were 3- to 11-year-old children and a parent (N =
212 total; 55.2% female, 44.8% male) recruited from the greater Philadelphia area as a part
of a larger study on environmental influences on brain development. Recruitment occurred
through local schools, outreach programs, community family events, and advertisements
locally and on social media. Study procedures were approved by the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Pennsylvania, and parents provided informed, written consent,
and children provided assent. Parent reported demographic data for the full sample is
presented in Table 1. Data were collected between June 2018 and March 2020.
Procedure
Among other tasks for the larger study, children completed structural and functional
neuroimaging scans at one visit (Mage = 6.38 years, SD = 1.46 years) and a subset of parentchild dyads completed a 15-minute interaction task modeled after the Three Bags Task
(Love et al., 2005) at another visit (Mage = 6.16 years, SD = 1.45 years). For the current
study, we will use the structural MRI data collected to measure cortical thickness, and one
part of the interaction task, a five-minute section where dyads read a wordless picture book
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together (Mr. Wuffles! By David Wiesner), to measure observed mental state language use.
Of the 212 families in the study, 74 families had usable data for both the parent-child
interaction task and child MRI scans, and will be included in the current analyses.
Measures
Mental state language use. The five-minute dyadic interaction task using the
wordless picture book (Mr. Wuffles! by David Wiesner) was video-taped and transcribed
for coding. Transcripts were coded for use of mental state language by parents and children
using a modified version of the scale use by Ruffman and colleagues (see Ruffman, Slade,
& Crowe, 2002 for a full coding scheme; see Appendix A for full coding scheme with
modifications). Briefly, mental state language included: cognitive terms (e.g. think, know),
desire terms (e.g. want, like), emotion terms (e.g. happy, sad), modulations of assertions
(e.g. might, maybe, probably), and other mental state terms (e.g. remember, idea). Thirty
percent of the videos were double-coded by a team of trained coders. Codes for each
category were calculated as well as total terms used, for six parent and six child mental
state language variables (Table 2). Total mental state language use by parents and children
each are included for analysis in the current study. Coders for mental state language were
highly reliable, and cohen’s kappa for total parent mental state language use was .897 and
for total child mental state language use was .922. Of the total sample, 104 families
completed the parent-child interactions tasks, and data was missing on one family who
completed the task in a non-English language that was not able to be translated for data
analysis. Of the remaining 103 families, 76.7% of children completed the interaction with
their mother, 13.6% with their father, and parent information was not available on the
remaining 9.7% of dyads.
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Cortical Thickness. Data were acquired at the Center for Advanced Magnetic
Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy (CAMRIS) at the University of Pennsylvania.
Participants underwent a mock scan to acclimate to the scanning environment and practiced
staying still by watching a movie that would pause each time they moved their heads by
more than 1 mm, for about 10 minutes. Scanning was performed using a Siemens
MAGNETOM Prisma 3T MRI scanner with a 32-channel coil. A whole-brain, highresolution, T1-weighted 3D-encoded multi-echo structural scan (MPRAGE) was collected
(acquisition parameters: TR = 2530 ms, TE = 1.69 ms/3.55 ms/5.41 ms/7.27 ms, BW = 650
Hz/px, 3x GRAPPA, flip angle = 7°, voxel size = 1 mm isotropic, matrix size = 256 × 256,
176 sagittal slices, FOV = 256 mm; total scan time = 4:38). This sequence included
interleaved volumetric navigators (vNavs) prospective motion correction system, which
tracked the subject's head motion and corrected the imaging coordinates to follow the
subject's motion in real time (Tisdall et al., 2012). This method has been shown, when
using a very similar scanning protocol, to significantly reduce motion-induced biases in
cortical thickness measures (Tisdall et al., 2016).
Two trained coders who were unaware of participant information rated structural
images for quality on a scale of 1 (highest quality) to 4 (lowest quality) based on a visual
guide of artifacts associated with motion. Ratings were averaged unless they differed by
more than one point, in which case, a third rater made a final decision.
Structural analyses were conducted in FreeSurfer Version 5.3 (Fischl et al., 2002,
2004). Surfaces were edited as needed, and final surfaces were checked by a coder who
was unaware of participant information. Each participant’s surface image was resampled
to a standard brain (fsaverage) and smoothed with a 15-mm full-width half-maximum
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kernel. Cortical thickness values, defined at the distance between the white matter and pial
surface at each cortex location (Fischl & Dale, 2000), were extracted for analysis.
Anatomically defined regions of interest (ROIs) based on an automated parcellation from
FreeSurfer (Desikan et al., 2006) will be used for analysis: the left and right rostral anterior
cingulate cortex (rACC; to index the mPFC) and left and right inferior parietal lobe (IPL;
to index the TPJ). Mean cortical thickness in each hemisphere will also be controlled for
in analyses.
Covariates. Several covariates were included due to their known association with
mental state language use and/or theory of mind development including child age, child
sex, and family SES. Child age at the time of the scan visit was used since cortical thickness
was the outcome variable of interest. Family SES was indicated by a standardized average
of parent income and education.
Missing Data. Of the total sample, 104 families completed the parent-child
interactions tasks, and data was missing on one family who completed the task in a nonEnglish language that was not able to be translated for data analysis. Of the remaining 103
families, 13 did not complete MRI scans, 12 had unusable data on MRI scans, and 4 were
excluded because of psychiatric diagnoses disclosed at the study visit. This resulted in a
final total sample of 74 families.
Data analysis plan. Eight regression models were constructed to test for effects of
observed mental state language use on cortical thickness in the left and right rostral anterior
cingulate and inferior parietal lobe (to index the mPFC and TPJ, respectively). Controls
include child age at scan, child sex, family SES, and mean cortical thickness in each
hemisphere. A version of these planned analyses were preregistered with Open Science
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Framework (OSF, https://osf.io/6q2mg/). The only difference between the stated planned
analyses posted of OSF and those presented here are that here, a control for child IQ and
general knowledge indicated by scores on the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of
Intelligence Information subtest (WPPSI; Wechsler, 1990) is not included, because data
were not available at the time of this analysis. The WPPSI information subtest was initially
intended to serve as a proxy for child language skills or verbal IQ, which are associated
with child theory of mind development (Adrian et al., 2005; Milligan et al., 2007).
However, the WPPSI information subtest assesses general knowledge or IQ, and is not
likely to indicate language skills and be an effective control for this purpose.
Results
Planned analyses
We first report the descriptive statistics for study variables (Table 3) as well as
bivariate correlations to understand patterns of variance and covariance between the study
variables and covariates (Table 4). Neither parent nor child total mental state language use
was associated with measures of regional or total cortical thickness.
For covariates, parental mental state language use was negatively correlated with
child age (r = -.298, p = .01), a positively correlated with family SES (r = .299, p = .01).
Additionally, family SES was correlated with several measures of cortical thickness,
including the total cortical thickness in both the left (r = .340, p = .003) and right (r = .359,
p = .002) hemispheres and the right inferior parietal lobe (r = .265, p = .023).
As mentioned above, eight regression models were constructed to test for effects of
observed parent and child mental state language use on cortical thickness in the left and
right rostral anterior cingulate cortex and inferior parietal lobe (to index the mPFC and
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TPJ, respectively). Controls include child age at scan, child sex, family SES, and mean
cortical thickness in each hemisphere. Each is presented in turn below.
Parent Mental State Language and Cortical Thickness
Left Rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex. To test the hypothesized main effect of
parent mental state language use on cortical thickness in the left rostral anterior cingulate
cortex, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided meancentered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years,
child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the left
hemisphere, and parental mental state language use (z).
The equation explained only 7% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5,
73) = 1.02, p = .413 (Table 5). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = -.07, p = .604) on cortical thickness values.
Left Inferior Parietal Lobe. To test the hypothesized main effect of parent mental
state language use on cortical thickness in the left inferior parietal lobe, we estimated a
general linear model (standardized variables provided mean-centered predictors) to explain
variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1),
family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the left hemisphere, and parental mental state
language use (z).
The equation explained 48.4% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5, 73)
= 12.78, p < .001 (Table 5). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = -.03, p = .775) on cortical thickness values.
Right Rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex. To test the hypothesized main effect
of parent mental state language use on cortical thickness in the right rostral anterior
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cingulate cortex, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided
mean-centered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in
years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the right
hemisphere, and parental mental state language use (z).
The equation explained only 6.1% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5,
73) = 0.882, p = .498 (Table 5). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = .06, p = .650) on cortical thickness values.
Right Inferior Parietal Lobe. To test the hypothesized main effect of parent
mental state language use on cortical thickness in the right inferior parietal lobe, we
estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided mean-centered
predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years, child sex
(Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the right hemisphere,
and parental mental state language use (z).
The equation explained 56.4% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5, 73)
= 17.584, p < .001 (Table 5). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = -.09, p = .340) on cortical thickness values.
Child Mental State Language and Cortical Thickness
Left Rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex. To test the hypothesized main effect of
child mental state language use on cortical thickness in the left rostral anterior cingulate
cortex, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided meancentered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years,
child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the left
hemisphere, and child mental state language use (z).
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The equation explained only 10.4% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5,
73) = 1.584, p = .176 (Table 6). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = .21, p = .093) on cortical thickness values.
Left Inferior Parietal Lobe. To test the hypothesized main effect of child mental
state language use on cortical thickness in the left inferior parietal lobe, we estimated a
general linear model (standardized variables provided mean-centered predictors) to explain
variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1),
family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the left hemisphere, and child mental state
language use (z).
The equation explained 50.5% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5, 73)
= 13.899, p < .001 (Table 6). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = -.16, p = .089) on cortical thickness values.
Right Rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex. To test the hypothesized main effect
of child mental state language use on cortical thickness in the right rostral anterior cingulate
cortex, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided meancentered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years,
child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the right
hemisphere, and child mental state language use (z).
The equation explained only 8.1% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5,
73) = 1.193, p = .322 (Table 6). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = .16, p = .200) on cortical thickness values.
Right Inferior Parietal Lobe. To test the hypothesized main effect of child mental
state language use on cortical thickness in the right inferior parietal lobe, we estimated a
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general linear model (standardized variables provided mean-centered predictors) to explain
variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1),
family SES (z), mean cortical thickness in the right hemisphere, and child mental state
language use (z).
The equation explained 55.9% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(5, 73)
= 17.255, p < .001 (Table 5). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = .04, p = .659) on cortical thickness values.
Exploratory analyses
After conducting the planned analyses, we sought to explore a few additional
hypotheses that were not outlined earlier in the paper. We describe each in turn below.
Mean Hemisphere Cortical Thickness.
While we did not observe any significant associations between mental state
language use or exposure on cortical thickness of specific regions, we sought to examine
this in relation to mean cortical thickness for each hemisphere, as indicated in some
previous work (Mackey et al., 2015).
Left Cortical Thickness and Parent Mental State Language Use. To test the
hypothesized main effect of parent mental state language use on cortical thickness in the
left hemisphere, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided
mean-centered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in
years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), and parent mental state language
use (z).
The equation explained 21.8% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(4, 73)
= 4.819, p = .002 (Table 7). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
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mental state language use (β = -.18, p = .126) on cortical thickness values. There was an
observed main effect of child age (β = -.29, p = .011), such that older children had lower
cortical thickness values in the left hemisphere. There was also an observed main effect of
SES (β = .41, p < .001), such that children from families who reported higher SES had
higher cortical thickness values in the left hemisphere.
Right Cortical Thickness and Parent Mental State Language Use. To test the
hypothesized main effect of parent mental state language use on cortical thickness in the
right hemisphere, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided
mean-centered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in
years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), and parent mental state language
use (z).
The equation explained 19.3% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(4, 73)
= 4.113, p = .005 (Table 7). There were no observed significant main effects of parent
mental state language use (β = -.12, p = .315) on cortical thickness values. There was an
observed main effect of child age (β = -.22, p = .056), such that older children had lower
cortical thickness values in the right hemisphere. There was also an observed main effect
of SES (β = .22, p < .001), such that children from families who reported higher SES had
higher cortical thickness values in the right hemisphere.
Left Cortical Thickness and Child Mental State Language Use. To test the
hypothesized main effect of child mental state language use on cortical thickness in the left
hemisphere, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided meancentered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in years,
child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), and child mental state language use (z).
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The equation explained 21.6% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(4, 73)
= 4.752, p = .002 (Table 7). There were no observed significant main effects of child mental
state language use (β = -.16, p = .144) on cortical thickness values. There was an observed
main effect of child age (β = -.24, p = .028), such that older children had lower cortical
thickness values in the left hemisphere. There was also an observed main effect of SES (β
= .38, p = .001), such that children from families who reported higher SES had higher
cortical thickness values in the left hemisphere.
Right Cortical Thickness and Child Mental State Language Use. To test the
hypothesized main effect of child mental state language use on cortical thickness in the
right hemisphere, we estimated a general linear model (standardized variables provided
mean-centered predictors) to explain variance in cortical thickness values: child age in
years, child sex (Female = 0, Male = 1), family SES (z), and child mental state language
use (z).
The equation explained 20.2% of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(4, 73)
= 4.366, p = .003 (Table 7). There were no observed significant main effects of child mental
state language use (β = -.15, p = .178) on cortical thickness values. There was an observed
main effect of SES (β = .40, p < .001), such that children from families who reported higher
SES had higher cortical thickness values in the right hemisphere.
Parent Mental State Language Interactions with SES.
Since family SES was found to be associated with cortical thickness in the left and
right hemispheres, and parent mental state language use was positively correlated with
family SES, we sought to examine if there might be any interactive effects of family SES
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and parent mental state language in statistically predicting cortical thickness values in the
left and right hemispheres.
Left Cortical Thickness and Family SES. To test the hypothesized main effect of
parent mental state language use on cortical thickness in the left hemisphere, and
moderating effect of family SES on the association between parent mental state language
use and cortical thickness in the left hemisphere, we estimated a hierarchical regression
equation (standardized variables provided mean-centered predictors) in two steps to
explain variance in cortical thickness values; child age in years, child sex (Female = 0,
Male = 1), family SES (z), and child mental state language use (z), and Step Two: parent
mental state language use X family SES (z).
The first step of the equation explained 21.8% of the variance in cortical thickness
values, F(4, 73) = 4.819, p = .002 (Table 8). There were no observed significant main
effects of parent mental state language use (β = -.18, p = .126) on cortical thickness values.
There was an observed main effect of SES (β = .41, p < .001), such that children from
families who reported higher SES had higher cortical thickness values in the left
hemisphere. There was also no significant interaction between family SES and parent
mental state language use (β = -.01, p = .972) in predicting cortical thickness values in the
left hemisphere, controlling for other variables. The final full equation explained 21.8% of
the variance in cortical thickness values, F(4, 73) = 3.799, p = .004, and this second step
accounted for no change in the variance in predicting cortical thickness values (Table 8).
Right Cortical Thickness and Family SES. To test the hypothesized main effect
of parent mental state language use on cortical thickness in the right hemisphere, and
moderating effect of family SES on the association between parent mental state language
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use and cortical thickness in the right hemisphere, we estimated a hierarchical regression
equation (standardized variables provided mean-centered predictors) in two steps to
explain variance in cortical thickness values; child age in years, child sex (Female = 0,
Male = 1), family SES (z), and child mental state language use (z), and Step Two: parent
mental state language use X family SES (z).
The first step of the equation explained 19.3% of the variance in cortical thickness
values, F(4, 73) = 4.113, p = .005 (Table 8). There were no observed significant main
effects of parent mental state language use (β = -.12, p = .315) on cortical thickness values.
There was an observed main effect of SES (β = .42, p < .001), such that children from
families who reported higher SES had higher cortical thickness values in the right
hemisphere. There was also no significant interaction between family SES and parent
mental state language use (β = .02, p = .881) in predicting cortical thickness values in the
right hemisphere, controlling for other variables. The final full equation explained 19.3%
of the variance in cortical thickness values, F(4, 73) = 3.248, p = .011, and this second step
accounted for no change in the variance in predicting cortical thickness values (Table 8).
Discussion
The current study aimed to examine associations between parent and child mental
state language use and cortical thickness in the left and right mPFC and TPJ, two brain
regions associated with theory of mind use in a sample of parent-child dyads. We sought
to explore the hypothesis that greater mental state language exposure and use would be
associated with greater cortical thickness using a variety of observational, parent-report,
and neuroimaging measures. Mental state language use by parents has been shown to be a
moderately significant predictor of explicit theory of mind development in children, when

169

measured behaviorally (Devine & Hughes, 2018). It has further been hypothesized that
explicit theory of mind “comes online” as a result of underlying neural structures involved
in theory of mind use developing (Grosse Wiessman et al., 2017). No work has examined
how environmental input, such as mental state language, might be influencing the
development of these neural structures that support social cognitive abilities. We sought
first to examine mental state language use in relation to cortical thickness, a structural
neural measure of brain development that is more independent of ability than some
functional neuroimaging measures. Finally, we conducted exploratory analyses to examine
differences in cortical thickness across whole hemispheres, as opposed to specific regions,
and to examine how parent mental state language might interact with family SES to
statistically predict differences in cortical thickness.
We did not find that either parent or child mental state language was associated
with cortical thickness in the left or right mPFC (indexed by the rACC) or TPJ (indexed
by the IPL). We further did not find any associations between parent or child mental state
language and mean levels of cortical thickness in the left or right hemispheres. However,
we did find a main effect of the control variable of SES in predicting cortical thickness in
the left and right hemispheres. This is not surprising, as a large body of work has found
differences in cortical thickness attributed to SES across many age groups (Brito et al.,
2017; Leonard et al., 2019; Mackey et al., 2015; Piccolo et al., 2016). This finding does
support the theory that environmental factors like SES impact neural development.
In subsequent analyses, because of past work demonstrating the influence of SES
on differences in cortical thickness (Mackey et al., 2015, we sought to explore if there
might be interactive effects between parent mental state language use and SES in
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statistically predicting variation in cortical thickness. However, we did not find any
significant interactive effects here either.
One of the largest limitations of the current study that impacts our ability to
interpret findings is the lack of either a behavioral or neural measure of theory of mind. An
outcome measure of theory of mind use would have allowed us to examine if mental state
language was even associated with theory of mind in the current sample, one that has
children who are slightly older than the children in previous samples examining parent
mental state language (e.g., Farkas et al., 2018; LaBounty et al., 2008; Ruffman et al.,
2002). While we did not observe any significant associations between mental state
language and cortical thickness in the current study, future work must include either a
behavioral or neural measure assessing theory of mind to truly test associations between
environmental input and brain structure and function related to social cognitive abilities.
Another limitation brought up in Chapter 4 is relevant here as well. There is great
variety in mental state language coding schemes in the existent literature (e.g. Ruffman et
al., 2002; Ensor & Hughes, 2008). While we only examined total mental state language use
in the current study, the categories, and terms included within categories, of mental state
language varies widely between coding schemes. Some research on mental state language
further considers additional components of conversation, including causal explanatory
language (Farkas et al., 2018; LaBounty et al., 2008) that were not included in the coding
scheme for the current study. Future research should consider specifying what the field
intends to measure as mental state language for more comprehensive cross-study
comparison. A more thorough discussion of this topic can be found in Chapter 6.
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Finally, the age range of children included in this study was quite large, between 3
and 11-years of age. While we controlled for age, there are additional contextual factors
that might vary due to age that were not considered in data analysis. Because of the age
range, the amount of time that children spend in non-home environments is likely important
to consider as well, as mental state language use by teachers has also been found to
influence child theory of mind in middle childhood (Lecce et al., 2021). Children in this
study were likely spending different amounts of time in their home context or school
context that wasn’t captured in the data. Future research should consider using multiple
different types of interactions to get a full picture of the daily mental state language
exposure for the child.
Despite these limitations and sparse significant findings, the current study furthers
our understanding of how environmental factors might impact neural development. While
mental state language was not found to influence cortical thickness specifically, we did
observe differences in cortical thickness associated with the environmental factor of SES
in subsequent analyses. Further, parent mental state language was also found to be
associated with SES. Results are consistent with the idea that environmental factors
influence neural development, though much more work is needed in this area. We hope
that these findings provide additional directions for future research to help us better
understand how contextual factors influence neural development.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Sample Demographic Information
Median Household Income
$2,500
$8,500
$14,000
$20,500
$30,000
$42,500
$62,500
$87,500
$125,000
$175,000
$200,000
Do not know/No response
Child Race
American Indian
Asian
Black/African American
Native Hawaiian
White
Another race not listed
No response
Child Ethnicity
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
No response
Highest Education – Parent 1
Some High School
High School/GED
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
M.D., Ph.D., J.D. or Equivalent
No response
Highest Education – Parent 2
Some High School
High School/GED
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
M.D., Ph.D., J.D. or Equivalent
No response
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4.7%
11.3%
3.3%
7.5%
9.0%
12.3%
12.3%
6.6%
6.6%
5.7%
9.9%
10.8%
0.9%
8.0%
62.3%
0.9%
34.0%
6.6%
2.8%
9.9%
87.3%
2.8%
2.4%
35.8%
17.5%
17.9%
17.0%
7.5%
1.9%
3.3%
38.2%
9.0%
13.7%
10.8%
5.7%
19.3%

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Mental State Language Use
M
SD
Total Parent Mental State Terms (z)
0.00
1.00
Total Parent Mental State Terms
12.49
8.78
Cognitive Terms
6.09
5.29
Emotion Terms
1.50
2.05
Desire Terms
1.78
2.17
Modulation of Assertion Terms
2.14
2.27
Other Mental State Terms
0.99
1.31
Total Child Mental State Terms (z)
0.00
1.00
Total Child Mental State Terms
4.50
3.88
Cognitive Terms
1.66
1.89
Emotion Terms
0.74
1.14
Desire Terms
1.13
1.49
Modulation of Assertion Terms
0.58
1.26
Other Mental State Terms
0.40
0.83
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Min
-1.42
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1.16
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
2.91
38
19
10
14
9
6
3.73
19
9
5
7
7
4

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Used in Analysis
M
SD
Min
Max
Child Age at Scan (years)
6.56
1.48
4.06
9.98
Family SES
-0.05
0.88
-0.99
2.08
Total Parent MSL
12.36
8.66
0
34
Total Child MSL
4.49
3.72
0
15
CT: l_rACC
2.84
0.11
2.50
3.04
CT: l_IPL
3.05
0.24
2.43
3.64
CT: l_totalCT
2.81
0.78
2.58
2.99
CT: r_rACC
2.82
0.12
2.37
3.04
CT: r_IPL
3.06
0.27
2.51
3.93
CT: r_totalCT
2.81
0.09
2.59
2.99
SES = socioeconomic status, MSL = mental state language, CT = Cortical Thickness,
l_rACC = left rostral anterior cingulate cortex, l_IPL = left inferior parietal lobe,
l_totalCT = left hemisphere total cortical thickness, r_rACC = right rostral anterior
cingulate cortex, r_IPL = right inferior parietal lobe, r_totalCT = right hemisphere total
cortical thickness.
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Table 4: Correlations Between Variables Used in Analysis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Child Age
1
2. Child Sex
.028
1
3. SES
-.059
.248* 1
4. Parent MSL -.298** .006 .299** 1
5. Child MSL -.003
.223 .204
.101 1
6. l_IPL
-.191
.066 .122
-.046 -.219 1
7. l_rACC
-.143
.055 .158
.004 .195 -.076
1
8. l_totalCT
-.265* -.047 .340** .028 -.107 .673** .220
1
9. r_IPL
-.195
.048 .265* -.013 -.021 .576** .029
.688** 1
10. r_rACC
-.085
-.060 .136
.099 .129 .058
.531** .250* .254* 1
11. r_totalCT -.212
-.037 .359** .069 -.091 .622** .156
.950** .752** .217 1
Notes:
** indicates significance at the .001 level and * at the.05 level.
SES = socioeconomic status, MSL = mental state language, l_rACC = left rostral anterior cingulate cortex, l_IPL = left inferior
parietal lobe, l_totalCT = left hemisphere total cortical thickness, r_rACC = right rostral anterior cingulate cortex, r_IPL = right
inferior parietal lobe, r_totalCT = right hemisphere total cortical thickness.
For child sex, male is coded as 0 and female as 1.
For age, child age is in years.
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Table 5: Multiple Regression Analyses for Parent MSL and Left and Right rACC and IPL
B
S.E.
β
t
p
Parent MSL and Left rACC
F(5,73) = 1.020, p = .413; R2 = .070
Child age
-.019
.021
-.117 -0.907 .368
Child sex
.018
.059
.039
0.315 .754
Mean Left CT
.481
.410
.155
1.175 .244
Family SES (z)
.038
.038
.109
0.788 .433
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.016
.032
-.068 -0.520 .604
Parent MSL and Left IPL
F(5,73) = 12.778, p < .001; R2 = .484
Child age
-.001
.007
-.020 -0.208 .836
Child sex
.030
.020
.139
1.522 .103
Mean Left CT
1.011
.137
.726
7.376 .000
Family SES (z)
-.019
.013
-.152 -1.479 .144
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.003
.011
-.028 -0.288 .775
Parent MSL and Right rACC
F(5,73) = 0.882, p = .498; R2 = .061
Child age
-.004
.023
-.023 -0.183 .855
Child sex
-.038
.065
-.071 -0.576 .567
Mean Right CT
.556
.402
.181
1.384 .171
Family SES (z)
.021
.042
.069
0.499 .619
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
.016
.035
.059
0.455 .650
Parent MSL and Right IPL
F(5,73) = 17.584, p < .001; R2 = .564
Child age
-.005
.007
-.066 -0.739 .444
Child sex
.018
.020
.076
0.907 .368
Mean Right CT
1.029
.125
.735
8.248 .000
Family SES (z)
.000
.013
.004
0.037 .971
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.010
.111
-.085 -0.962 .340
Note:
For child age, age is in years.
For child sex, female is coded as 0 and male as 1.
Cortical Thickness is abbreviated as CT.
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Table 6: Multiple Regression Analyses for Child MSL and Left and Right rACC and IPL
B
S.E.
β
t
p
Child MSL and Left rACC
F(5,73) = 1.584, p = .176; R2 = .104
Child age
-.014
.019
-.085 -0.716 .476
Child sex
.005
.058
.011
0.094 .925
Mean Left CT
.640
.401
.207
1.595 .115
Family SES (z)
.010
.036
.038
0.289 .773
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
.050
.029
.206
1.704 .093
Child MSL and Left IPL
F(5,73) = 13.899, p < .001; R2 = .505
Child age
-.001
.006
-.018 -0.200 .842
Child sex
.036
.019
.166
1.841 .070
Mean Left CT
.978
.134
.703
7.294 .000
Family SES (z)
-.016
.012
-.127 -1.317 .192
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
-.017
.010
-.155 -1.725 .089
Child MSL and Right rACC
F(5,73) = 1.193, p = .322; R2 = .081
Child age
-.007
.022
-.036 -0.303 .763
Child sex
-.054
.065
-.101 -0.821 .414
Mean Right CT
.617
.400
.201
1.545 .127
Family SES (z)
.017
.040
.054
0.408 .684
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
.042
.033
.158
1.294 .200
Child MSL and Right IPL
F(5,73) = 17.255, p < .001; R2 = .559
Child age
-.003
.007
-.039 -0.479 .634
Child sex
.019
.021
.076
0.898 .372
Mean Right CT
1.053
.126
.752
8.343 .000
Family SES (z)
-.005
.013
-.034 -0.372 .711
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
.005
.110
.038
0.443 .659
Note:
For child age, age is in years.
For child sex, female is coded as 0 and male as 1.
Cortical Thickness is abbreviated as CT.
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Table 7. Multiple Regression Analyses for Parent and Child MSL and Left and Right
Mean CT
B
S.E.
β
t
Parent MSL and Left Mean CT
F(4,73) = 4.819, p = .002; R2 = .173
Child age
-.015
.006
-.291 -2.606
Child sex
-.022
.017
-.140 -1.272
Family SES (z)
.036
.010
.412
3.563
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
-.014
.009
-.181 -1.548
Parent MSL and Right Mean CT
F(4,73) = 4.113, p = .005; R2 = .146
Child age
-.013
.007
-.220 -1.941
Child sex
-.023
.019
-.133 -1.186
Family SES (z)
.041
.012
.415
3.537
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
-.011
.010
-.120 -1.012
Child MSL and Left Mean CT
F(4,73) = 4.752, p = .002; R2 = .171
Child age
-.013
.006
-.240 -2.247
Child sex
-.015
.017
-.099 -0.886
Family SES (z)
.034
.010
.383
3.434
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
-.013
.009
-.163 -1.477
Child MSL and Right Mean CT
F(4,73) = 4.366, p = .003; R2 = .156
Child age
-.011
.006
-.186 -1.729
Child sex
-.017
.020
-.098 -0.864
Family SES (z)
.040
.011
.403
3.581
Total Child Mental State Language (z)
-.013
.010
-.152 -1.362
Note:
For child age, age is in years.
For child sex, female is coded as 0 and male as 1.
Cortical Thickness is abbreviated as CT.
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p

.011
.208
.000
.126

.056
.240
.000
.315

.028
.379
.001
.144

.088
.390
.000
.178

Table 8. Multiple Regression Analyses Examining SES by Parent MSL Interaction
B
S.E.
β
t
Parent MSL and Left Mean CT
Step One
F(4,73) = 4.819, p = .002; R2 = .218
Child age
-.015
.006
-.291 -2.606
Child sex
-.022
.017
-.140 -1.272
Family SES (z)
.036
.010
.412
3.563
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.014
.009
-.181 -1.548
Step Two
F(5,73) = 3.799, p = .004; R2 = .218
F = -1.020; R2 = 0.00
Child age
-.015
.006
-.291 -2.585
Child sex
-.022
.017
-.140 -1.263
Family SES (z)
.036
.010
.412
3.494
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.014
.009
-.181 -1.535
Parent MSL X SES (z)
.000
.009
-.004 -0.035
Parent MSL and Right Mean CT
Step One
F(4,73) = 4.113, p = .005; R2 = .193
Child age
-.013
.007
-.220 -1.941
Child sex
-.023
.019
-.133 -1.186
Family SES (z)
.041
.012
.415
3.537
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.011
.010
-.120 -1.012
Step Two
F(5,73) = 3.248, p = .011; R2 = .193
F = -0.865; R2 = 0.00
Child age
-.013
.007
-.219 -1.918
Child sex
-.023
.020
-.132 -1.168
Family SES (z)
.041
.012
.412
3.438
Total Parent Mental State Language (z)
-.011
.010
-.121 -1.008
Parent MSL X SES (z)
.001
.010
.017
0.151
Note:
For child age, age is in years.
For child sex, female is coded as 0 and male as 1.
Cortical Thickness is abbreviated as CT.
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p

.011
.208
.000
.126

.012
.211
.000
.129
.972

.056
.240
.000
.315

.059
.247
.001
.317
.881

CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Humans learn to navigate a rich and complicated social world through developing
social cognition. Theory of mind is one early developing, foundational component of social
cognition that allows us to understand that others have their own internal mental states
(beliefs, thoughts, and desires that may differ from our own), and that these internal mental
states motivate outward behavior (Wellman et al., 1990). This important skill of theory of
mind develops rapidly early in life and is influenced by a number of environmental factors
(Devine & Hughes, 2018), though how these environmental factors interact to influence
the behavioral development of theory of mind, and neural development of brain structures
involved in theory of mind use, is not well understood. Below, I briefly review the results
of the studies included in this dissertation, provide a discussion of the influences of parent
behavior and the environment on theory of mind development, and describe limitations and
areas for future research.
Brief Review of Results
Chapter 2 investigates the association between maternal sensitivity, child theory of
mind, and household chaos in a sample of 250 3.5-year-old twins. We find evidence to
support the known positive association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of
mind, but we find that this association is moderated by household chaos. The positive
association between maternal sensitivity and child theory of mind is only observed in
households rated lower in household clutter and crowding. We discuss that this may
suggest that the beneficial interactions between parents and children might either happen
with more frequency in lower chaos homes, or that ongoing noise or crowding otherwise
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disrupt theses interactions to make them less meaningful for theory of mind development.
Limitations considered include the homogeneity of the sample, the raters of the measures,
and the single timepoint data.
In Chapter 3, we dig further into this idea but investigate the role that children may
play in these interactions. To do so, we investigate the associations between parent-child
dyadic mutuality, child theory of mind, and household chaos in a sample of 88 fatherpreschooler dyads. We find evidence that dyadic mutuality is correlated with child theory
of mind development suggesting that the bidirectional, mutually responsive relationship
between fathers and children is important for child theory of mind development. While this
association was no longer significant when controlling for several covariates, we also find
a significant interaction with household chaos in predicting child theory of mind. Similar
to Chapter 2, the positive association between dyadic mutuality and child theory of mind
only appears to be significant in lower chaos households, providing further evidence that
that chaos may be somehow disrupting the valuable interactions between parents and
children, though the mechanisms for how this might happen remain unclear. Limitations
discussed include sample size, measures, and father only sample.
In Chapter 4, we dig even further into these parent-child interactions to examine to
specific mental state language content used. We examine associations between mental state
language use, child theory of mind, and household chaos in the same sample of 88 fatherpreschooler dyads as in Chapter 3. We do not find any association between total mental
state language use by fathers and child theory of mind. Though, we do find that household
chaos is negatively correlated with both father and child mental state language use. We
suggest that this is consistent with the idea that household chaos negatively impacts the
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interactions between parents and children, perhaps resulting in lower mental state language
use. However, we do not observe any significant associations in predicting child theory of
mind development. Limitations include the coding scheme used, measurement issues, and
sample size.
Chapter 5 investigates the potential influence of mental state language use on
cortical thickness of brain regions involved in theory of mind reasoning. We examine
associations between parent and child mental state language use and cortical thickness of
the left and right rostral anterior cingulate cortex (to index the mPFC) and inferior parietal
lobe (to index the TPJ) in a final sample of 74 parent-child dyads. We do not find any
association between total mental state language use by parents or children and the cortical
thickness of any brain region of interest. Subsequent analyses show that, while the control
variable of family SES is positively associated with average cortical thickness in the left
and right hemispheres, there is no interaction between mental state language and family
SES in statistically predicting differences in average cortical thickness in either
hemisphere. The finding that family SES is associated with cortical thickness is consistent
with the idea that environmental influences impact brain development, but more research
is needed to explore specific associations with mental state language and social cognitive
outcomes. Limitations include coding scheme used, lack of a theory of mind outcome
measure, and other measurement issues.
Environmental Context: Household Chaos
Consistent with theory (Evans et al., 2005) and previous work demonstrating the
negative impacts of household chaos on academic and behavioral outcomes (e.g. Coley et
al., 2015; Deater-Deckard et al., 2009; Marsh et al., 2020, Vernon-Feagans et al., 2012;
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Vernon-Feagans et al., 2016), we find here that household chaos also serves to negatively
impact theory of mind use. In Chapters 2 and 3, we demonstrate that higher levels of
household chaos weakens the positive associations between aspects of parent behavior and
child theory of mind development, and in Chapter 4, we find that greater levels of
household chaos are associated with lower observed levels of parent and child mental state
language use during a dyadic interaction. There are several potential reasons for these
consistent findings presented here. It may be that either highly chaotic homes have fewer
opportunities to engage in parent-child interactions, or perhaps that these interactions occur
with a similar frequency as lower chaos homes, but are disrupted by ongoing noise,
crowding, or other factors. Longitudinal studies and intervention experiments with larger
samples will better allow for causal inferences to be made regarding the particular influence
of household chaos on social cognitive outcomes.
These findings also suggest that aiming to reduce levels of household chaos may
be one useful part of future parenting interventions. This has been proposed by many
studies in the past (i.e. Deater-Deckard et al., 2012; Emond et al., 2018; Fiese et al., 2013;
Fulkerson et al., 2019; Micalizzi et al., 2019). Though there is no current outcome evidence
of interventions aimed at specifically reducing overall household chaos, interventions
aimed more specifically at increasing the use of routines have been demonstrated to lead
to improved child outcomes (e.g. Fiese et al., 2013; Mindell & Williamson, 2018).
But for both of these points (understanding why chaos might be so detrimental and
if reducing it improves child and family outcomes), it will be critical for future research to
consider how we are measuring and conceptualizing household chaos. A great deal of the
existent research utilizes parent report questionnaires, based off of the original Chaos,
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Hubbub, and Order Scale (CHAOS: Matheny et al., 1995), that asks questions assessing
noise, routines, clutter, and more and sums these into a total or mean ‘chaos’ score. Some
research also utilizes researcher-observed measures of chaos (Vernon-Feagans et al., 2012;
Vernon-Feagans et al., 2016; Whitesell et al., 2015) or measures of environmental and
neighborhood chaos (Coley et al, 2015; St. John & Tarullo, 2020), though these measures
also tend to sum various aspects of chaos into one total score. The various components that
make up the construct of household chaos may have impacts that vary within and between
families, specific outcomes, and/or that change over time. For example, perhaps crowding
reflects opportunity for social interaction and therefore has a smaller negative or even a
potentially positive impact, while lack of routines, noise, and clutter may largely serve to
amplify risk processes. Or, perhaps a lack of routines is more detrimental when children
are younger and have less agency over their day, as opposed to when they are older and
able to have a greater say in developing the daily structures that might support them best.
These are all open questions, and qualitative data, like the Ecocultural Family Interview
(Weisner, 2010), can provide additional data that explores family-wide processes and gives
contextual information for the causes and impacts of household chaos. Further,
experimental manipulations of chaos can be used to break these elements apart further
(Andeweg et al. 2021; Bodrij et al., 2021) Better understanding how, when, and why
household chaos impacts theory of mind development will be critical for understanding
how social cognition develops in context.
Environmental Context: Parenting & Mental State Language
Previous work has found parental mental state language use to be fairly consistently
associated with child theory of mind development (Devine & Hughes, 2018). However, the
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work presented here does not find mental state language use, by parents or children, to be
associated with behavioral child theory of mind skill use or structural differences in the
brain regions associated with theory of mind. One potential reason for this that we have
begun to discuss is the wide variety in existing coding schemes that may account for some
of the variability in findings across studies. For example, the coding scheme used in this
dissertation work, based on the original by Ruffman and colleagues (Ruffman et al., 2002),
contains five separate categories assessing cognitive, emotion, desire, modulations of
assertion, and other mental state terms. Another coding scheme by Ensor and Hughes
(2008) contains three separate categories for cognitions, emotions, and desires. The terms
that make up these categories varies between coding schemes as well (i.e., ‘wonder’ is
counted as a cognitive term in the Ensor and Hughes coding scheme but is either a
modulation of assertion or other mental state term in the Ruffman and colleagues coding
scheme). While many studies end up summing these categories for a total value of mental
state talk, these differences between coding schemes in what counts as a mental state term
may matter. Further, there are several terms that could arguably reflect mental state
understanding that are typically not included in coding schemes, such as ‘hiding’,
‘planning’, or ‘pretending’. Greater agreement in coding schemes may serve to better be
able to compare findings across studies.
There are several additional components of conversation that are sometimes, but
not always examined in relation to theory of mind outcomes that may be relevant to
consider here. This may include causal explanation (Farkas et al., 2018; LaBounty et al.,
2008), referents of statements (Tompkins et al., 2018), and syntactic complexity (Rakhlin
et al., 2011). These are all elements of conversational speech that may serve to help provide

192

additional contextual information that helps children understand social interactions.
However, it is also possible the theory of mind is what allows for children to better
understand these elements of conversational speech (Ilgaz & Allen, 2021). The
directionality of these associations remains an open question, and one that may be
important to consider when examining linguistic input in relation to theory of mind
development.
Further, as children get older they spend an increasing amount of time with nonparental caregivers. There may therefore be more to consider for linguistic input beyond
parents, such as teacher use of mental state language (Lecce et al., 2021). Future work
should consider gathering interaction data on multiple parental and non-parental caregivers
to better capture the full amount on mental state language exposure that a child is receiving.
These data may also be better captured by in-home recording devices over several days, as
opposed to brief in-lab sessions.
There finally remains the open question of how much linguistic input matters for
theory of mind development. When coding videos for mental state language use, it becomes
clear that verbal language is not the only kind of communication that is effective for dyads
completing a task together. The role of gesture and joint attention was not considered in
the current work but may be an important factor to consider for future work on theory of
mind development. Recent work shows that gesture in particular can help distinguish
between two possible referents and assist in making communication clearer (Kim &
Schachner, 2020). Considering how non-verbal communication and input influences
theory of mind development will be critical for understanding how these abilities begin to
be shaped even in infancy.
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Neural Development
Work with adults, children, and infants has consistently demonstrated several brain
regions involved in theory of mind reasoning, including the TPJ and mPFC (e.g. Gweon et
al., 2012; Saxe et al., 2009; Schurz et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2019). But, very little work
exists examining how environmental input might be influencing the development of these
neural structures and functions. The work presented in this dissertation only slightly begins
to address this gap by examining how mental state language use might be related to cortical
thickness in two brain regions associated with theory of mind, the TPJ and mPFC. We did
not observe any significant associations between mental state language use by parents or
children in relation to cortical thickness in specific regions or overall.
However, from these results alone we cannot determine that mental state language
has no impact on neural development, structural or functional, and many open questions
remain. The lack of either a behavioral or neural theory of mind outcome measure in the
current work makes it hard to draw conclusions about the findings in relation to predicting
theory of mind development. Further, previous work has suggested that connectivity
between the TPJ and mPFC is associated with explicit theory of mind use (Grosse
Wiesmann et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2019). Neither structural nor functional connectivity
was able to be examined in the current study but will be very important to investigate in
future research. It is possible that the influence of mental state language and other
environmental inputs are better observed in differences in functional activity, as opposed
to in structural differences.
Future Directions
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One potential future direction based on the work presented here is to examine the
early development of connectivity between social brain regions, namely the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), and how this
development may be driven or influenced by environmental factors like mental state
language exposure and household chaos. As mentioned before, recent work has suggested
that it may be that the TPJ is recruited in social cognitive processes throughout
development, beginning in infancy, but that the co-recruitment of the mPFC during task
completion allows for the onset of explicit theory of mind reasoning during the preschool
time period (Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017). Previous work has also shown that explicit
theory of mind reasoning is associated with white matter maturation and connectivity
between the mPFC, TPJ, and other social brain regions via the arcuate fasciculus (AF)
(Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017). Given the role of the AF in language processing
(Friederici, 2009), it is possible that greater mental state language exposure throughout
infancy and childhood is developmentally related to earlier emergence of explicit theory of
mind reasoning. Further, given the findings of this dissertation, it may be that higher levels
of household chaos during this developmental time period may result in weaker
associations between mental state language exposure and theory of mind development,
including behavioral performance and connectivity between theory of mind brain regions.
Examining white matter maturation at rest as well as task-related activation patterns
longitudinally would allow us to answer key questions about how social cognitive abilities
are supported in the brain and how they are influenced by the family environment.
Final Conclusions
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Findings from the work presented here demonstrate further support for the
developmental enrichment view of theory of mind development (Sodian et al., 2020), that
theory of mind development is influenced by contextual factors. However, all of the data
presented here are correlational and cross-sectional. Replicating these and other findings
longitudinally, and with novel experimental and quasi-experimental study designs and
manipulations, will be critical for understanding developmental change in theory of mind
within these contexts.
One major goal of the work I have described here and plans for future work is to
learn more about how the brain is developing within context. The field of developmental
cognitive neuroscience is fairly new, and sometimes suffers from a lack of theoretical
motivation (Johnson & de Haan, 2015). But, it also has great promise, and developmental
neuroimaging studies can also help inform theories of social cognitive development. As
we seek to understand how the developing brain is influencing behavior, it will be critical
to understand the context that neural development is occurring within (Bronfenbrenner,
1979; Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006; Mizokawa &
Komiya, 2014)
Another major goal for this type of research is to inform public policy. As
evidenced in this dissertation however, there is still much work to be done in understanding
what environmental factors are most harmful to child social cognitive development, and
when and how to intervene. Advances in research and understanding of environmental
influences on development must also be accompanied by larger systemic changes to
support families (Emond, 2020). Science and policy advancements must work together to
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understand development in context and to work towards improving the lives of children
and families.
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APPENDIX A
MENTAL STATE LANGUAGE CODING SCHEME
IDDLab Mental State Language Coding Protocol
This coding protocol for mental-state language use was created for use with the Fathers
and Children Together Study (FACT), and was created following completion of the study.
It is for use during a free-play interaction task (Etch-a-Sketch and Marble Maze). It is
also being used for the UPenn CBPD Study during a picture book reading task. This
coding scheme is based on Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002.
Mental-State Language Coding
Cognitions: Code “think” and “know” and “believe” terms as cognitions.
Genuine mental state utterances include use of “think” as:
1) a mental activity (e.g., “They’re thinking hard”),
2) “think” used to refer to beliefs (e.g., “I think it’s a cat,” “Why do you think that?”,
“How do you think they did that?”),
3) “think” used to refer to desires (“I think it’s lovely,” “They think that’s good
fun”), and rarely used contrastives (e.g., “I thought it was a cat, but I was
wrong”).
Think terms that could primarily mean “Yes” or “No” (e.g., “I think so”), and terms used
for turn taking (“What do you think?”) are not coded as genuine uses.
“Know” terms coded as genuine mental utterances include:
1) those that referred to a lack of knowledge (e.g., “I don’t know what it is,” “I don’t
know how to do it,” “I don’t know whether it’s a dog”), and
2) those that questioned the source of knowledge (e.g., “How do you know that?”).
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“I don’t know” responses (i.e., responses that consist of only these three words and do not
elaborate on what was unknown) are not coded as mental state terms because of their
possible use to mean simply “I can’t answer”.
Emotions: These include “happy,” “sad,” “unhappy,” “feel” (e.g., feel bad), “cross,”
“angry,” “grumpy,” “scared,” “afraid,” “disappointed,” “worried,” “upset,” “surprised,”
“pleased,” “enjoy,” “excited,” “fun,” “interested,” “frustrated,” “missed,” “annoyed,”
“hurtful,” “bored,” and “fed up.”
Also, code “love” as an emotion term (and not a desire term) when used to refer to a
person (e.g. I love you, Dad).
Desires: These include “want”, “like,” “love,” “dream,” “hope,” “wish,” “prefer,” and
“keen on.” “Like” when used as a placeholder (similar to “Umm”) or simile/comparision
term (e.g. “this house looks like that house) is not coded as a mental state term.
Modulations of Assertion: Modulations of assertion include, “might,” “maybe,”
“perhaps,” “possibly,” “probably,” “could be,” “must,” “certainly,” “definitely,” “sure,”
“guess,” “figure,” “reckon,” “certain,” “suppose,” “wonder,” “expect,” “curious,”
“usually,” and “bet.”
Other Mental State Terms: The category “other mental state terms” describe some sort
of mental activity and included “remember,” “understand,” “forget,” “remind,” “realize,”
“idea,” “consider,” “have in mind,” “daydream,” “dream” (when asleep), “mean,”
“imagine” “wonder,” and “expect.”
-Note that “wonder” and “expect” could also be coded as modulations of assertion, and
context was always used to assign the correct category. For instance, “I expect so” in
response to a question about an object’s identity might be treated as a modulation of
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assertion, whereas “He expects her to cry” might be coded as a mental state term rather
than an expression of uncertainty.
Additional considerations
Do not code:
1) Simple descriptions of an event (e.g., “She’s riding a bicycle”).
2) Physical state terms that may include “cry,” “smile,” “laugh,” “giggle,” “hurt,”
“in pain,” “ill,” “sleepy,” “tired,” “hungry,” and “thirsty.”
3) Causal utterances when parents or children talk or ask questions about causes
(e.g., “Why is he pointing?”, “They have no clothes because they’re in the
water”).
4) Thematic elaborations that occur when parents or children expanded on the
visible content of a picture, for instance, saying “I wonder what fish he’ll catch,”
when there was no fish visible.
5) Links to the children’s lives that occur when parents connected the pictorial
information to their children’s life (e.g., “We did that when we went to the
beach”).
6) Factual utterances that involve some attempt to teach children (e.g., “A
stethoscope is for listening to the heart”).
7) Orienting responses by parents to focus children’s attention on a picture (e.g.,
“Look, what’s that?”).
8) Utterances in which the mothers or children repeat themselves, with nothing in
between.
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9) Utterances in which mothers repeat their children’s utterance (or vice versa) with
no change in content
Quick Glance Appendix
Category
Cognitions

Examples
Think; know; believe

Notes
-I think so and what do
you think are not coded as
cognitions
-”I don’t know” with no
further elaboration is not
coded as cognition
-Include past tense, like
thought, knew
Emotions
Happy; sad; unhappy; feel; -exclude things that seem
angry; almost any term for like emotions but are
emotions; proud
more physical (I.e.
sleepy)
Desires
Want; like; love; dream;
-When like is used as a
hope; wish; prefer
conversational
placeholder or
comparison, it should not
be coded as desire or any
mental state term
-include past tense, such
as wanted
Modulations of Assertion Might; maybe; perhaps;
-supposed to is not the
possibly; probably; could
same as suppose
be; must; certainly;
-Don’t count sure when it
definitely; sure; guess;
is used to mean “Yes”
figure; reckon; certain;
suppose; wonder; expect;
curious; bet
Other Mental State
Terms

Remember; understand;
forget; remind; realize;
idea; consider; have in
mind; daydream; dream
(when asleep); mean;
imagine; wonder; expect;
concentrate; distract;
learn; pretend; recognize;
interest; trust;
plan/planning; decide
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-wonder and expect could
also be modulations, so
use context to determine
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